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Written evidence from Dr. Johanna Jonsdottir, Policy Officer,  
European Free Trade Association Secretariat 
 
Author background  
 
I am currently a policy officer at the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Secretariat in Brussels, which is responsible for the management of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. 
 
In 2010 I was awarded a PhD in European Studies from the University of Cambridge. 
My dissertation focused on Iceland’s relations with the EU through the EEA 
Agreement.  
 
My PhD dissertation was awarded the Sir Walter Bagehot Prize by the Political 
Studies Association for best dissertation in the field of government and public 
administration.  
 





I understand the Committee is starting from the assumption that the UK should and 
will remain a member of the EU. Nonetheless, as the Committee has expressed a 
particular interest in submissions from non-member states and in light of increasingly 
frequent suggestions that the UK should withdraw from the EU, I will reflect on the 
suitability of an EEA type solution for the UK. This is related mainly to the first two 
questions posed by the Committee: 
 
- To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome 
be seen as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union? 
- Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership 
should the UK seek for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or 
more)-tier EU and start to develop ideas for multiple forms of EU 
membership?  
 
Please note that my submission does not in any way represent the official views of 
EFTA or its member states, but is based on my research and personal observations, 
which I hope may be of use to the Committee in its inquiry.  
 
Summary of key points 
• The EEA Agreement allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate 
in the EU’s internal market while excluding potentially less attractive areas 
such as the common fisheries policy. 
• The EFTA states adopt all EU legislation in relevant areas without 
participating in the EU’s decision-making institutions.  
• Although the EEA contains various clauses to formally protect the EFTA 
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states against loss of sovereignty, there are indications that it functions as a 
supranational agreement in practice.  
• It is unlikely that the UK would find the EEA model in its current form to be a 
suitable alternative to EU membership.  
• The EEA could perhaps provide some lessons for the potential development of 
a “multi-tier Europe”.  
 
Introduction 
1. The members of EFTA have a long history of EU rule adoption and close 
institutional contact with the EU. The current members of EFTA are Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. With the exception of Switzerland, the 
EFTA states are parties to the EEA Agreement and thus participants in the EU’s 
internal market. Indeed, it could be argued that the EEA Agreement entails a 
form of ‘quasi-membership’ of the EU. Having been in force since 1994, the 
EEA Agreement has proved considerably more resilient than was expected at the 
time of its inception. Furthermore, it appears to have functioned relatively well 
over the years and in many respects it has benefited its signatory states. Although 
it is not without its challenges, it is an institutional framework which deserves 
attention, particularly in light of increasingly louder calls for a multi-tier Europe.  
 
2. In recent years, proposals have been made to expand EEA membership, for 
example to Western European micro-states such as Andorra, San Marino and 
Monaco and Eastern giants like the Ukraine. In particular, following the UK’s 
decision in December 2011 to veto the new “fiscal compact” Treaty, suggestions 
have also been made as to whether the UK might better belong in the EFTA 
family rather than the EU. In order to evaluate the viability of this course of 
action, it is necessary to examine how the EEA Agreement works in practice, 
including its main challenges. In this submission I will explain the content and 
functioning of the EEA Agreement, before moving on to the recommendations 
section where I evaluate whether it potentially provides a realistic or suitable 
alternative to EU membership for the UK or whether it provides any lessons for 
the development of a multi-tier Europe. 
 
What is the EEA Agreement and how does it work? 
 
3. The history of the EEA Agreement goes hand in hand with the EU’s plans to 
develop an internal market, which gained momentum in the 1980s. At the time, 
Western Europe was split into two blocks: the EEC and EFTA. The UK was the 
original driving force behind the establishment of EFTA as a non-supranational 
counterbalance to the European Economic Community (EEC), as it was called at 
the time. However, by the time the EEA was being negotiated, the UK had long 
since left EFTA for the EEC. Nonetheless, EFTA’s membership still included 
some of the Community’s most important trading partiers, i.e. Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.1 The aim of the EEA 
 to participate in the internal market.  
 
1 Liechtenstein became a full member of EFTA in 1991 having previously been linked to EFTA 




4. The EEA Agreement was signed in May 1992 and came into effect on 1 January 
1994. However, Switzerland rejected membership of the EEA in a referendum on 
6 December 1992. On the other hand, Austria, Finland and Sweden decided to 
join the EU, becoming full members in 1995, thereby leading to speculation that 
the EEA Agreement’s primary role would be to ease the EFTA states’ transition 
to EU membership. Currently, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein are thus the 
three remaining EFTA parties to the Agreement and there is potential for further 
dwindling on the EFTA side as Iceland has applied for EU membership. 
 
5. In return for access to the internal market, the EEA Agreement requires a high 
degree of integration of EU acquis into the national legal systems of the 
participating states. The EFTA states must adopt nearly all provisions relevant to 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. In addition, the 
Agreement provides for the adoption of EU legislation in a variety of horizontal 
areas such as labour law, consumer protection, environmental policy, statistics 
and company law. As the EU’s legal framework is in a state of continuous 
development, this includes not only legislation that was in place at the time the 
EEA Agreement came into effect but also all new legal acts that are passed in the 
relevant areas, which constitutes a large bulk of EU legislation. A number of 
substantial areas do fall outside the scope of the EEA Agreement (although the 
EFTA states participate to a certain extent in some of these policy areas through 
other agreements) including: 
 
(1) Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies,  
(2) Economic and Monetary Union,  
(3) Customs Union,  
(4) Common Trade Policy,  
(5) Taxation,  
(6) Common Foreign and Security Policy and  
(7) Freedom, Security and Justice. 
 
6. The exact proportion of the EU legal framework which is covered by the EEA 
Agreement is difficult to measure. In 2010, the Norwegian Government 
commissioned a comprehensive review of Norway’s agreements with the EU, the 
EEA Agreement being by far the most extensive. The results of this review, 
totalling 900 pages, were published in January 2012.2 The report estimates that 
through its agreements with the EU, Norway has incorporated approximately 
three-quarters of all EU legislative acts into Norwegian legislation. Iceland’s 
membership talks with the EU are also sometimes cited as an indicator of the 
scope of the EEA Agreement. The Commission stated that, prior to commencing 
negotiations, Iceland had already fully implemented 10 and partially 
implemented a further 11 chapters out of a total of 33 policy chapters through the 
EEA Agreement. Figures from the EFTA Secretariat show that at the end of 2010 
approximately 8,300 legal acts had been incorporated into the EEA Agreement.  
 
 
2See link to the English translation of the introductory chapter of the 
review: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36798821/PDFS/NOU201220120002000EN_PDFS.pdf  
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7. Despite the exclusion of certain fields, it is clear that the EEA Agreement is quite 
extensive. It has enabled Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein to participate in the 
internal market while remaining outside of some potentially less attractive areas. 
However, there is a price to pay for ‘à la carte’ relations with the EU, as the EEA 
Agreement grants the EFTA states very limited access to EU decision-making 
institutions, while requiring them to adopt all EU legislation in the relevant areas. 
The EEA Agreement does allow some access to the Commission´s expert groups 
and comitology committees (Articles 99 and 100 of the Agreement) but no 
formal access to either the Parliament or the Council. As the EFTA states adopt 
the majority of EU legislation, they have a clear incentive to make their voices 
heard and research suggests that they are increasingly making use of more 
informal lobbying tactics to do so. These may in some cases yield results, though 
this is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the EFTA states do 
not have a seat at the table and their impact is undoubtedly limited. This inherent 
‘democratic deficit’ is indeed one of the main criticisms of the EEA.  
 
8. Unlike the EU member states, the EFTA states have not formally ceded 
sovereignty to supranational institutions. In order to counter their lack of access 
to EU decision-making institutions, the EEA Agreement contains various clauses 
to formally protect them against loss of sovereignty. In the first place, EU acts do 
not automatically become part of the EFTA states’ legal orders. Rather, an 
agreement has to be reached between the European External Action Service and 
the EFTA states in the EEA Joint Committee3 as to their incorporation into the 
EEA Agreement. All decisions of the Joint Committee are taken by unanimity 
and, if approved, the acts are listed in the relevant Annexes to the EEA 
Agreement. 
 
9. If the EFTA states find a piece of EEA relevant legislation unacceptable they 
have the right to refuse its incorporation into the Agreement. This was considered 
extremely important when the EEA Agreement was being negotiated. However, 
it could be argued that in practice it is a mere formality. In fact, it can be said that 
the EFTA states do not have any ‘real veto power’ as they do not have the right to 
refuse without considerable consequences, i.e. the provisional suspension of the 
relevant part of the EEA Agreement according to Article 102 of the Agreement. 
As internal market issues are all interlinked, there is also fear that the entire EEA 
Agreement could be called into question if Article 102 were put into force. 
Therefore, due to their dependence on access to the internal market, this clause 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the EFTA states to say ‘no’. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, they have never yet refused the incorporation of an act into the EEA 
Agreement, although the Norwegian government has recently indicated that it 
intends to veto the incorporation of the third Postal Services Directive, which 
would mark a historic development in the EEA.  
 
10. In some cases, the EFTA states have been able to negotiate certain exemptions or 
orporating acts into the EEA Agreement. However, they 
 
3 The EEA Joint Committee provides the forum in which views are exchanged and decisions are taken 
to incorporate EU legislation into the EEA Agreement. The Joint Committee generally meets about 
eight times per year and is made up of ambassadors of the EEA EFTA states and representatives from 
the European External Action Service. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission (DG RELEX) was 
the EFTA states’ counterpart in the Joint Committee.  
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 must be able to demonstrate the necessity of such adaptations for example 
because domestic conditions are entirely different from those in the EU member 
states. Granting exemptions or adaptations is at the discretion of the EU and they 
are generally not given because something is ‘inconvenient’. 
 
11. Another feature of the EEA Agreement which is aimed at retaining the 
sovereignty of the EFTA states is that they have not formally transferred binding 
legislative powers to the EEA Joint Committee. In this way, although an act has 
been incorporated into the EEA Agreement, one or more EFTA state may have 
so-called constitutional requirements which means that their respective national 
parliaments must ratify the act before it can take effect. Thus, unlike in the EU, 
regulations are not directly applicable and directives do not have direct effect. 
However, the national parliaments of the EFTA states have never yet rejected an 
act which has been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. This is perhaps not 
surprising as refusing to transpose EEA relevant legislation at the national level 
would have the same effect as refusing to incorporate the act into the EEA 
Agreement, i.e. the suspension of the relevant part of the Agreement.  
 
12. Once acts have entered into force in the EFTA states, they are not subject to 
monitoring and surveillance by EU institutions but have their own Surveillance 
Authority and Court which monitor compliance with EEA law. EFTA 
infringement procedures are fairly similar to the mechanisms for monitoring 
compliance in EU member states. The EFTA Court does not, however, have the 
same authority as the CJEU as it does not have the power to issue binding 
decisions, only recommendations and advisory opinions. This, coupled with the 
fact that the EFTA states monitor themselves, means that these mechanisms may 
appear rather weak at first glance. Nonetheless, research suggests that they 
function fairly well. This can partly be explained by the fact that having their own 
institutions increases the legitimacy of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, each 
EFTA state is subject to control from its partners, not just its own officials. 
Finally, the EFTA bodies are in close contact with the EU throughout the 
monitoring process and so the EFTA states are aware of the potential danger in 
allowing the EU to perceive that the EEA Agreement is not functioning well. 
Therefore, in practice, the EFTA states appear to feel strong pressure to adapt to 
EU requirements. 
 
13. If domestic opposition is very fervent significant delays may be experienced 
throughout the process of incorporating acts into the EEA Agreement and putting 
them into practice at the national level. Nonetheless, on the whole the EEA 
framework appears to be fairly conducive to domestic adaptation to EU 
requirements due in large part to the asymmetrical nature of the relationship 
between the EFTA states and the EU and their dependence on participation in the 
internal market. Taking into consideration lack of access to EU decision-making 
bodies, it could therefore perhaps be argued that in practice the EEA Agreement 
involves a greater loss of autonomy than EU membership and there are 
indications that the EEA Agreement functions as a supranational agreement in 
practice.  
 
14. In this context it is important to note that the EFTA states have generally found 
participation in the EEA Agreement to be beneficial. In most cases, EU 
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 legislation corresponds relatively well with pre-existing domestic arrangements 
in the EFTA states and does not require much change to the national legal 
framework. State actors may also often feel that EU policy poses an effective 
solution to domestic needs and challenges. Therefore, the EFTA states willingly 
adopt the majority of the EU legislation which they are required to take on board 
through the EEA Agreement. Yet, as in all states adopting EU rules, situations do 
arise where EU requirements effectively clash with domestic policies or 
preferences. In these cases, the EFTA states have not had the opportunity to 
express themselves within EU decision-making institutions and they are not 
generally able to prevent their incorporation into the EEA Agreement or their 
implementation at national level. 
 
15. Given that the EFTA states incorporate a large bulk of EU legislation into the 
Agreement without access to the EU’s decision-making institutions, they have 
been likened to colonies of the EU. This situation has also been described as a 
‘fax democracy’, although perhaps a more apt description today would be an 
‘email democracy’. The democratic deficit has been a well-known aspect of the 
EEA Agreement from the start. It is the price which the EFTA states agreed to 
pay for enjoying many of the benefits of European integration without being full 
members of the club and without being bound to participate in some of the areas 
they considered less attractive.  
 
16. In this context it should be noted that the EEA has been slowly extending into 
new areas. The EU’s methods of legislating have evolved over time with more 
comprehensive acts being adopted which can span over different policy areas. In 
many cases some elements of an act may be EEA relevant while others are not. 
As a result, the question of EEA relevance has become increasingly ambiguous. 
Cases where EEA relevance is controversial can potentially lead to an expansion 
of the scope of the EEA Agreement into new areas which were not foreseen when 
it first came into effect, at least when the EU attaches importance to their 
adoption by the EFTA states. Furthermore, the Parliament and the Council have 
gained more say in the EU legislative process over the past two decades at the 
expense of the Commission. Therefore, it could perhaps be argued that the 




17. Having considered the functioning of the EEA Agreement, a question arises as to 
whether it is, in fact, a viable long-term alternative to EU membership. To date, 
this has not been a model that has been replicated elsewhere; the closest 
exception might be Puerto Rico’s relations with the United States. As noted by 
the authors of the Norwegian review, the EEA Agreement has often been 
considered a second best solution both by those who favour EU membership and 
those who would prefer looser ties with the EU. By and large other states have 
not found this to be an attractive model and no other state has so far seriously 
made an effort to join EFTA and the EEA. Yet the possibility of developments in 
the membership of EFTA have often been suggested.  
 
18. As a founding member of EFTA, the UK has been frequently named as an EU 
outsider. Indeed, as previously noted, the UK was instrumental in setting up 
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EFTA as a counterbalance to the supranational EEC. Although the UK later 
decided that membership of the Economic Community better served its interests, 
it has never been a very enthusiastic member of the European project preferring 
to remain outside of areas of cooperation such as Schengen and the Eurozone. 
Indeed, some would argue that Euroscepticism and a general distrust of the EU 
are inherently British.  
 
19. David Cameron’s veto of the EU fiscal treaty in December 2011 reopened the 
debate on the UK’s relationship with the EU, with a return to EFTA frequently 
being named as a potential alternative to EU membership. In the British media a 
number of reports suggested that the UK might have something to learn from 
Norway and Switzerland.4 One article argued that ‘switching from the costly and 
undemocratic European Union and joining the European Free Trade Association 
would bring many benefits and job creation is one of them’. Slightly ironically, 
the article further explained that such a move would mean regaining control over 
democratic law-making processes and being able to choose the best policies in a 
host of important areas.5 Another report stated that if Britain were to withdraw 
from the Union, but remain in the EEA ‘it would neither participate in the much 
maligned Common Agricultural Policy - nor the equally criticized Common 
Fisheries Policy. It would also fall outside of the common foreign and defense 
policies so detested by some Eurosceptics’.6  
 
20. Many would, however, argue that a return to EFTA would not work for the UK. 
Not least because the EFTA states are bound by EU rules but lack access to its 
decision making processes. As noted in one article, in comparison to the EFTA 
states ‘semi-detached status for a larger and more assertive country might well be 
harder to achieve. And being in with the outs while trading freely in Europe 
comes at a price. It means paying to administer and police the single market 
while the in-crowd makes the important decisions about how it works. For a 
noisy nation accustomed to a place at the table and having its voice heard, that 
could feel like a very un-splendid isolation’.7  
 
21. It is true that the EFTA states have so far been willing to pay the price of non-
participation in EU decision-making institutions. However, this would arguably 
be a much larger price to pay for the UK, particularly due to its size and general 
international standing. If Iceland and Liechtenstein joined the EU they would be 
the smallest members of the Union in terms of population. Therefore, even if they 
did join the Union, they would not receive a large portion of the vote in the 
Council or a large number of seats in the Parliament. It is also likely that lack of 
resources would pose a problem for them in terms of active participation. Indeed, 
questions have even been raised as to whether membership of the EU is possible 
for a state as small as Liechtenstein. Norway is by far the largest of the EFTA 
states and therefore membership of the EU might make the biggest difference 
ncreasing influence within the institutions. However, although 
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Norway is large in the EFTA context, it would still be a relatively small member 
state within a growing EU.  
 
22. The UK on the other hand is one of the EU’s largest member states. It generally 
has the resources to participate actively in all policy areas and it is an important 
actor when it comes to coalition building and Qualified Majority Voting. Losing 
access to the decision-making institutions would therefore be a substantial blow. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of EU acquis into the EEA Agreement is an 
inherently asymmetrical process whereby the EFTA states adopt legislation 
which has been decided without their participation. In the view of the author, 
taking such a subordinate role would not sit well with the UK’s self image. True, 
the UK´s accession to EFTA would potentially make the relationship between the 
EU and EFTA pillars slightly less asymmetrical. Nonetheless, the EEA in its 
current form, is very much a one-way street whereby the EFTA states follow the 
EU’s lead. Therefore, a return to EFTA for the UK might not be such a plausible 
scenario. 
 
23. Although the EEA Agreement in its current form is not a viable option for the 
UK, a future scenario of a two or multi-tier Europe in which structure, content 
and membership of the EEA was substantially revised could potentially be 
explored further. Forecasts predicting a widening gap between an outer core and 
an inner core within Europe abound. In his book, The Future of Europe: Towards 
a Two-Speed EU?, Jean-Claude Piris reaches the conclusion that the solution to 
the current economic and political climate is to permit 'two-speed' development: 
allowing an inner core to move towards closer economic and political Union. 
Michael van Hulten, a former Dutch MEP, has detailed what a two-layer Europe 
might look like. ‘The outer layer would be an overarching, less intrusive and 
more inclusive framework for European cooperation: a European Area of 
Freedom, Security and Prosperity (EFSP). This would comprise all EU and 
EFTA member states, as well as all existing EU candidate countries including 
Turkey. It could be expanded eastward to all European countries, including 
Russia, if and when the Copenhagen accession criteria (or similar) were met’.8  
 
24. Any such plans could potentially in some ways build on the experience of the 
EEA, albeit with substantial revisions. For example, changes in the EU’s policy 
making process and recent Treaty revisions should be taken into account. 
Furthermore, according to the EEA Agreement, Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein are meant to harmonize their positions internally and then speak 
with one voice towards the EU. A greater number of diverse states would make 
this system of unanimity quite difficult and cumbersome. Changes might 
therefore imply a more supranational structure. However, in return, the members 
of the outer tier should be allowed further participation in decision-making 
processes.  
 
25. The economic climate within the EU has perhaps served to decrease the 
attractiveness of EU membership. The future of the EEA is of course largely 
dependent on developments within the EU. Whether the EEA Agreement’s 
embership are revised or whether it ceases to exist at all 
 
8 http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/7421503/what-kind-of-europe.thtml  
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 are questions which will only be answered in the fullness of time. In general, the 
EEA in its current form, probably does not provide a viable solution for countries 
such as the UK. However, this does not mean that the EEA can provide no 
lessons for the future of Europe. Rather, given that it has generally been found to 
function well, any deliberations on a multi-tier Europe should take the experience 
of the EEA into account. 
 












Written evidence from Mrs Anne Palmer, JP (retired) 
 
I do not belong to, and have never been in any Political Organisation or Political 
Party. My Faithful and True Allegiance is, as always, to the wearer of the British 
Crown. Responding to The Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into 'The Future 
of the European Union: UK Government Policy. 
 
1. Question: To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its 
outcome be seen as a watershed in the UK’s EU Policy and place in the Union? 
At first glance it looks as if we should and will stand by and watch while a continental 
system is built. A statement by the Eurogroup made 30th March 2012, states, “The 
stability and integrity of the Economic and Monetary Union have required swift and 
vigorous measures that had been implemented recently, together with further 
qualitative moves towards a genuine Fiscal Stability Union.” Etc. To me it is and 
should be a “wake-up call” for those that want to be further integrated into the 
European Union rather than be proud to be elected Politicians of what many believe 
is/was the best free Country and Nation in the World.  
 
2. Noted that one Gentleman, Mr Ottaway was starting from the assumption that 
the UK should and will remain an EU Member. Should the EU progress towards 
the one State of European Union will that decision still stand? The people have 
recently watched this present Government divide the Nation and Country of England 
into nine EU Regions through the Localism Bill/Act which is shown quite clearly on 
the Council of Europe’s Website where “ticks” are recorded when action is taken. Is 
he and the Government concerned at the extra money for and extra layer of 
Governance this Country has never had before? These REGIONS with elected 
Mayors, full Cabinets and all the regalia that goes with them? Note also, “The 
Regional Dimension of Development and the UN System”. Is this also wanted? 
 
3. Noted that Mr Hague made quite clear on 8th March 2012 that, the protocol was not 
agreed, and as a result the agreement among the 25 nations is not part of the Treaties 
of the European Union, and does not have the force of EU law and that we will have 
to continue to seek to protect the single market, financial services and our national 
interests in other ways in the absence of having secured a protocol to changes to the 
Treaties of the European Union. I would have thought even changing a Protocol to 
an already ratified Treaty requires a referendum in ALL EU Nation States. 
 
4. However, on May 31st Ireland is to hold a referendum on the ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
which is in fact the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union” an extra Treaty on top of the Treaty of Lisbon, and 
whether it disturbs or intrudes on the previous Treaty remains to be seen for the 
original paragraphs relating to the Eurozone Members are in the body of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
5. I pray that the original intention to alter just the ‘Protocol’ rather than alter the body 
of the Treaty, which I believe was/is required for such an important matter, was not 




6. “Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ into 
the EU Treaties?” Without doubt, if the alleged “Fiscal Compact” is included into the 
Treaty of Lisbon and therefore an alteration to the original Treaty of Lisbon, this 
Country should-without doubt, have the promised referendum. With a further 
additional Treaty, which may touch or intrude on the previous Treaty, I leave it to the 
experts.  
 
7. I do have concerns regarding the recent extra funding to the IMF by the UK 
Government, which is not in the Euro-zone, yet this extra funding has knowingly been 
used to ‘help out’ the Euro area through the IMF. This does raise concerns. 
 
8. Further to Paragraph 2 re Mr Ottaway’s remarks regarding remaining in the 
European Union. That this Country will remain an EU Member. I have noted on more 
than one occasion that the EU wants to “use its ‘one voice’ in all matters and 
especially in the United Nation Security Council.” In the General Assembly 30th 
July at the 88th Meeting “General Assembly, in recorded vote, adopts resolution 
granting European Union, Right of Reply Ability to Present Oral Amendments”.  
 
9. In fact I read Hungary’s representative, submitted the draft resolution on behalf 
of the European Union and reading a number of oral revisions, said it was the 
product of extensive consultations among a broad spectrum of Member Sates, held 
following the Assembly’s vote on 14th September 2010 to defer consideration of the 
original text outlining the bloc’s expanding rights”, Do you know what those 
expanding Rights were? Did the people of this Country know? Were they told? 
See here GA/10983. 
 
10. UN General Assembly 3rd May 2011. Mr Körösi (Hungary) “It is an honour for 
me to appear before the general Assembly, on behalf of the members of the 
European Union (EU), the draft resolution on the participation of the European 
Union in the work of the United Nations, contained in document A/65/L.64/Rev.1 I 
would like in particular to thank the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for being here today at a moment of great 
significance for the European Union”. Etc.  
 
11. What a great pity the people of this Country did not have the opportunity to 
celebrate this good news with them-FOR THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY 
WERE NOT TOLD. Will the EU soon have “one Voice” in the UNSC? Will this 
Country still need a British Government or a House of Commons or House of 
Lords, especially as the EU Regions have been set up here in the once United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at all, because no one will hear 
their voices, not even in the United Nation’s Security Council if the European Union 
are going to speak with their one VOICE in all matters and on our behalf.  
 
12. Your questions, 'The Future of the European Union: UK Government Policy. 
The future of the European Union as it is at the moment is rather doubtful. Whether 
we as a country could remain in the EU knowing without doubt that it is to become 
one European State/Country, not even as once thought a United States of Europe 
rather like the USA, which should, under the circumstances when recent Governments 
have let the people down, I would have thought should be decided by a Government 
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of Great Britain that is faithful and true to their solemn Oaths of Allegiance to the 
British Crown, that the Oaths they make before they take their seats in that 
wonderful and once proud Houses of Parliament, would lift the people into perhaps 
bringing a little faith and hope of a Government they could be proud of once more. 
For the only way for this Country and nation to survive, is out of the European Union 
completely. We truly should never have joined. (See Hansard from the 1960’s) 
 
13. If that is rejected, the people of course should be given a referendum on an ‘in or 
out’ of the European Union, and surely knowing exactly what the European Union is 
in reality to become, far better for our Government to tell the people exactly why they 
are proposing to allow such a referendum and for the people to make a decision. A 
federal European Union or a Sovereign United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland once more? That way, a British Government may win back some 
credibility and respect which it lacks at present and a chance to really govern this 
Country according to its long Standing Common Law Constitution. Failing that, in all 
honesty, if the EU continues as is proposed and encouraged by British Governments 
to fill the role of a Single State of Europe, I have absolutely no idea what the ending 
will be, except that there will be in all probability a terrible and tragic ending for all, 
with no going back. 
 
11 May 2012 
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FEU 03 
Written evidence from Dr. Martyn Bond, Visiting Professor,  
Royal Holloway University of London 
 
Please find below my evidence submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House 
of Commons concerning the future of the European Union.  
The argument of my submission can be summarised as follows:  
The UK has lost its way in adapting to the challenges of globalisation. It is heading for an 
increasingly isolated position, out of sympathy with its regional partners in Europe. It needs 
to develop a leading role within its regional bloc, co-ordinating its priorities with other 
leading players there. UK foreign policy should prioritise the EU and project UK power 
increasingly through this regional organisation.  
A note on my background: 
I am Visiting Professor of European Politics and Policy at Royal Holloway University of 
London, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the European Business School as well as a Senior 
Fellow of the Salzburg Global Seminar.  
My main career was as a European civil servant, serving eight years from 1974 as press 
spokesman in Brussels for the Council of Ministers of the EU (then the EEC), a further seven 
years, first as a senior administrator during the negotiation of the fourth Lomé Convention 
with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and then with responsibility for 
relations between the Council and the European Parliament. From 1989 until 1999 I worked 
in London as Director of the UK Office of the European Parliament. 
My initial professional training, however, was in the BBC, which I joined on my return from 
Hamburg in 1966, working there until 1970. I later took leave of absence from my civil 
service post in Brussels from 1981 to 1983 to work as BBC correspondent in Berlin, 
broadcasting in German and English about politics, economy and society in West Berlin and 
East Germany. In 2005 I was invited to become the London Press Correspondent for the 
Council of Europe, advising on media strategy and promoting the image of the Council in the 
UK. 
I gained a BA in modern languages and literature from Cambridge, followed by further study 
at Hamburg and Sussex Universities (D.Phil 1971). Between 1970 and 1973 I was lecturer in 
West European Studies at the New University of Ulster. After retiring from the European 
civil service I was Director of the Federal Trust for Education and Research from 2000 to 
2003, and from 2005 I have been Visiting Professor at Royal Holloway. In 2006 I was invited 
to become a patron of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies. 
I have written and edited several books, including Eminent Europeans (Greycoat Press, 
1996), The Treaty of Nice Explained (Federal Trust, 2001), Europe's Wider Loyalties: Global 
Responsibilities for the New Europe (Kogan Page, 2002), The European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2010), and The Council of 
Europe: structure, history and issues in European politics (Routledge, 2011). I also write for 
Public Service Europe (web only) and for Parliament Magazine, a Dods publication in 
Brussels, and I lecture on European issues both in the UK and abroad. I have contributed to 
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numerous training courses for UK civil servants, in particular in the context of Dod’s 
programmes Westminster Explained and Brussels Explained.  
The future of the European Union: Implications for UK Government policy 
Global framework – Regional priority 
1. The power of individual states such as the UK to shape an effective response to global 
shocks has considerably diminished over the past fifty years. Poor economic 
performance in relation to other European economies has increased the need for the 
UK in particular to work with other members of the EU in seeking common solutions 
for the region. The UK is not as impecunious as Greece, but it is also not as wealthy 
as Germany.  
2. In addition to the shock of the current financial crisis, the member states of the EU 
now face cultural, social and economic adjustments to an exceptionally strong 
migratory influx as a result of globalisation. Doubtless other external shocks – 
possibly ecological or energy-related - will also soon call for a European response. 
3. As Chou-en-Lai predicted long ago, at the global level the move to dialogue among 
several strong regional powers appears unstoppable. The EU represents one such 
power. The UK individually – despite retaining some elements of power acquired in 
earlier years (nuclear deterrent, Security Council seat, special relationship, 
Commonwealth) - does not. Sooner or later it will be the EU and not an individual 
nation which will answer Kissinger’s phone call and speak for Europe. The route to 
optimising the UK’s influence globally lies therefore in strengthening its position 
inside the EU.  
Government influence or Party politics?  
4. Many policy initiatives derive from party political discussions at European level. 
Across the continent, political forces are organised in three main groups, the European 
Peoples Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and the Alliance of Democrats and 
Liberals in Europe.  
5. The absence of the Conservative Party from the EPP represents a serious weakness 
for the UK in its efforts to exert influence in the EU at a political level. Without a 
close alliance with the EPP, the Conservative element of the Coalition government is 
absent from the dominant circle of those deciding the direction of EU policies in most 
other states. This is a party political issue that is harming the national interest. It 
should be remedied as soon as possible. 
6. The December fiasco last year was the most recent high-level example of the UK’s 
misjudgement of continental responses because of Conservative political isolation. 
Absent from the meeting of the EPP in Marseilles just before the Brussels Summit, 
the Conservative leadership was unable to grasp the importance of other states’ 
political capital invested in the Eurozone.  
7. Ideological assumptions increasingly shape member states’ political positions at 
continental level. They influence the European argument well before the Commission 
puts practical proposals on the table for formal discussion in Brussels. For the UK, the 
underlying issue is as much a matter of political contacts and ideological affinities as 
of institutional structures.  
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8. In this analysis, the fiasco of last December was not a watershed, but one of a series 
of accidents as these broad political affinities surface from time and time. Until the 
Conservative Party changes its continental political alignment, the UK under its 
present leadership will be isolated again and again. In the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, for instance, the main political groups are all likely to nominate their 
candidates for the post of President of the Commission well in advance. Conservative 
absence from the EPP will again isolate the UK Prime Minister when the European 
Council is subsequently called on to endorse the next President of the Commission. 
9. The grand narrative of European unification has little attraction in the UK at the 
popular level. However, it clearly still has – as it has had since 1945 - considerable 
strength among European political elites. The assumption of “strength through unity” 
drives the policy choices of major political parties across the continent. If the 
alternative is impotent isolation, it also makes more and more sense for the UK.  
Maximising UK influence inside the EU 
10. It is only within a grand strategy of close co-operation with other like-minded 
political forces in the EU that the UK government – whichever Party is in power - will 
achieve its specific foreign policy goals: security of supply for food and raw 
materials, open markets in third countries, and respect for our values in regard to 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. All these objectives are shared with 
other members of the EU. Only by playing an engaged and proactive role in 
advancing further integration within the EU will the UK have a powerful voice in 
deciding how these objectives are to be secured at a global level. 
11. Successful opposition to manifestly unfair proposals or specifically detrimental 
policies at EU level increasingly requires enough allies to form a blocking minority, 
and preferably a positive majority to press for improvements. This is not achieved 
from a position of isolation, opposed to the main thrust of integration. Opposition by 
the UK can be productive – as witness stalling proposals for a financial transaction tax 
and advancing reforms in agriculture and fisheries – but it is considerably more 
successful when exercised from within the tent.  
12. The UK government should move from a default position of opposition in principle to 
further European integration to a position that allows it to respond positively to new 
proposals. The UK administration is still respected for the clarity and consistency of 
the positions it takes in Council, and a shift of stance in no way detracts from its right 
to raise objections and call for amendments to proposals as discussions proceed. But 
to gain a more sympathetic hearing, the UK government needs to signal that Brussels 
is appreciated more as the solution and criticised less as the problem.  
13. In particular the UK government needs to show that it wants to stay as closely 
associated as possible to initiatives undertaken by groups of other states under 
“enhanced cooperation”. The UK should avoid formalising divisions within the EU, 
maintaining above all the option to join such initiatives later. It should maintain this 
option for itself and argue for it as a principle for other states.  
14. With specific regard to the “fiscal compact”, the UK should rapidly seek allies within 
the Eurozone prepared to argue its case to keep open the option for the UK a) not to 
be excluded from the decision-making fora set up for Eurozone countries, and b) to be 
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able to opt in without onerous conditions if it later decides to. Hence the fiscal 
compact treaty should be agreed - like other EU treaties – by all member states.  
15. Exclusion from the treaty would cause political, moral and economic damage to the 
UK. It stands to lose its traditional status as a leading member state of the EU if it is 
forced to position itself outside the mainstream of European integration. This is 
reflected in exclusion from political decision-making (the top table argument), the 
absence of British officials in important posts (the engine room reality), and reduced 
formal and informal influence in Brussels (the everyday experience). The UK stands 
to lose morally if it is not present alongside its traditional allies in debate, notably 
states of Scandinavia and central and eastern Europe. In economic terms it stands to 
lose by being absent from decisions that directly affect the UK’s trading interests, 
notably regarding currency issues and matters relating to the Single Market. 
Re-positioning among larger and smaller allies  
16. As the EU develops further it will need more than just Franco-German leadership, and 
the UK should have enough awareness of its own interests to seek a role alongside 
them in deciding the future of Europe. France and Germany need the UK as a 
balancing partner in their bi-lateral relationship, if this traditional core of the peace 
settlement in Western Europe is to develop into a regional force in the world. 
17. The reformed voting arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty give the larger states a greater 
say in the development of EU legislation and policy. The UK should therefore 
prioritise its efforts, identifying and developing common interests in particular with 
the big players. The UK’s main allies in the EU should be those countries which have 
the capacity – material and moral – to lead it. 
18. At the same time, the UK should not neglect its relations with smaller states in the 
EU. Many of these - Scandinavia, Ireland, Portugal, Benelux, Malta, Cyprus and the 
Baltic States - have traditionally had close relations with the UK. As it has done in the 
past, the UK needs to maintain good relations with the medium and small member 
states, building up clusters of friends, but in doing so it should not lose sight of the 
need to identify common interests with the larger leading countries.  
Wider responsibilities and the longer view 
19. As the UK is increasingly linked with its European neighbours – tourism and 
residence abroad, trade and aid, finance, military alliance and foreign policy co-
ordination, higher education, intermarriage, historical experience and cultural roots - 
it should strive to maximise its interests in playing a leading role in the new structures 
of Europe. That cannot be done effectively from the sidelines.  
20. The UK government should take measures to stop the drift towards isolation from the 
continent which has recently marked the country’s relations with the EU. A role for 
the UK comparable to Norway without its oil or Switzerland without its reserves is 
profoundly unattractive. If the country were reduced to this, the UK would be 
dominated by an integrated power on the continent and relegated to a subordinate role 
in both regional and global affairs – an outcome which would realise the worst fears 
of British foreign policy. 
21. As an alternative, the UK should develop its own vision of an EU under conditions 
acceptable both to this country and to our European allies. It should position itself in 
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the mainstream of economic and political integration, from which position it would be 
better able to steer it in the direction and at the speed which optimises British 
interests.  
22. Division among EU states plays into the hands of other powers which are not slow to 
take advantage of it. Examples include Russia on energy supply, the US on air 
transport, China on a range of trade issues, and many multinationals (backed by their 
governments) on conditions for FDI. Temporary advantages won by the UK in 
competition with other EU states are more than balanced out by benefits won by other 
members and lost to the UK. Overcoming this zero sum game would benefit all and 
permit the development of a more coherent foreign policy as a regional bloc.  
23. That geopolitical option will involve a considerable revision of recent UK foreign 
policy aims and means, which have assumed that the UK will continue as a priority to 
relate bilaterally to the rest of the world. The future will require a perspective looking 
from London through Brussels out to the wider world. The world by 2020 will be 
looking first towards the EU and only secondarily towards the individual member 
states.  
24. A view of the UK independent of this perspective is doomed to increasing irrelevance. 
If the UK does not want to be marginalised in international affairs by positioning 
itself outside any regional power bloc, it must quickly concert its efforts with other 
European states to optimise its interests both within and through the EU. 
15 May 2012 
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FEU 04 
Written evidence from Sir Colin Budd, KCMG 
SUMMARY 
- The December European Council not necessarily a watershed for UK/Europe, but 
an important wake up call. 
- For the UK voluntarily to accept demotion from the top European tier would be a 
huge strategic error. On the contrary, we should wherever possible ensure that we 
are part of its leadership. 
- To maximize our leverage in EU policy making, the whole of UK plc must apply 
itself to that task, with energy, imagination and unceasing effort. 
- If we fail to wake up, we will increasingly find that we are living in Britzerland. 
- We can and should do better. 
Introduction 
The writer was a member of HM Diplomatic Service from 1967-2005, serving in Warsaw, The 
Hague, Bonn and Brussels. He was Assistant Private Secretary to Geoffrey Howe, then 
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, from 1984-87; Chef de Cabinet to Leon Brittan, then 
Vice President of the European Commission, from 1993-95; Director General for Europe in 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1997-2001; and Ambassador to the Netherlands 
from 2001-5. 
Background 
1. Sir Percy Cradock, who from 1983-1990 was Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy 
adviser, once observed that the story of British European policy since 1945 had to an alarming 
extent been one of “mistaken assessments and missed opportunities, a depressing chronicle of 
delayed awakening to reality, of belated arrival in institutions fashioned by others, of 
repinings, second and third thoughts, divided counsels and qualified enthusiasms, and a 
general confusion of policy designed to achieve maximum pain and minimum influence”. 
2. To ask about the impact of the December 2011 European Council on the UK’s policy 
towards and place in the European Union (EU) is to beg the question: what should that policy 
and place ideally be? If as a nation we want to avoid simply continuing the lamentable story 
so pithily summed up by Cradock, we need to think clearly about this. 
3. The policy of the present UK government, as laid down in the Coalition Agreement, is 
that this country should play a leading role in the EU – in order (inter alia) to ensure that “all 
the nations of Europe are equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century”. 
4. What that, quite rightly, implies is that European countries can meet those challenges 
more effectively if they stand together than they could on their own. But there is more to the 
story than that. 
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5. The underlying logic of EU membership for the UK, for those who support it, has 
always in essence rested on two perceptions: 
(i) the assumption that UK interests are best served by our being inside the EU; 
(ii) the view that we are best placed to protect and promote those interests the more 
influence we can bring to bear on the directions in which the EU is heading. 
6. Why is EU membership to our advantage? Partly for economic, and partly for wider 
reasons. 
7. The economic case in favour is very well trodden ground. It rests on full access to the 
Single Market, with its many implications for profitability and employment; on the 
magnetism of the EU for foreign direct investment; and on the huge clout the EU has in 
world trade talks. The UK badly needs Europe to be economically strong, open to free trade, 
and prosperous. The best way to maximize the chances of that is for the UK to be influential 
inside the EU. 
8. There are also numerous wider benefits – including the ability to travel, live and work 
anywhere in the EU, the scope the EU affords for action to improve the environment, and the 
forum it provides for more effective cooperation over crime and justice matters.  
9. Above all, there is the wider strategic imperative: the whole question of how in the 21st 
century to maximize the UK’s global influence and authority, in a world in which so many of 
the key problems cross national borders. As a member state in the EU the UK exercises far 
greater influence internationally than it could on its own. The more we fall out of the key EU 
decision-making circle, the more that will undermine our political relationship with the 
United States and reduce our influence in many international fora.  
10. If we want to maximize our prosperity, trade and employment rate, if we want our 
own continent and the world to be safer and greener, if we want to be as influential as 
possible in world affairs, there is simply no option but for the UK to be an active and leading 
member of the EU. 
11. It follows that unless there is a compelling case, given the national interest, for 
standing aside from any particular policy proposal, we should in all circumstances aim to 
exert as much influence as possible on the decision-making process inside the EU. 
12. It was with that analysis in mind that the outcome of the December 2011 European 
Council left many UK observers with a considerable unease. Far from strengthening the UK’s 
position in Europe, there is accumulating evidence that this has reduced our capacity to 
influence future EU legislation in the areas it covered – which by common consent are of very 
great importance for this country. Though there is much left to play for, there must be a 
strong probability that by the time future policy proposals in the areas in question come to 
ECOFIN, where the UK will still be present, the outcome of ECOFIN discussion will in effect 
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have been predetermined - by decisions in the prior caucusing of the member states 
committed to the fiscal compact. 
13. The key dilemma for the UK, when it comes to questions of EU institutional 
architecture, is that the more we choose to stand aside from the evolving process, the more it 
will tend to evolve in directions and ways which do not suit our interests, while continuing to 
impact very directly on those interests. Eurosceptics may want us to roam the globe, 
untethered by Europe. But whatever their dreams, we will still be 22 miles from the European 
mainland, and profoundly affected by the way the EU is organized. 
Response to the FAC’s Questions 
14. The FAC asks what institutional architecture the UK should seek for the EU, and 
whether the UK should embrace the idea of an EU made up of two or more tiers. That 
directly raises the question of what on any such analysis would be the right tier for the UK to 
be in. The answer plainly depends on how far we want in future to be counted among the 
leaders of Europe, rather than the followers. 
15. Germany and France will continue to lead, and will tend always to look to each other 
first – bound as they are by the 1963 Elysée Treaty to arrive, “on all important policy 
questions, insofar as possible, at a similar position”. Along with the leaders of the key EU 
institutions, they will tend to dominate any European top tier, however much they may 
disagree on many of the substantive issues. 
16. If the UK wishes to maximize its influence in Europe, it has much scope for exercising 
as much influence as and sometimes more than Germany and France. So long as we remain 
in the top tier, then in the future as in the past, when either Germany or France disagree with 
the other, they will often seek support from the UK, thus giving us real scope for influencing 
the outcome in question. In addition to which, if we cultivate as we should our natural allies 
on each issue among the other member states, we can in any case often build up a strong 
bargaining position. But to the extent that we fall, voluntarily or otherwise, outside the top 
European tier in any given field, there will be an inevitable reduction in UK leverage and 
influence, often to our disadvantage. 
17. We need in this connection to beware of the incremental effect of the widespread and 
increasing assumption in the rest of the EU that the UK perspective, when it comes to 
considering the future of Europe, is of less and less importance.  
18. The potential danger to which the UK needs to be alert, in assessing the impact of the 
new ‘fiscal compact’ treaty, is that in other areas too the notion will take hold that in the 
construction of the key deal the UK does not have to be involved from the start, but can 
instead be presented later – as now happens routinely to Switzerland - with a series of faits 
accomplis. Our rights under the Treaty, where unanimity is required, of course still provide us 
with real protection, but there is nonetheless a clear and significant difference between being 
one of the prime movers in the power dynamics of the EU, from the beginning of any 
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discussion, and simply being presented with an already constructed package, which by that 
stage has become much more difficult to amend. 
19. There is little solace to be had, even when we are right, from any situation in which we 
end up, as most recently in the context of the EU’s implementation of the Basel III rules on 
banking regulation, isolated 26-1. If we find ourselves in that position, the strong likelihood is 
that we have in one way or another misplayed our hand – especially if it is clear that a number 
of the 26 in fact share our analysis. 
20. Thus at the time of last December’s European Council, it was plain that a number of 
other member states had real sympathy for aspects of our position – but we tabled our 
proposals and started to look for allies so late in the day that it proved impossible to build the 
alliance in our favour which would have greatly strengthened our position. The way the UK 
played its hand, in response to all attempts to agree the fiscal compact unanimously, and 
within the existing treaties, was in some respects understandable but on any analysis 
weakened our overall position in the European Union. The outcome of the December 
European Council, it is increasingly clear, in the eyes of many observers in the rest of Europe 
as well as in the UK strengthened the perception of a binary division between the UK and the 
rest, and opened up speculation about the more formal establishment of an explicitly two tier 
system. 
21. It would certainly be better if the fiscal compact could still be incorporated in the 
treaties - provided the UK position were adequately safeguarded – because the UK would 
then be able, in an area of such cardinal importance for its interests, to play a full role in all 
relevant EU discussion. As far as possible, all future framework policy statements should be 
agreed by all 27 member states. 
22. There will always be instances in which the strength of the UK interest in a particular 
policy line is such that we may prefer isolation to dilution of our own proposals – but there is 
a strong case for reducing their number to the absolute minimum, to avoid as far as possible 
our being forced de facto to live with policy outcomes affecting our interests which have been 
shaped and decided by others. How can we best seek to achieve that? 
23. To keep the UK in the forefront of European decision-making will require, in addition 
to the necessary political commitment, first class planning and a clear and sustained 
determination to use to the full the networking and other assets we have. What are those 
assets?  
24. We start with the benefit of the growing strength in Europe of the English language. It 
would be bizarre indeed to accept demotion from the top European tier just when our 
language is increasingly the lingua franca of our continent. 
25. We have, and need to use to the full: 
- bilateral links to the 26 other member states of the EU, which need to be nurtured 
constantly by all Ministers with EU-relevant business; 
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- and a policy coordination system the envy of our European partners (Jacques Delors, 
when President of the European Commission, went on record as saying he considered 
the UK’s system to be the best in the EU). If used sufficiently far in advance, that 
system will tend to maximize our chances of securing, in any given case, at least a 
significant proportion of our objectives. If we continually reinvest in keeping it well 
oiled, and in first class working order – which requires (i) optimal coordination 
between the Cabinet Office, FCO and UKREP Brussels; (ii) effective EU coordination 
sections in other Whitehall Departments, and (iii) full involvement and use of our 
Embassies in other EU member states. 
26. We also have, but have so far only fitfully chosen to play, a potentially significant role 
in the developing European polity which is, like it or not, part of the way today’s European 
policy-making game is played.  
27. Both Government Departments in London and our political parties need to 
understand the significance of the evolving pattern of party politics on a European scale. 
Important in part, clearly, because of the European Parliament’s position in the EU, but also 
because of the prior caucusing of the party leaders before many European Council meetings 
which has now become a routine part of political life in the EU.  
28. Our Government Departments need to make a much greater effort to engage with the 
MEPs, from all countries, who are active in their policy areas. All our political parties need in 
the national interest to ensure that they are playing an active role in intra-European dialogue, 
and in particular that their weight is felt in intra-party debate at the European level in the run 
up to key meetings of the European Council. In this respect, for instance, the Conservative 
Party’s decision to leave the European People’s Party has in effect meant that in recent 
meetings of the EPP leaders from the EU member states – such as that at Marseilles just 
before last December’s European Council - the UK voice has gone unheard, sometimes at 
tactically very important moments. 
29.  Another weakness in our position is the alarming decline in recent years in the 
number of UK nationals securing posts in the EU institutions: in the most recent EU-wide 
competition, fewer than 3% of the successful candidates were from the UK (which has some 
12% of the EU’s population). This needs urgent attention, otherwise 15-30 years from now it 
will come to haunt us. In the real world, all EU member states rely significantly on the 
nationals they have in the EU institutions as part of their collective networking strength, and 
it makes no sense for the UK not to push hard to ensure that the playing field is made level. 
There is a strong case, which the FAC may wish to consider, for a substantial remedial 
package – including more training, especially in foreign languages, and agreement across 
Whitehall that the UK needs to send to Brussels some of its best and brightest civil servants.  
30. One obvious test case in the offing for the UK’s ability to remain constructively 
engaged in the EU inner core discussions is the subject of growth, and the issue of a potential 
growth compact to match the fiscal compact. Here the UK will plainly want an outcome to 




some other participants in the discussion may tend to emphasise questions on which they are 
not at one with HMG – but there will certainly be some member states in broad agreement 
with the UK. The question of growth and how best to stimulate it should very clearly not be 
left solely to the euro area. It is much to be welcomed that the UK has been to the fore in the 
so-called “Like-Minded” group of member states, which since well before the French 
Presidential election has been stressing the strength of the case for action to help boost 
economic growth in the EU. 
31. Another test case will be the forthcoming discussion of the EU budget. There we can 
either establish a purely defensive position, and just sit tight, determined to be inflexible, 
leaving the shape of the final package to be created by others – or apply ourselves proactively, 
while still of course pulling no punches about the importance of the UK interest, to the task of 
working hard at the core of the EU’s debate on the subject, using all the arguments we can, to 
help forge an outcome which can be seen as acceptable to all. 
Conclusions 
32. Last December’s European Council does risk becoming a watershed for the UK’s place 
in the EU, but that is by no means inevitable. 
33. To conclude that the UK should now favour a much looser arrangement for the future 
institutional architecture of the EU, whereby we would take up a position somewhere outside 
a new core Europe, would be a fundamental misreading of the UK national interest. 
34. Certainly the UK must continue to fight its corner in relation to the fiscal compact, 
but our strategic approach should continue to be to do all we can to shape the evolution of 
future European policy. 
35. In pursuing that strategy we need always to remember that in the modern European 
Union outcomes are increasingly shaped and predetermined away from the formal 
negotiating table. The race tends to go to the proactive, well organized alliance-builders, who 
maintain effective networks and plan their approach to each issue well in advance. Last 
minute initiatives of the kind the UK tried immediately before last December’s European 
Council are unlikely to prosper. The UK has in ample measure the skills needed to build 
effective alliances in Europe, but we need to ensure that we both maintain them and use 
them, early enough in the game to have a chance of achieving our objectives. 
16 May 2011 
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FEU 05 
Written evidence from Jean-Claude Piris, former Legal Counsel, European Council 
and EU Council, and Director General, EU Council Legal Service 
Written evidence submitted by Jean-Claude PIRIS (Piris Consulting sprl), Former legal Counsel of 
the European Council and of the EU Council and Director General of the Legal Service of the EU 
Council (1988-2010), at the request of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons. 
SUMMARY 
• The implementation of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (“Fiscal Compact”) which was signed on the 2nd March 2012 by 25 
Member States of the European Union (EU) will not, in itself, go against the UK’s interests. 
• The conclusion of other intergovernmental agreements or arrangements of a similar kind, 
binding EU Member States other than the UK, and in particular the members of the eurozone, 
are not to be excluded in the future. 
• If this were going to happen, the UK’s policy should be to obtain legal guarantees for the 
protection of its rights and interests. 
• An intergovernmental agreement or arrangement might be signed, in the period to come, by 
the members of the eurozone, given the need to increase the convergence of their budgetary and 
economic policies in order to solve durably the current financial and economic crisis. 
• Solving this crisis and relaunching economic growth in Europe is a priority aim and an 
essential interest not only for the eurozone but also for the UK. 
• It is argued that, if the way of a further integration was chosen by the eurozone to attain this 
aim, the UK would have no interest, and in any case would have no legal or political means, in 
trying to oppose or delay this evolution. The UK’s aims could be that the provisions of any new 
intergovernmental arrangement should be fully compatible with the EU Treaties and 
guarantee openness and transparency. It should as well confirm the legal obligation of the 
Contracting Parties, under the judicial control of the EU Court of Justice, to comply with the 
letter and spirit of the EU Treaties, including the rules on the internal market. 
********* 
BRIEF ANSWERS TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE “FISCAL 
COMPACT” 
1) The December 2011 European Council and its outcome, including the signature on the 2nd 
March 2012 of the Fiscal Compact by 25 EU countries, are a logical consequence both: 
- of the need felt by the eurozone members to go forward in the integration of their policies 
in order to try and solve the current crisis, and 
- of the policy decided by the UK’s Government and Parliament, in particular by the 19 July 
2011 EU Act.1  
                                                 
1 See the Written Evidence that I submitted on the EU Bill to the House of Commons (European Scrutiny Committee) on November 24, 2010: “...this 
might lead to the UK to be sidelined on certain issues. This is because it could trigger a tendency among other Member States to circumvent this 
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2) One cannot expect the other EU Member States to remain inactive, if and when they think 
that they have important interests at stake, in cases when the UK exercises its right of veto 
within the framework of the EU. 
3) If such a case happens, it is argued that the UK’s policy should aim at ensuring that any 
action by the eurozone members shall respect their legal obligations under the EU Treaties. 
If this condition were fully respected, in letter and in spirit, the place of the UK in the EU 
and the possibility for the British Government to defend its rights and interests could be 
safeguarded. 
4) The Fiscal Compact will not be legally part of the EU’s acquis. Its entry into force will not 
have any impact on the EU budget, on enlargement, or on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.  
5) The rights and interests of the UK might be easier to defend through an incorporation of the 
Fiscal compact in the EU Treaties. It appears that the Contracting Parties to the Fiscal 
Compact would not have any obligation or interest to make concessions as a price to pay to 
the UK for that incorporation. However, the UK could ask that some rules should be 
formally confirmed (this would in any case follow from the incorporation in the Treaties), 
such as the possibility to go to Court in case the UK’s interests would be put in jeopardy by 
any decision taken by the Contracting Parties to the Fiscal Compact. 
*********** 
ON THE POSSIBLE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE EU AND ON THE POLICY OF THE UK 
6) TO SOLVE DURABLY THE CRISIS OF THE EUROZONE, ITS MEMBERS WILL 
PROBABLY HAVE TO INCREASE THE CONVERGENCE OF THEIR BUDGETARY 
AND ECONOMIC POLICIES  
7) Most economists argue that it will not be possible to exit the financial (now also economic) 
crisis without increasing significantly the convergence of the budgetary and economic 
policies of the members of the eurozone. This has also been acknowledged by British 
political authorities.  
8) This is now becoming more pressing. The high rate of interest which some of the eurozone 
countries have to pay to borrow money in the markets makes it difficult to encourage 
investment. Given the present state of affairs, trying to re-launch their economic growth 
could trigger a further increase in their interest rate. At the same time, it is becoming 
unsustainable to continue on the road of more austerity. This increases desperation on the 
part of their population suffering unemployment and fall in revenues and translates into a 
heavy price to be paid to populist political parties. 
9) To be able to use adequate instruments to re-launch economic growth, a protection from 
possible reactions of the financial markets would be needed. The opportunity to earn money 
by speculating against individual members of the eurozone should disappear. To reach this 
aim, the eurozone should move closer to becoming a full economic and monetary union, as 
this is the only realistic way for the markets to be convinced. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
situation, either by engaging in enhanced cooperation among themselves without the participation of the UK, or by concluding intergovernmental 
agreements outside the framework of the EU”. 
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10) This would demand visible and credible - albeit politically hugely difficult - actions, 
committing the governments, parliaments and populations of the eurozone countries. This 
evolution might be accelerated by the current situation in Greece. 
11) It is obvious that this would raise huge political problems in the countries concerned, and 
that it is by no means certain to happen. Would taking such a road be sustainable politically, 
especially when coupled with budgetary austerity and slow or negative economic growth 
during a few years? This is a big question mark. However, the economic and political risks of 
an explosion of the crisis are such that one can bet that the road towards more share of 
powers within the eurozone has a reasonable chance to be accepted. 
12) MAKING THE EUROZONE A FULL ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION WOULD 
INVOLVE ACCEPTING A SUBSTANTIAL SHARING OF POWERS 
13) In such a hypothesis, the members of the eurozone would accept not to be the only masters 
of their budgetary and economic policies.  
14) In legal terms, this would translate into a legally binding convergence, ie to go much further 
than the language used in the 2nd March 2012 “Fiscal Compact”, where the Contracting 
Parties “undertake to work jointly towards...”, “stand ready to make active use, whenever 
appropriate and necessary...” and “ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they 
plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among 
themselves...”. 
15) The members of the eurozone would be linked together by a joint responsibility and 
solidarity. 
16) According to the author of this Evidence, “joint responsibility” would mean that each 
country involved should not finally adopt its national budget before having obtained a green 
light from “the centre”. The choice not to respect a red light would entail the exclusion of 
financial help from Eurozone Funds. Economic policies might be subject to a convergence 
mechanism, which would be tighter in cases where a country is receiving financial help. A 
Eurozone Debt Agency could be created, as well as a Eurozone Banking Supervision 
Authority, going in the direction of a kind of Banking Union. This might also be 
accompanied by a minimal harmonisation of national laws concerning taxation (eg a 
common basis for the assessment of corporate taxes, to be followed eventually by minimal 
harmonisation) and social policy (such as linking the age and conditions of retirement to 
current demographic trends, establishing a common minimum guaranteed salary, taking 
measures to liberalise the labour market and to encourage labour mobility). It is also recalled 
that Article 138 TFEU might be used to ensure unified representation of the members of the 
eurozone in the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington, both the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These policies and actions would not be detrimental to 
the rights and interests of the UK or of the other EU States not having the euro as their 
currency. 
17) If such a framework were to be adopted, the other side of the coin, ie “joint solidarity”, might 
trigger a joint answer to a move from the financial markets directed against an individual 
country in the eurozone. 
18) SUCH AN EVOLUTION WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
TREATY OR ARRANGEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE EUROZONE 
COUNTRIES 
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19) A revision of the EU Treaties is politically excluded, especially due to the opposition of the 
UK and of other EU Member States. The only way forward for the eurozone members 
would therefore be to negotiate an intergovernmental agreement or arrangement among 
them. Taking into account its content, the conclusion of a legally binding instrument might 
involve a referendum, and possibly a change of Constitution, for some countries. 
20) It is argued that the UK would not be able, and in any case would have no interest, in trying 
to oppose such an “Intergovernmental Arrangement” among the countries of the eurozone. 
However, the UK could and should obviously demand that this arrangement be compatible 
with the EU Treaties.  
21) Besides, the members of the eurozone might, for reasons of coherence and also of political 
visibility, decide that the Additional Treaty could have other ambitions than in EMU 
matters stricto sensu, for example : 
- in the policy of immigration, as linked to the labour market; 
- in giving new political rights to the citizens of the countries involved, after a few years of 
residence; 
- in encouraging swift progress in judicial cooperation in civil matters, especially the law of 
contracts and family law with cross-borders implications, in order to try and make life 
easier for families of different nationalities; 
- in armament industry cooperation, aiming at a common public procurement; moreover, 
as regards defense policy, it is not excluded that some of the Contracting Parties consider 
that the time has come for the implementation among them of the “Permanent Structured 
Cooperation” foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty. If these last issues were to be considered as 
raising a difficulty for the UK, the British Government might think about launching other 
ideas in that domain, if that would better suit the UK’s interests. This might be welcome 
by the other EU States, as it is difficult to conceive a group of European countries going 
ahead on defence matters without the active participation of the UK. 
22) ONE OF THE ISSUES CONCERNING THE UK WOULD BE TO KNOW IF A NEW 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD ENTAIL A NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, DISTINCT FROM THE EU’S INSTITUTIONS 
23) It would be in the interest of all to avoid the establishment of new organs, in order not to 
make the picture of Europe more complex than it is already today.  
24) In principle, this should not be problematic for some institutions: the EU Court of Justice, 
the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank could work, in their present 
composition and without any change to their status, in the implementation of an “ 
Intergovernmental Arrangement”, subject to the acquiescence of all EU Member States. One 
could hardly see what would be the interest of the UK in opposing this. Actually, British 
nationals are members of all these institutions. It would look better for the UK (and the 
other EU Member States non members of the eurozone) to accept that these institutions 
work for the eurozone as well as for the EU, rather than pushing the Contracting Parties to 
create new organs, which would appear to be legally feasible, even if politically unadvisable. 
25) As for the European Council and the Council, the current situation would not be changed. 
Meetings of the 17 are already taking place back-to-back with them, both at the level of 
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Heads of State or Government and at the level of ministers responsible for economic and 
financial affairs. 
26) The issue of the possible role to be conferred on both the European Parliament and the 
Commission would be more difficult. 
27) It is quite obvious that, given its content, the implementation of an Additional Treaty would 
make it an absolute requirement to have strong, effective and legitimate democratic control. 
For legal reasons (text of the EU Treaties), it would look a priori impossible to use only the 
MEPs from the eurozone countries.2 For political reasons, it would be difficult to use the 
entire European Parliament which, moreover, would not bring sufficient political 
legitimacy, especially in these matters, which are in the remit of National Parliaments, which 
have the power to decide on taxes. It would also be difficult to ask the National Parliaments 
of the States concerned to accept an important transfer of their powers in such essential 
domains, without giving them any say when corresponding decisions will be made at the 
European level. The logical solution would therefore be to establish a Delegation composed 
of Representatives of the National Parliaments concerned and to confer upon it a real power 
of co-decision and control.  
28) As to the Commission, it would be difficult to imagine the EU Commission, composed of 
one member for each of the 27 (soon to be 28) EU Member States, taking (at least 
theoretically) all its decisions by a simple majority, being in charge of monitoring and 
imposing its decisions in essential matters to a group of them. However, it would be even 
more difficult to envisage the creation of a new organ with a whole range of similar 
functions, as well as with the necessary human resources which that would require. A 
solution might be found through the establishment of a small political organ, exercising 
limited tasks by itself, and out-sourcing their preparation, as well as other tasks, to other 
bodies, including to the EU Commission, if this was accepted by all EU Member States.  
29) This would look easier if the EU Commission were re-organised, in order to be more 
efficient, assertive and independent, both from the Member States and from the European 
Parliament, in particular at a time when more powers are conferred upon it for the 
governance of the euro. The UK might be interested in such a way out, especially if it helps 
re-organising the EU Commission, which has been regrettably weakened over the last two 
decades or so. 
30) THE IMPERATIVE FOR THE UK WOULD BE TO REQUEST AND OBTAIN RESPECT 
AND PROTECTION OF ITS RIGHTS AND INTERESTS  
31) The UK will certainly demand that the eurozone should not establish itself as the first class 
of a permanent two-class or two-tier EU. Any action of what should remain a temporary 
group should be excluded in areas pertaining to the exclusive competence of the EU, 
including the areas of shared competence where the EU has already exercised its 
competences. The group should be forbidden to deal with issues directly linked, inter alia, to 
the internal market, external trade or foreign policy.  
32) It should respect the normal functioning of the EU and of its institutions. Priority should 
always be given to proposals of the Commission to act or to legislate in the framework of the 
                                                 
2 This might be seen as going against the letter and the spirit of the provisions of the EU Treaties on the European Parliament. Article 
10(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that “citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament”. 
The mandate of MEPs is a European and not a national one. Actually, there are numerous acts voted in the EP that do not apply to all 
twenty-seven EU Member States, for example legal acts concerning fisheries, mountain areas, or specific kinds of industry. 
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 EU. The cohesion of the EU should be preserved, both in the internal market and in foreign 
policy. 
33) An Intergovernmental Arrangement, legally binding or not, should always remain open to 
accession for the other EU Member States, and foresee means to help those of “the others” 
willing and able to join. Actually, “the others” include States whose stated policy is to have 
the euro as their currency as soon as possible. Once these States will have ratified the “Fiscal 
Compact” and confirmed their policy, they might be offered an “active observer status” in 
the organs of the eurozone group.  
34) As for the others, including the UK, they should insist that their concerns be taken into 
account and allayed. Provisions ensuring the legal protection of their rights and interests 
should be included in any new Intergovernmental Agreement. Firstly, openness and 
transparency should be ensured. Secondly, legal rules, whose respect should be under the 
judicial control of the Court of Justice of the EU, should guarantee the group’s strict 
compliance with the letter and spirit of the EU Treaties, in particular of the rules on the 
internal market. 
******* 
35) Solving the current crisis of the eurozone would obviously be good for all EU Members, 
including the UK. It would be in the interest of the UK that the members of the eurozone 
organise themselves in order to solve durably the crisis, on the condition that the rights and 
interests of the UK be strictly and legally protected.  
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and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food 
Summary 
• the December 2011 European Council did not disrupt business and was not a 
watershed. 
• the EU can accommodate different national needs without the dangers of a ‘two-tier’ 
Europe. 
• political changes in France and elsewhere open a new debate on how to restore 
growth in Europe; the UK must play a full part. 
• in other important areas of EU activity, the UK has an important contribution to 
make. 
• HMG should see its role in the EU in constructive not defensive terms, and present it 
in this way to Parliament and the British public. 
 no need and many dangers in trying to 
haps as part of a package of measures acceptable to 
the UK resulting from the current debate. 
1. The December 2011 European Council was not, and should not be seen as a watershed. 
Whatever the arguments for and against the position taken by HMG at the meeting, its effect 
was not to block progress. With characteristic ingenuity, the EU institutions found a way of 
dealing with the UK’s unwillingness to sign up to the draft fiscal declaration. It is 
encouraging that, since the meeting, HMG has shown every sign of wishing to proceed with 
‘business as usual’. The eurozone crisis is too serious to worry too much about legal niceties. 
2. Over the years, the EU has shown itself adept at accommodating different requirements of 
the member states. It abounds in derogations, opt-outs, partial membership, special treatment 
and other departures from a monolithic structure. I see
formalise this practice into some kind of two-tier EU. 
3. It is now clear, notably with the arrival of a new French President, that a new debate on 
how to deal with the economic crisis is beginning. It may not reopen the Fiscal Treaty as such 
but it will certainly lead to a vigorous challenge to its adequacy as a means of solving the 
many problems of recession, unemployment and banking failures. In one form or another, 
there will be more emphasis on parallel policies to stimulate growth. This will be an EU-wide 
debate and it is therefore important that the UK should play its full part in it. It could also 
provide a convenient opportunity for the Fiscal Treaty to be incorporated into the EU 
Treaties. Since its contents accord so closely with current UK policy, there seems no reason 
why HMG should not give its consent, per
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4. I note with satisfaction that the Committee’s enquiry is “starting from the assumption that 
the UK should and will remain an EU Member”. This must surely be right. But at present the 
UK is not getting full value from its membership. The Committee could play a very valuable 
role in asking, more generally than the particular questions on which the Committee has 
sought evidence, how the UK Government should play its role as an EU member. All too 
often in the past, under governments of different persuasions, the UK has put itself on the 
defensive in Europe. Hence it is often seen by others as a reluctant member, not willing to 
engage constructively and all too often seeking special treatment for the UK. 
5.  When we were fighting for a fair UK budgetary contribution such an attitude was 
inevitable and the legacy is still with us. But that touches only one aspect of EU policy. There 
are others where the UK can and should have a positive contribution. That has always been 
true of trade policy where the generally liberal trade policies have owed much to British 
influence. Even in agriculture, the CAP, albeit still absorbing too large a share of the budget, 
has changed significantly for the better in ways much closer to UK thinking. In those areas 
where the EU has still not achieved a single market, there is much for the UK to play for.  
6. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is a hugely important and growing part of 
the EU’s activities. Here, surely, with its basis in co-operation rather than majority voting, is 
a place where the UK by virtue of its history and diplomatic skills can and should play a 
leading role. 
7.  If, in these and other areas, the UK Government can be seen actively to serve British and 
European interests well, it would offer public opinion good news to counterbalance the 
negative and often misleading accounts currently offered by the media. Its actions and 
decisions need to be explained to Parliament and to the British public not in confrontational 
terms but as being the result of honest negotiation and in terms which show where the 
outcome has been beneficial for Britain and of the EU as a whole. As I wrote in 1990,1 “by 
all means let Britain act in the future more as though what is good for Britain is good for the 
Community, but we need also to believe that what is good for the Community may be good 
for Britain”.        
18 May 2012 
                                                     








history a European Church.  It recognizes that to have any  influence  in Brussels  it needs to 








impression  that  it  was  an  unreliable  partner.  An  opportunity  to  show  solidarity  with 
partners was missed. The UK must work to rebuild trust with its EU partners. 
 
• Successive  British  governments  have  failed  to  articulate  a  policy  towards  the  United 
Kingdom’s  closest  partners  that  sustains  public  opinion  while  enabling  it  to  take  a 
constructive  line across  the board. Unless  future governments develop more constructive 






• By  agreeing  a  legally  binding  intergovernmental  agreement  outside  the  scope  of  the  EU 
Treaties, signatories  to  the  fiscal compact have marginalised  the EU  institutions and  in so 















comment on  social and political  issues on behalf of  the Church. The Council  comprises a 





















have  been  endorsed  by  the  General  Synod,  its  representative  assembly.  The  Church  of 
England engages with the European Union to ensure a values based approach to Europe's 
development.  It  does  so  in  order  to  build  a  humane,  socially  conscious  and  sustainable 
Europe at peace with itself and its neighbours. 
 
To what  extent  should the December 2011  European Council and its outcome 
be  seen as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union?  
6. The 2011 December European Council was  less a watershed  in Britain’s  relationship with 
the EU as  it was  the natural and  inevitable consequence of decisions  taken by  successive 
British governments over the last two decades.  
 
7. The decision not to  join the Euro until the economic conditions are right, and only then  if 
approved  by  referenda,  has  meant  that  Britain  has  always  been  detached  from 
conversations  regarding  the governance of  the Eurozone. One of  the  stated  reasons why 
past governments have opposed membership of the Eurozone is that along with monetary 
union must come closer fiscal integration. There is therefore a ‘remorseless logic’ of closer 
integration  in‐built  into  the  Euro  project  that  Britain  has  rightly  or  wrongly  decided  to 
exclude itself from.  
 
8. Moving  beyond  Eurozone  specifics,  the  2011  European Union  Act  acts  as  an  emergency 
brake on Britain's relationship with the EU by requiring any proposed EU Treaty or Treaty 
change  to be  subject  to a  referendum. As a number of Lords Spiritual pointed out at  the 
Second  Reading,  the  Bill  ties  the  government’s  hands  in  future  Treaty  negotiations  by 
delegating  authority  to  the  people  acting  through  a  referendum.  The  relatively  negative 
state of public opinion towards the EU (in 2011 opinion polls  indicated for the first time a 






even  if  that  means  working  outside  the  formal  structures  of  the  EU,  is  symptomatic  of 
Britain’s waning influence in Europe and its declining ability to cultivate allies in Europe. 33
 Between  now   and  2020,  what  institutional  architecture  and  membership 
should  the UK  seek  for  the EU?  Should  the UK embrace a  formalised  two  (or 
more)­tier  EU  and  start   to  develop  ideas  for  multiple   forms  of  EU 
membership? 
10. Institutional  architecture  and  membership  should  be  the  servants  of  the  issues  and 
priorities  that  can  be  anticipated,  not  goals  in  themselves.  Economic  austerity  and  its 
consequences  are  likely  to  dominate  policy,  not  just  in  the United  Kingdom,  but  across 





and positive  conceptions and  commitments  to  the EU,  sell  these  ideas  to an  increasingly 
sceptical domestic audience, and find friends in Europe. Unless it does so the UK could find 
itself  slowly  drifting  towards  the  exit.  That  would  be  a  travesty  given  the  positive 
contribution that Britain has made to the EU since it joined in 1973. 
 
12. Any notion  that  the UK could somehow  turn  to  ‘like‐minded’ member states  to define an 
alternative  to  a  core  of  more  ‘integrationist’  member  states  was  shown  by  events  in 
December to be unrealistic. The problem of the December European Council was not that of 
two camps, but of a single camp with one major player outside  it, despite  its vital  interest 
being at stake.  
 
13. The  events  of  December  have  shown  that,  despite  differences  of  approach  between 
member  states,  almost  all wish  to  travel  together  based  on  a  recognition  of  continuing 





14. Existing  European  Treaties  provide  for  enhanced  cooperation  between  member  states. 
Britain should  look  to use  this Treaty provision  to develop permanent areas of structured 
cooperation with like‐minded member states on issues of strategic concern across the other 
two pillars of the EU. An obvious area which would benefit  from enhanced cooperation  is 
the field of defence and security and  it  is an area where Britain can play a  leadership role. 
Such an approach might ensure  that Britain  is  seen as a  full and committed EU member, 
even if it absents itself from the Eurozone and its governance structures. 
 
15. Under this arrangement member states are  likely to find themselves operating  in different 
contexts  with  a  different  mix  of  partners  and  travelling  at  differing  speeds  rather  than 





unpack  some  of  the  obstacles  that  currently  impede  the  future  enlargement  of  the 
European Union. Enlargement has run into the ground within the current EU. But a messier 




















19. From  a UK  perspective  the Government  needs  to move  beyond  the  defensive measures 
provided by the 2011 European Union Act to articulate new channels by which voters can 




What  is  the  relationship  between  the  new   ‘fiscal  compact’   Treaty  and  the 
EU’s acquis?  What impact  might the conclusion  of the  ‘fiscal compact’  Treaty 
have  on  other  aspects  of  the  EU  and  its  policies,   such  as  the  EU  budget, 
enlargement, or the Common Foreign and Security  Policy? 
20. As  the  Lord  Bishop  of Guildford made  clear  in  the  EU  debate  of  16  February  it  is  to  be 
welcomed  that Britain has  taken  a more pragmatic  line when  it  comes  to  the use of  EU 
institutions in the workings of the fiscal compact.  
 








22. It was possible  that over  time  the  ‘Euro core’ even without  the complication of  the  fiscal 
compact would  increasingly speak with one voice within  the EU as well as outside  it. The 
fiscal compact threatens to accelerate this process. Although history suggests that countries 
tend not to act as a cohesive caucus there is clearly a risk of signatories to the fiscal compact 
agreeing  a  single  position  and  only  then  negotiating  with  others.  It  is  important  that 
assurances are in place beyond those set out in the fiscal compact that key policy areas such 
as  the single market, common  trade policy and  the common budget will be negotiated at 
the level of all 27 member states rather than being decided by a subset of the EU.  
 
23. Externally,  there  is  a danger  that  these new  arrangements will  impair  the  EU’s  ability  to 
present a coherent and unified position to others and in international forums with the result 
that  the benefits of a common  foreign and  security policy  remain unrealized. The EU has 
built  a  reputation  for  being  fiercely  committed  to  a  global  order  based  on  strong, 
multilateral  rules  and  institutions.  It  supports  free  trade,  the United Nations  and  global 35
solutions  to  challenges  such  as  climate  change,  economic  marginalization,  poverty  and 
organized crime.  
 
24. As  suggested by  the  Lord Bishop of  Exeter  in  a  supplementary question  in  the House of 
Lords on 8 December 2011 the EU’s international reputation has already been dented by its 
handling of the Eurozone crisis, but its soft power could be further eroded if others find the 
way  it organises  itself  less attractive. We suspect  it will be hard for the EU to meet future 
challenges if an important geopolitical country such as Britain is excluded from its core.  
 
25. We  note  here  the  ongoing  discussions  between  France,  Germany  and  Italy  as  to  the 
possibility of unilaterally establishing their own joint representation at the IMF which might 





Should  the UK Government  support   the  incorporation of  the  ‘fiscal compact’ 
Treaty  into  the  EU  Treaties?   If  it   should, what  demands  and  safeguards,  if 
any, should it  make its condition for doing so? 
26. The EU and the Eurozone had various options available to them to resolve the institutional 
crisis  that  lies  behind  the  euro  crisis.  They  could  have  continued  with  the  policy  of 




27. None  of  these  options  provide(d)  a  cast  iron  solution  to  the  problems  affecting  the 
Eurozone, but we consider the third option the most risky and least attractive. It potentially 




28. It  is  in Britain’s  interests that this fiscal compact and/or  its provisions are folded back  into 
existing EU Treaties as soon as possible. Those wishing to press ahead with a stability union 











30. Taken  together  these measures might go  some way  to dispelling  the  impression given  in 








Written evidence from Professor Clive H. Church, Dr Paolo Dardanelli and 
Sean Mueller, Centre for Swiss Politics, University of Kent 
 
The ‘Swiss Model’ of Relations with the EU and its relevance for the UK 
Executive Summary 
1. The idea that it would be advantageous for the UK to adopt the ‘Swiss model’ of relations 
with the EU instead of membership is neither new nor politically neutral. 
2. The suggestion is based on a poor understanding of the features of such a ‘model’ and of 
the conditions within which it operates. 
3. Actual Swiss relations with the EU have disadvantages as well as advantages. 
4. A careful examination of the Swiss experience suggests that the Swiss ‘model’ is inferior 
to the status quo of UK-EU relations. 
5. The UK should try to preserve a unified institutional structure for the EU in the face of 
pressures for a formalised two-tier architecture. 
0. Submitters 
Clive H. Church is Emeritus Professor of European Studies, Paolo Dardanelli Lecturer in 
European and Comparative Politics, and Sean Mueller a doctoral researcher in Comparative 
Politics, all at the University of Kent’s Centre for Swiss Politics. Prof. Church has been working 
on Switzerland since the 1970s and published three books, notably the edited volume 
Switzerland and the European Union (Routledge 2007). Dr Dardanelli is the author of a series of 
articles and book chapters on Swiss politics while Mr Mueller, a Swiss national, is completing a 
PhD on inter-governmental relations in Switzerland. 
1. Purpose 
It is sometimes claimed that Switzerland’s relations with the EU might provide a better model 
for the UK than membership. The claim is generally based on a limited understanding of the 
Switzerland-EU ‘model’ and especially of the conditions within which it operates. The purpose 
of the present evidence is to outline key features of Switzerland’s actual relations with the EU 





I. SWISS RELATIONS WITH THE EU 
 
2. The Idea of a Swiss ‘model’ 
Those who suggest the UK adopts the ‘Swiss model’ proceed from admiration for Switzerland’s 
economic and political performance. However, the reasons for this are rarely spelled out. They 
have to be teased out of a series of broad statements about free trade and bilateral cooperation. 
Critics of UK membership tend to believe the main pillars of the Swiss model to be a popular 
refusal to join the EU; government intransigence towards ‘Brussels’; one-to-one free trade deals 
with the EU; co-operation in other areas of use to Switzerland; a separate currency; a limited/part 
time parliament; and referenda. However, whether all this amounts to a ‘model’, either in the 
sense of a single, deliberate Swiss creation or a template accepted by all those who urge the UK 
to follow the Swiss example, is far from certain. 
3. Background 
Membership of any supranational organisation was long considered incompatible with the 
country’s traditional policy of neutrality. Switzerland did not get involved in the early phases of 
European integration and stayed outside both the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Economic Community. It joined, however, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) in 1960 and the Council of Europe in 1963 as these organisations were by then 
perceived not to encroach on neutrality and sovereignty. In 1972, along with the other EFTA 
states, it signed a treaty with the EU on free trade of manufactured goods. 
4. EEA negotiations and EU application 
The emergence after 1989 of a narrower conception of neutrality, and the changing international 
context led Switzerland to take part in the negotiations to create the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and to apply for EU membership in May 1992. Ratification of the EEA treaty, however, 
narrowly failed in a referendum in December 1992. The campaign exposed deep divisions within 
Swiss society and led to a record high turnout. Subsequent events have confirmed the caution of 
the Swiss electorate about further integration, although pragmatism has often won out over 
Europhobia. 
5. The bilateral approach 
After the EEA vote, the country embarked on a bilateral approach, aiming to sign separate 
treaties covering a range of policy areas so as to fill the gaps left by being outside the EEA. The 
first main package of bilateral treaties proved difficult to negotiate and only came into effect, 
after endorsement in a referendum, in 2002. It contained seven separate agreements on free 
movement of persons; technical barriers to trade; public procurements; agriculture; research; and 
overland transport. A second package was signed in October 2004. Its nine separate agreements 
entered into force at different times, according to different ratification requirements: processed 
agricultural goods, pensions, and taxation of savings (all three in force since 2005); environment 
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and media/film industry (both 2006; renewed film agreement signed in 2007 and in force since 
2010); statistics (2007); Schengen/Dublin (2008; airports 2009); education (2010), and fight 
against fraud (not yet ratified by all EU states; applied by Switzerland since 2009 with those that 
have). In these areas, EU law directly applies to Switzerland. At least 120 other technical 
agreements are also in place, some dating back to the post war years. Switzerland also 
contributes financially to EU cohesion and research policies. 
6. Informal Integration 
The EU’s impact on Switzerland goes beyond the effect of formal treaties. In order to make its 
economy as EU-compatible as possible, the country has adopted a policy of ‘voluntary 
adaptation’ whereby Swiss law is aligned with the EU’s acquis communautaire. A prominent 
example is the incorporation of the Cassis de Dijon principle into domestic law in 2010. Recent 
research shows that around 55 per cent of the laws passed by the Swiss parliament concern 
transposition of international, including EU, law. The bilateral treaties and the country’s 
voluntary adaptation have led to Switzerland being much more deeply integrated with the EU 
than suggested by its formal status as a non-member. Indeed, in certain respects such integration 
is deeper than that of EU members such as the UK, as the case of Schengen shows. 
7. Advantages 
7.1 The resulting relationship clearly has many attractions for Switzerland. If initially it was a 
fallback option in the face of a lack of popular support for membership, it has come to be seen by 
both the elite and the electorate as the best way of managing the country’s relations with the EU. 
7.2 The bilateral way essentially enables Switzerland to benefit from access to the single market 
while retaining a degree of political autonomy in other spheres. Compared to EU membership, 
such autonomy is particularly significant in monetary, fiscal, trade, and agricultural policy. It 
also exempts the country from making a contribution to the EU budget commensurate with the 
size of its economy. 
7.3 Symbolically, the bilateral way preserves the formal trappings of state sovereignty and 
allows the unencumbered exercise of direct democracy. The bilateral way has so far served the 
country rather well. After a difficult period in the early 1990s, the economy has been highly 
successful over the last 15 years. At least some of this success can plausibly be attributed to its 
pragmatic partial integration with the EU. 
8. Disadvantages 
8.1 The most fundamental disadvantage is that Switzerland finds itself directly or indirectly 
compelled to adopt much of EU law without having any say in the process of making such law. 
The EU has made it clear that access to decision-making can only come with membership, so 
this is unlikely to change. The paradox is thus that an arrangement meant to protect 
Switzerland’s autonomy is actually eroding it. Indeed, some say Switzerland is a vassal or 
satellite of the EU. 
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8.2 The legal framework of the bilateral approach is cumbersome, fragmented and static. The 
linked nature of most of the treaties makes individual agreements potentially hostage to others. 
This complicates their adaptation to the evolving acquis communautaire. A subsequent negative 
vote in a referendum might endanger the whole initial package. Moreover, while the Swiss 
government has contemplated negotiating a third set of treaties, the EU has made it plain that it 
believes the bilateral road has come to an end and that in the future the relationship would have 
to be based on quasi-automatic acceptance of EU law. The government has aired proposals on 
the basis of which Switzerland would ‘provisionally’ adopt the evolving acquis under the 
supervision of a Swiss monitoring agency and subject to direct democracy challenges. But the 
EU has already signalled its opposition to such an arrangement. 
8.3 Some of the advantages also have a negative side to them. Freedom of movement has led to a 
substantial influx of labour and exacerbated tensions around the high percentage of non-nationals 
in the country (22 per cent). In April 2012, the Swiss government decided to cap immigration 
from the post-2004 EU states under a safeguard provision, attracting vocal EU criticism. The 
rapid appreciation of the Swiss franc in the context of the Eurozone crisis has also created 
problems. The Swiss National Bank tried to cap the currency’s rise by committing itself to 
maintaining a lower bound of Sfr 1.20 to the euro, a stance now being tested by the markets.  
9. Conclusions 
9.1 The Swiss ‘model’ of relations with the EU is one of considerable integration without 
membership. It would be erroneous to interpret it as ‘market access without the burden of 
regulation’ as the impact of EU law on Switzerland is very extensive. Equally, the idealized view 
of an intransigent and wholly aloof stance is not borne out in practice. Moreover, while 
bilateralism has served the country well so far, there are serious doubts as to whether it can 
continue to do so. Switzerland thus finds itself in an impasse, with the bilateral room for 
manoeuvre increasingly narrow, on the one hand, and severe domestic obstacles in the way of a 
more comprehensive agreement – or membership – on the other. 
9.2 Switzerland has not ruled out membership altogether. Although joining is no longer active 
government policy, the application submitted in 1992 has not been formally withdrawn despite 
much pressure for this. A fundamental obstacle is presented by negative public opinion and high 
constitutional hurdles. Under the country’s federal system, membership would have to be 
approved in a referendum by a double majority of citizens and cantons. As some of the latter are 
very small and strongly anti-EU, observers estimate that close to a 60 per cent popular majority 
would be needed to clear the cantonal majority requirement. The present state of public opinion 
is very far from that: only around 20 per cent favour EU entry, although attempts to insert a ten-
year moratorium on entry into the Constitution have recently failed. 
9.3 Switzerland thus faces a fundamental trade-off, pitting the autonomy derived in some areas 
from staying outside the EU against the costs of not having access to EU decision-making. The 
viability of the bilateral model rests on the former being greater than the latter. While this might 
have been true in the past, as the country’s de facto integration continues – hence its autonomy 
shrinks – there are increasing concerns that costs might soon outweigh benefits. 
40
   
II. THE MODEL’S RELEVANCE FOR THE UK 
10. Origins of the idea 
The idea that the UK should adopt the Swiss model of relations with the EU is neither new nor 
politically neutral. It has its roots in calls for the UK to rejoin EFTA and was advocated in the 
late 1980s by the Bruges Group. More recently, it has been advanced by Daniel Hannan MEP, 
Sir Rocco Forte and others. Thus David Campbell Bannerman MEP told the EP that the UK 
should replace membership by ‘a free trade agreement, an arrangement very successfully 
adopted by Switzerland, saving it CHF 3.4bn.’ In other words, the idea has come mainly from 
critics of the EU. Some have also called for the adoption of features of the Swiss system in the 
UK, notably direct democracy and decentralisation. 
11. Applicability to the UK 
However, the model has significant limitations even for Switzerland. Any discussion over its 
applicability to the UK must also take into account the major differences between the two 
countries. While some of them would work in favour of the UK, others would make the model 
even less attractive for the country than it is for Switzerland. 
12. Levels of interdependence 
A first important aspect is the different level of interdependence with the EU. Because of its size, 
economic structure, and geographical location, the UK is less dependent on (the rest of) the EU 
than Switzerland is – the EU buys 60 per cent of Swiss exports. A hypothetical UK-EU bilateral 
relationship would thus be less asymmetrical than the Switzerland-EU relationship at present. 
This could mean that the UK would find itself in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU 
and be better able to secure advantageous terms. 
13. ‘Withdrawal’ versus ‘rapprochement’ 
A fundamental difference, however, is that Switzerland has come to the present model through 
progressive rapprochement to the EU. The UK would have to adopt it after having left the EU. 
The two dynamics are obviously very different and might produce different attitudes on the part 
of the EU. While the EU has been more accommodating in its approach to Switzerland than 
might have been expected, this is now changing, and could rub off on attitudes to the UK after 
renegotiation or withdrawal.  
14. No such thing as ‘free trade without regulation’ 
As outlined, the Swiss model is essentially one of considerable integration without membership, 
not of rejection of integration. Crucially, it includes acceptance of EU economic regulation 
without a say in shaping such regulation. If support for the Swiss model in the UK is motivated 
by a desire to escape EU regulation, then the former certainly is not the way to pursue that 
objective. If the UK left the EU, it could only retain access to the single market by also accepting 
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regulation, and would have no influence over the making of such rules – or certainly less than at 
present. 
15. Savings versus influence trade-off 
The UK already enjoys a tailor-made, semi-detached form of EU membership – which leaves it 
outside two of the key areas of integration, monetary union and Schengen, but with the option of 
joining them any time – while Switzerland has joined Schengen. Hence, the Swiss situation’s 
chief attraction for the UK essentially rests on the savings the country would make if it did not 
have to pay member-level contributions to the EU budget. While such savings would be 
substantial, they should be set against the loss of influence the UK would suffer from 
withdrawing from the EU. In broad, as opposed to narrow accounting, terms, the costs of the 
latter would almost certainly be greater than the benefits of the former. 
16. The impact of possible EU restructuring 
It is possible that the EU will restructure in the direction of a two-tier, core and periphery, 
architecture as a response to the Eurozone crisis. If so, the key question for the UK would be 
what level of access to institutions and decision-making the ‘outer’ members would have. Should 
restructuring go as far as effectively marginalising the non-core countries, membership of such 
‘periphery’ would come to resemble membership of the EEA. This would raise questions in the 
UK as to whether the terms of the trade-off outlined above would still be in the country’s 
interests. In such a scenario, the Swiss model might become more attractive for the UK. It would 
be premature, though, to assume a restructuring along these lines. While the ‘remorseless logic’ 
of integration, as the Chancellor put it, is certainly at play in the Eurozone, there are powerful 
obstacles in the way of fundamentally changing EU membership into separate ‘classes’. 
17. Conclusions 
Many of the advocates of the Swiss model in the UK have an imperfect understanding of the 
features of actual Swiss practice and the challenges it is currently facing. In particular, they fail 
to appreciate that the model does not deliver free trade without regulation and that it carries high 
costs in terms of influence. The ‘selective’ form of membership the UK currently enjoys appears 
clearly superior to the Swiss model, even from a narrow cost-benefit analysis, let alone from 
wider considerations such as the UK’s place in the world etc. Unless the ‘constitutional’ 
architecture of the EU changes dramatically in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, this situation is 
unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE 
18. Swiss model unsuited to the UK 
Our central recommendation is that the Committee should consider the Swiss ‘model’ of bilateral 
treaties as unsuited to the UK. It would be an inferior form of pursuing the country’s interests in 
its relations with the rest of Europe compared to the status quo, because it would mean giving up 
political leverage over fundamental EU decisions. 
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19. December 2011 European Council and the ‘fiscal compact’ 
We would not over-emphasise the significance of the December 2011 European Council. While 
the ‘fiscal compact’ is important, it has not so far greatly impinged on thinking about the Swiss 
‘model’ or on actual Swiss relations with the EU. The latter continue to focus on banking 
secrecy, tax policy and the question of finding a mutually acceptable form of institutional and 
policy cooperation. However, in line with much Swiss opinion which sees the history and 
structure of Swiss nation building as something which the Union should adopt, one think tank 
has seen it as another potential case where the EU might use Switzerland as a model. This points 
to the fact that the fiscal compact, assuming it comes into effect in its present form, and 
especially if it is incorporated into the treaty base, could well introduce a new element of EU-
directed control of national economic and financial policies. 
20. UK position on a ‘two-tier’ EU 
The UK is already in a de facto special form of membership but has full access to the institutions 
and formal decision-making. A more formalised division into two tiers that would limit 
institutional access and influence on decision-making would be unlikely to be in the country’s 
interests. The UK should thus try to retain a unified institutional structure for the EU. 
2
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FEU 09 
Written evidence from Civitatis International 
 
About Civitatis International 
Civitatis International is an independent and supranational think-tank on global governance. 
Civitatis International is composed of a global network of leading international relations 
professors and practitioners around the world who research according to the editorial mandate 
of Civitatis International: Constructive solutions to the common global challenges and crucial 
issues facing mankind’s civilization now and in the future. 
Civitatis International works with stakeholders around the world as a supranational research 
institute independent of any state interest so as to effectively analyse and propose solutions to 
the interlinked global challenges. Civitatis International publishes its high-level research on 
global issues to former and serving heads of state and government and global stakeholders. 
Policy Seminar: The Future of Europe 
Civitatis International convened a policy seminar on “The Future of Europe: Towards the 
European Dream?” at the Office of the European Parliament in London on April 19th 2012. 
Sir Peter Marshall KCMG CVO, Former Deputy Secretary General of the Commonwealth and 
distinguished British diplomat, chaired the seminar. The discussants included: Mr. Edward 
Mortimer CMG, Former Chief Programme Officer of the Salzburg Global Seminar and former 
speechwriter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Mr. Daniel Ottolenghi, Head of the 
London Office of the European Investment Bank; Mr. Maurice Fraser, Senior Fellow in 
European Politics at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Associate 
Fellow at Chatham House and Professor Christopher Coker, Lecturer in International 
Relations at the London School of Economics and former member of the Council of the Royal 
United Services Institute. 
Taking part in the Civitatis International policy seminar were: Ambassadors to the Court of St 
James’s; First Political Officers and Embassy representatives from key nations; former British 
Ambassadors and diplomats; representatives from the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office; Former Members of the British Parliament; the Atlantic Council and 
CEOs of City of London companies. Also in attendance were selected young leaders from the 
British political parties and London’s leading universities.  
The basis of the seminar was to explore the greater vision for the future of the EU in a broader 
context and not necessarily for the specific interests of each member state. Therefore our 
recommendations to the UK Foreign Affairs Committee drawn below are specifically to 
questions 1 and 2 as submission of evidence.  




Summary to Recommendations 
Some of the solutions derived from the seminar included: Retelling the European story in a way 
that engages and makes sense to all Europeans; emphasizing not what divides us but focusing 
on what brings us together as Europeans; reaffirming the values on which Europe was built 
and not allowing politicians to override those values; building a new European economic 
growth based on an increased European competitiveness in the global market; accepting the 
new realities of the changing world order towards a more communitarian world and that the 
European cosmopolitan model may not become universal. 
1.      Observations and Factual Information Derived from the Civitatis Seminar 
1.1. The current pockets of optimism for Europe appear to be, on the surface, more 
economic, as opposed to political, and in terms of any separation between the two, a 
‘two-tier’ Europe appears to exist. However this is not just simply political versus 
economic, since there are aspects of economic union which are very important to 
countries such as Britain, the single market particularly, and equally there are aspects 
of the political which not all Eurozone members are willing to fully sign up for. 
‘Variable Geometry’ or ‘Multi-speed’ Europe is the best description of Europe's 
current state. Phrases like ‘two-tier’ imply some sort of automatic division. The 
situation is infinitely complicated and unless there is full political union it is bound 
to exist. Sovereign states will always want to do different things. How far will it be 
possible to organise some sort of fiscal union without it drawing in its train 
everything else? The language of ‘two-tiers’ is unhelpful. There must be more 
flexibility than terms of ‘two-tiers’ or ‘two-speed’, and so ‘Variable Geometry’ is a 
better phrase for the UK government to use. 
1.2. It is imperative that Europe overcomes the Eurozone crisis, because apart from the 
economic damage, it decreases talk of integration and increases the language of 
break-up; of the Eurozone or perhaps even of the European Union. Average 
unemployment in Europe was at 10.9 percent in March 2012, according to the 
Financial Times, and there are nine countries in the European Union with double-
digit unemployment rates. In creditor countries there is growing appeal of 
Eurosceptic populist parties. In debtor countries austerity is perceived as imposed 
by Brussels or hostile Northern European countries, and Europe-wide there is anti-
EU sentiment feeding on the impact of recession. The UK government should look 
into alternatives to austerity. 
1.3. To see growth which might facilitate its aims Europe must achieve an increase in 
competitiveness. This will require both in-depth structural reforms at the national 
level and gains in competitiveness that can be achieved by European action, through 
completing the single market in areas so far untouched, such as many service 
sectors, and potentially developing common infrastructure in transport and energy. 
Some countries, such as Germany, have already progressed greatly, but many others 
still have much to do to improve competitiveness. Here too, there is evidence, 
including that of Germany, suggesting it will take a long time. Mario Monti, the 
Italian Prime Minister, has even said that Italy will need eight years of structural 
reforms. Improving competitiveness will mean reform of labour markets, of 
pension and welfare systems, investments in physical infrastructure, education, 
Research & Development, and at the European level, completing the single market. 
There will be powerful resistance to reform from those who benefit from the 
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existing system.  Current opposition in Greece, or Italy, to structural reforms is 
because they touch the interests of people who are benefiting from the existing 
system. 
1.4. While Europe needs to increase competitiveness, it does not have a problem of a 
finance gap in aggregate. Looking at the EU-27 as a whole, the European Union’s 
balance of payments is essentially in equilibrium. The problem of gaps in foreign 
finance for Europe as a whole would arise if Europe had a balance of payments 
deficit, and in order to finance that deficit it would need recourse to finance from 
countries such as China, Japan, and Brazil. Europe, as a whole, also does not have a 
balance of payments deficit. However there are surplus countries and deficit 
countries, so the problem is of a flow of funds within Europe. There is a reluctance 
already within Europe by European investors to invest in countries which currently 
do not appear to have favourable prospects. Why would Japanese investors, for 
example, want to invest in projects in countries where there is little confidence of a 
sufficient return? This reinforces the argument for improving competitiveness in 
Europe. The moment competitiveness begins to increase private capital will start 
flowing again. A reform that improves the productivity of a rail transport system, 
for example, would very much interest private investors globally.  
1.5. It may be time to start thinking of a wider Europe, and a looser confederation of 
countries, perhaps in stark contrast to any protectionist measures, including 
countries like Turkey. This does not exclude the European project or the European 
Union continuing to go on its way as a free-market, but it does rule out the idea of a 
political state in the near term, because a political state would exclude those other 
European countries that have to be part of the European project. Indeed through a 
broader lens the EU should welcome the fast growth of new emerging powers as 
they could power a major engine of growth for Europe through trade, and therefore 
there needs to be an increasingly open trading system both within the EU and with 
the rest of the world. 
1.6. The emerging economic powers must be factored into European decision-making. 
Many non-Western people see the European Project as a form of regulatory 
imperialism, translating Europe’s minimal political power into maximal political 
power by changing the rules of the game. There are also an increasing number of 
non-Western social advocacy groups and NGOs that do not share the liberal agenda 
of the 75,000 NGOs Europe is familiar with, in areas such as social planning. Much 
of the world does not share Europe’s vision. For example in Africa the Cotonou 
agreement has existed since 2008, a tripartite dialogue between the European Union, 
China and Africa around terms of trade. Europe has tried to use this to influence 
China away from corrupting local officials or using bribery, and to adhere to 
International Labour Organization standards regarding labour practices. However 
those in Africa share the Chinese view not the European view. So perhaps there is a 
failure by the European Union, despite its commitment in its first security paper of 
2003, to underwrite soft power with a military dimension which Solana said was 
essential for civilian power to mean anything in a 21st Century world. 
1.7. There is an emerging common European voice on the world level. It is a voice 
based on European values that speaks on global issues: on climate change, on 
human rights, on democracy, on the breakdown of non-proliferation, and on the 
activities of transnational companies around the world. In terms of trade and 
climate change, it is evident that there is such a thing as collective preferences based 
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on a particular culture and originating in a particular set of values. If Europe intends 
to be serious about multilateralism then it is going to have to develop a new 
emboldened type of multilateralism and back up its values with a credible 
peacemaking capability. 
2.     Civitatis International Recommendations from the Seminar 
 2.1.  Europe must increase its competitiveness. This is imperative if Europe seeks to see 
growth and is the strongest plan to bring Europe out of the Eurozone crisis. This 
will allow the flow of private capital to recommence within Europe, both internally 
and through external investment. 
 2.2. The European story must be retold in a way that engages and makes sense to all 
Europeans. The threat of far-right and -left parties in Europe is very real and many 
people feel disassociated with the European Project. It is important to connect with 
those living in Europe to make them feel like Europeans and become engaged with 
the European story. 
 2.3. Europe should adopt an increased liberal attitude, rejecting insular protectionist 
measures. The future of Europe is not as predictable as it once was and as it is 
rewritten, Europe must ensure that this is not at the cost of the project. Europe 
needs to start rethinking what it should be ultimately by emphasizing not what 
divides but what unites us. 
 2.4. Europe should consider a common military policy. Although it looks unlikely at 
present, if the EU is going to punch at least not under its weight in the future, there 
will need to be some form of common military and foreign policy with teeth. This 
could take the form of an integrated EU Army, Navy, and Air Force. Furthermore, 
Europe should create its own European Security Council, composed solely of EU 
member states, enabling Europe to speak and act with one voice on security issues. 
 2.5. There is a need for a real European identity. Having created Europe there is now a 
need to create Europeans. It may be time to start thinking of a looser confederation 
of countries as the way forward for Europe and through this establish what a 
European identity actually means. This is also true for ideas of the West, which must 
reconsider its own common values and integration, and seek a new model which 
facilitates these.  
 2.6. The EU needs one voice on the global stage, and to enable this each EU country 
should be represented by one voice on the boards of global economic institutions 
such as the IMF and World Bank. A debate should begin on the merits of a directly 
elected, through universal suffrage, executive President of the European Union.  
 2.7. The EU should welcome the growth of the new emerging powers, as they could 
prove an engine for growth within the EU through trade. To enable this Europe 
must promote an increasingly open trading system between itself and the rest of the 
world. 
 2.8. Erecting protectionist barriers, both within Europe and at its borders, would be a 
grave mistake as it would deprive Europe of at least half its potential for growth and 
job creation. Seeking compromise solutions would do a great deal to avoid the 
break-up of the EU, and encourage further integration, as many past crises have 
done. 
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 2.9. Europe must achieve gains in competitiveness by completing the single market in 
areas so far untouched such as many service sectors and developing common 
infrastructure in areas such as transport and energy. Europe must also recognise and 
invest sufficiently into key areas where opportunities for future growth lie, such as 
Research and Development.  
 2.10. The UK should seek to emulate states such as Denmark, Sweden and Germany in 
building models of affordable welfare states within stabilised economies. These 
countries show this existence is not beyond the capabilities of European states such 
as the UK and on a wider scale suggest that competitiveness can be restored without 
eliminating the social protection to which Europe has become accustomed. 
 2.11. If European heads of government do not pull themselves together in matters of 
solidarity with Greece, consolidating the common European values of human rights, 
social justice and delivering real democracy, they risk the break up of the EU and 
the values that it and the broader West stand for. To consolidate the peace of 
Europe, heads of government must build a common defence and energy security 
framework for the E-27 and accession states or the European Dream of a 
cosmopolitan legal and rights based world order risks being eclipsed by one of 
‘Hybrid free-market communism’. The United Kingdom, more so than others, has a 
key interest in and therefore responsibility to secure the peace, values and prosperity 
of the European Union. The British Government, MPs and MEPs should be 
mindful of this in their statements which are noted as representing our resolve on 
the world stage. 





Written evidence from Graham Avery, CMG 
 
1. This submission addresses the following questions posed by the Committee: 
o To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be 
seen as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union? 
o Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should 
the UK seek for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier 
EU and start to develop ideas for multiple forms of EU membership? 
 
2. In summary, I argue that: 
a) The UK’s ‘veto’ at the European Council, as seen by its partners, illustrated 
significant aspects of Britain’s relationship with the EU 
b) The EU already has the characteristics of a multi-tier system; the UK will face 
grave risks if it remains in the outer circle  
c) The UK has a strong interest in participating in the main political and economic 
decisions of the EU, including the shaping of its foreign policy 
 
3. I am a Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Senior Adviser at the 
European Policy Centre, Brussels, and Honorary Director-General of the European 
Commission. My evidence is based on personal experience of 40 years as a senior 
adviser and administrator in Whitehall and Brussels (see biographical note at end). 
 
Implications of the December 2011 European Council 
 
4. The British ‘veto’ at the summit was not, according to commentators, the result of 
strategic planning on the part of the UK, but a response to the unexpected failure of 
negotiations in which the UK requested guarantees for Britain’s financial sector in 
return for ratifying amendments to the Treaty. According to sources in diplomatic 
circles and the EU institutions in Brussels, this incident illustrated a number of aspects 
of Britain’s relationship with the EU: 
a) The partners were unwilling to compensate the UK for ratifying a deal that 
imposed no new obligations on it. As one diplomat remarked ‘we would have 
liked you to join with us in changing the Treaty, but we didn’t see why we should 
pay you for it’  
b) Although the UK’s position was presented as a ‘veto’, it did not stop 25 other 
partners from continuing with the process of ratifying the changes in another way. 
As another diplomat remarked ‘we prefer you to join with us in doing things 
together, but you are not going to stop us from doing things without you if we 
think it’s necessary’ 
 
5. These remarks were made – more in sorrow than in anger – by persons friendly to the 
UK. Others are more critical of British attitudes, for example ‘you continually preach 
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at us, saying that the success of the euro is a priority, but you show little solidarity; as 
a result, Britain loses influence and credibility’. Others have remarked that the 
preparation of the December summit on the UK side was below the professional 
standards expected of British negotiators. 
 
6. The events of December may not represent a watershed in the UK’s relationship with 
the EU, but they did demonstrate that when Britain stands outside important EU 
policies, it has little leverage with its partners. 
 
Multi-tier membership of the EU 
 
7. The EU already has the characteristics of a multi-tier system: 22 of its 27 member 
states are in the Schengen zone, and 17 are in the euro-zone. This has not had much 
impact so far on the EU’s institutions, which still operate mainly in a unitary fashion, 
but the increasing importance of decisions concerning the euro-zone is beginning to 
create problems and tensions that will be aggravated by the recent compact involving 
25 member states. 
 
8. The EU’s enlargement from 15 to 27 did not result, as some predicted, in more 
‘variable geometry’. Although the 12 new members could not join Schengen or the 
euro on their entry to the EU, they have progressively qualified for membership of the 
‘inner circles’ and continue to do so. The UK thus finds itself in a diminishing 
minority in the ‘outer circle’. 
 
9. The Coalition’s Programme for Government stated ‘We will ensure that the British 
Government is a positive participant in the European Union, playing a strong and 
positive role with our partners’. This declaration sits uncomfortably with the actual 
situation in which the UK is a commentator, rather than an actor, in current decisions 
on the euro-zone. 
 
10. Britain’s EU policy encourages by default the development of a multi-tier system in 
which the UK remains in the outer circle. The members of the inner circles will 
continue to develop common actions and common policies, and take decisions 
without other members having a vote or being at the table. Whatever assurances may 
be given, they will naturally tend to ignore the interests of the outer circle. 
 
11. If you are not at the table, your point of view is not likely to be taken into account. 
Decisions taken without you may not go in the direction that you prefer, and may go 
in directions that are against your interests. A non-British commentator has expressed 
it brutally in the following way: ‘if you are not at the table, you will be on the menu’. 
 
12. As a matter of national interest, the UK needs to be involved in all the important 
political and economic decisions concerning Europe. This is a question of realism. If 
the development of common policies is left to Germany, France, Italy and others, this 
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may lead to serious economic and political problems for us. The EU poses difficulties 
and problems for the UK (and for other members) but it remains the most effective 
system that has been devised of organising Europe in political and economic terms. It 
is an illusion to think that, if Britain pulls back, the EU will disintegrate, or limit itself 
to a common market. Without an effective British presence in the balance of power – 
in the inner circle – the EU may move in directions that are not in our interest. 
 
13. Two practical conclusions: 
a) The British government should be more proactive in the development of European 
policies in areas where we have a decisive contribution to make and much to gain; 
this is especially true of foreign policy, a field in which the UK has the experience 
and resources to shape policy in ways that correspond to British interests. 
b) When the sovereign debt crisis is resolved, and the euro-zone is stable, a future 
British government needs to address the question of joining the euro. In the long 
term we cannot evade this question if we are to play a decisive role in Europe. 
 
Britain’s role in the development of EU foreign policy 
 
14. The most important feature of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of new structures 
for foreign policy - the EU’s High Representative and the European External Action 
Service. This reform, which brings together the economic and political instruments of 
foreign policy, offers the possibility for the EU and its member states to act more 
effectively to deal with regional and global problems. 
 
15. There are few areas of foreign policy where the UK can be more successful acting on 
its own than acting together with its European partners. In Beijing, Delhi and Moscow 
the Europeans exert more influence jointly than individually. As for Washington, an 
American diplomat with experience in London and Brussels recently told me ‘in the 
State Department we naturally want to cooperate with the Europeans acting together; 
when they act separately – and particularly without the UK – it’s less useful for us’. 
 
16. Although the European External Action Service – the EU’s embryonic diplomatic 
service – has had a difficult birth, it offers a chance to project the interests and values 
of the EU’s member states in a more efficient and cost-effective way. In this, British 
ideas and British personnel can have a decisive influence. If it’s true that the common 
agricultural policy was fashioned by France, and corresponded largely to France’s 




Graham Avery is Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Senior Adviser 
at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, and Honorary Director-General of the European 
Commission. He has given evidence on a number of occasions to Committees of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords 
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In the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in London (1965-72) he headed the unit 
responsible for negotiations for accession to the EC, and later (1976) served as Private 
Secretary to two Ministers. 
 
In the European Commission in Brussels (1973-2006) he worked in agricultural policy, 
foreign affairs, enlargement policy, and the cabinets of the President and other 
Commissioners. His last post was as Director for Strategy, Coordination and Analysis in the 
Directorate General for External Relations. 
 
He has been Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Fellow at the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence; 
Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, and Secretary General of the Trans European 
Policy Studies Association. 
 
In the Queen’s New Year Honours 2012 he was appointed Companion of the Order of St. 
Michael and St. George (CMG) for services to European affairs. 
 









I welcome  your  Committee’s  decision  to  hold  an  inquiry  on  the  Future  of  the  European 
Union: UK Government policy. 
In providing written evidence I have focused exclusively on addressing the questions posed 
by  the  Committee  rather  than  commenting  on  wider  Eurozone  issues.    However,  I 
appreciate that these issues and broader questions about the Future of the European Union 







they must be seen  in  the context of  the original decision  to set up a single currency 
within the European Union, which  led to the creation of the Eurozone. Greater  fiscal 
cooperation  within  the  Eurozone  is  a  logical  consequence  of  that  decision  and  the 
December European Council is one moment in this process. As the Chancellor has said, 
Eurozone  states need  to  accept  the  remorseless  logic of monetary union  that  leads 














outside  the  euro  area  has  been  proved  correct.  This Government  has  also  enacted 
legislation  (the  European  Union  Act  2011)  to  ensure  that  approval  in  a  national 
referendum would be required by law before the UK could join the euro.  
3. Stability and growth  in the Eurozone, to which 40% of our exports are sold, matter to 














5. There  is  a material difference  in  terms of  the  value of  and  rationale  for  integration 
between  those Member States  in  the Eurozone and  those outside  it. Given  the UK’s 
role outside the euro and having not committed to join the euro, it is right and logical 
that we have said we will not be part of that closer fiscal integration. It is good that we 
have our own economic policy, our own  interest  rates and  the ability  to deal as we 
deem fit with the problems that face our economy. 
Protecting the interests of non‐Eurozone Member States 
6. The  UK  considers  that  under  the  EU  Treaties  there  is  a  proper  role  for  the  EU 
Institutions  in  supporting  the Eurozone and  strengthening  its  internal governance,  in 
the way  that  the  European  Commission  already  suggests measures Member  States, 
including Eurozone Member States, should take to correct an excessive deficit. But the 
interests  of  non‐Eurozone  Member  States  must  also  be  protected  and  the  EU 
Institutions must  not  be  used  in  a way  that  undermines  the  integrity  of  the  Single 
Market. 
7. We want to ensure that the EU  Institutions continue to operate fairly for all Member 
States  and  safeguard  the  Single Market.  This  is  as  important  for  those  current  and 
future members of the EU, for whom it will be many years before they join the euro, as 









the  EU, whilst  advancing  the UK’s  national  interests  and  protecting  its  sovereignty. 
Over  the past  two years, Britain has pursued an active and activist policy  in Europe, 






9. Our  approach  has  not  changed  since  December  and  we  continue  to  play  a  full, 
committed  and  influential  role  in  the  EU.  For  example, we worked  closely with  the 
European  Parliament,  other  Member  States  and  the  Danish  Presidency  to  reach 
agreement earlier this year on the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), 
which  regulates  post‐trading  of  derivatives  and  the  operation  and  governance  of 
Central  Counterparties  and  Trade  Repositories. We welcome  EMIR  as  an  important 
element  in  delivering  on  our  international  commitment  to  reduce  systemic  risk  in 
derivatives markets, and  in negotiations we ensured  that  the  final  regulation upheld 
single market principles. 
10. We  are  also  leading  a  like‐minded  group  on  growth which  spans  both  euro‐ins  and 
euro‐outs.  Together we  are working  to  push  the  Commission  to  implement  various 
reforms to help stimulate economic growth in the EU. 
11. Furthermore, ahead of the March 2012 European Council, the Prime Minister and 11 
other EU  leaders set out an action plan for jobs and growth  in a  letter to Mr. Barroso 
and  Mr.  van  Rompuy.  This  letter  effectively  became  the  agenda  for  the  European 
Council  and our proposals on  free  trade, deregulation  and  completion of  the  Single 





at  its most effective – complementing and  supplementing, not  replacing,  the  foreign 
policies  of  individual  EU  Member  States.  We  have  also  led  the  way  on  EU  policy 
towards Syria. Working closely with our European partners, we have agreed 14 rounds 
of sanctions on Syria which seek to undermine the Syrian regime and deny it access to 
significant  sources  of  revenue  to  fund  its  killing  machine.  On  Iran,  we  have 









this  clearly  demonstrated  how  we  can  work  through  the  EU  to  achieve  our 
international objectives as well as the value of a co‐ordinated EU approach to climate 
diplomacy.  By  settling  on  a  legally  binding  approach,  Durban  removed  the  biggest 
roadblock to reaching agreement on the measures that will be necessary to tackle the 
problem.  
14. The UK  champions  the  EU’s  further  enlargement,  including  to  the Western Balkans, 
Iceland and Turkey, based on all  countries’  continued progress  towards meeting  the 
necessary  conditions  for  membership.  Croatia’s  Accession  Treaty  was  signed  in 
December 2011 and  it  is expected to become a full EU member  in July 2013; a Bill to 
seek Parliamentary approval  to enable us  to ratify  that Treaty was announced  in  the 
Queen’s Speech on 9 May 2012. Serbia  received EU candidate  status  in March 2012 
after progress in meeting conditions related to Kosovo. 
15. EU enlargement is a vital strategic goal for all of the countries of the Western Balkans: 
it  creates  stability,  security  and  prosperity  across  Europe  on  a  firm  foundation  of 
democracy,  freedom,  and  the  rule  of  law.  Through  tough  accession  negotiations 
designed to ensure that candidate countries fully meet the EU’s standards before they 
join, EU enlargement offers an unparalleled opportunity  for  these countries  to move 
on from the conflicts of the past. 
16. It  follows  that  the Government does not believe  that  the December 2011 European 
Council represents a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the European Union. 
The UK was prepared to support EU Treaty change with all 27 Member States in return 







17. We  support  a  multi‐faceted  EU  where  Member  States  with  a  range  of  different 






good  for  the  EU.  Instead  of  speculating  in  this  evidence  on  possible  structures, 
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therefore,  we  will  show  how  we  aim  to  deliver  the  FCO’s  agenda  of  security  and 
prosperity through the EU and our membership of it as we approach 2020, touching on 
some  key  principles which  govern  our  approach  to  the  EU  reform  agenda,  such  as 
accountability  and  subsidiarity.  But  of  all  the  institutional  issues  which  others  are 
discussing  in more detail,  there  is one which we  think  is worth  raising here,  as  it  is 
pertinent on the state of democracy in the EU – the role of national parliaments. In all 
European  countries  national  parliaments  embody  national  democracy.  No  other 





global  stage.  The  speed  and  scale  at  which  globalisation  is  shifting  the  balance  of 
wealth  and  political  power  towards  emerging  economies  poses  a  challenge  to  the 
position  of  the  EU  in  the world  order.  This  shift  reinforces  the  urgent  need  for  EU 
countries  to  reform  to  stay competitive, generate growth and maintain employment 






legislation. We will  also  continue  to  contribute  to  the  EU’s  prosperity,  for  example 
through the City of London, one of the most significant global financial centres. It is in 
and through the City that many French pensions are managed, German manufacturing 
companies buy  financial  services, many energy  risks  throughout Europe are hedged, 
and provisions of capital for European infrastructure projects flow.  
21. Second,  we  want  an  EU  that  is  able  to  use  its  collective  weight  for  our  common 
interests,  such  as  trade  and  security.  The UK’s  ability  to  influence  events  abroad  is 
greatly enhanced by our place within the EU. Together we hold more sway than apart 
and we are stronger in assuring our security when the 27 EU Member States agree. So 
on  issues where there  is a common European  interest, when the national  interests of 
the  27  EU  Member  States  converge,  it  makes  sense  for  the  EU  Members  to  act 
together, pool our influence and speak with a united voice.  
22. On  trade,  one  voice  representing  half  a  billion  consumers  is  heard  more  loudly  in 
Beijing,  Delhi  and  Moscow,  than  27  separate  ones.  With  UK  support,  the  EU  has 
already  completed  a  Free  Trade  Agreement  with  Korea  worth  £500  million  to  UK 
exporters.  But  our  ambition  does  not  stop  here.  We  also  aim  to  conclude  trade 






EU military  and  civilian missions  supporting NATO  in  building  stability  and  security, 
with a specific focus on police training. In the Balkans, others are working in EULEX as it 
seeks  to  bring  justice  and  stability  to  Kosovo;  and  off  the  Horn  of  Africa,  the  EU 
mission, ATALANTA, is tackling international piracy.  
24. The Government will work  to make  sure  that  the  European  External Action  Service 
(EAS) acts to boost UK prosperity and security by complementing and supplementing – 
not replacing ‐ the work of the FCO. The Lisbon Treaty makes clear that the EAS “shall 
work  in  cooperation  with  the  diplomatic  services  of  the  Member  States”.  The  EAS 
brings  together  existing  EU  external  action  mechanisms  and  experts  from  the 
Commission and Council.  
25. While  I did not personally  support  the EAS’s  creation, now  it  is established  I believe 
that our goal should be to ensure that  it usefully complements and supplements our 
national foreign policy but does not in any way replace it. Therefore we believe the EAS 
can  have  the most  effective  impact  on UK  security  and  prosperity  by  focussing  on: 
stability  in Europe’s neighbourhood  ‐ South, East and  the Western Balkans;  relations 
with  emerging  and  major  powers  such  as  the  US  and  BRIC  countries;  conflict 
prevention,  development  and  peace  building  –  especially  in  Africa;  and  some  key 
foreign  policy  challenges  such  as  Iran  and  the  MEPP.  We  are  working  at  home  to 
promote the EAS as a stepping stone  in the career of talented UK officials, so we can 
ensure  that  the UK participates  fully both  in Brussels and  in  the work of delegations 
abroad. We remain very clear that the division of competences must be respected,  in 
line with the Treaties; and any changes  in representation must be agreed by Member 






a  key  emerging  economy  –  and  those  of  the  Western  Balkans  is  providing  the 
incentives to encourage and embed the necessary reforms to enable both the EU and 
the  aspirant  countries  to  benefit  from  the  expansion  of  stability,  security  and 
prosperity across Europe. This is a key part of our vision for the EU.  










recognise  that  many  people  in  Britain  feel  disconnected  from  how  the  EU  has 
developed and  the decisions  that have been  taken  in  their name on EU matters. To 
counter this, the Government is committed to ensuring that there is no further transfer 
of competence or power from the UK to the EU over the course of this Parliament. 





30. Looking  ahead, we will  continue  to make  the  case  for  a  Europe which  respects  and 




embedded  into EU decision making  in  line with the approach to decentralisation and 
flexibility we are seeking to achieve in the UK. 






32. In conclusion, under this government, Britain  is developing  its global role.  In 2020 we 
will be a nation with closer ties to the emerging economies of the world than today. 
We  will  have  more  British  companies  with  a  foothold  overseas,  and  exports, 
manufacturing  and  investment  will  make  a  bigger  contribution  to  our  economic 
growth. This reinvigorated and expanded approach will be built on our strong alliances 
in  the EU and with  the United States, building new networks without  sacrificing  the 
old. But a strong economy is the bedrock of international influence and the EU’s ability 
to  contribute  to  a  secure,  peaceful  and  prosperous  world  ultimately  rests  on  its 
economic strength.  




33. The  Fiscal  Compact  is  not  part  of  the  EU  Treaties.  It  is  a  self‐standing  international 
agreement between  the  signatory States.  It  is outside  the EU Treaties and  therefore 
does not form part of the EU acquis.  
34. The Fiscal Compact does not have  the  force of EU  law,  for  the UK,  the EU or  for  the 
signatory States. The principle of  the primacy of EU  law  is not affected by  the Fiscal 
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35. The  Fiscal  Compact  deals  primarily  and  in  some  detail with  fiscal  discipline  for  the 
Eurozone  States,  and  also  touches  on  growth  where  its  provisions  are  much  less 
specific.  The  Fiscal Compact does not  touch on  the  EU budget, enlargement, or  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. These and all other EU policies will continue to 
be negotiated under the terms of the EU Treaties.  
Should the UK Government support the  incorporation of the  ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty  into 




negotiation  on  Treaty  change,  we  would  protect  and  advance  our  own  national 
interest.  
37. The Prime Minister demonstrated  this  in  agreeing  to  a  change  to Article 136 of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU),  which  recognises  that 
Eurozone  Member  States  can  establish  a  permanent  stability  mechanism  –  the 
European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM)  –  to  safeguard  the  financial  stability  of  the 
eurozone. By agreeing  to  the Article 136 Treaty  change,  the Prime Minister  secured 
agreement in both the Council Conclusions and the European Council Decision that the 
ESM will  replace  both  the  euro  area‐only  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF) 




UK  will  not  be  exposed  to  any  future  programmes  of  financial  assistance  for  the 
eurozone through the EU Budget, specifically the EFSM. 
38. In  his  letter  to  the  Treasury  Select  Committee  on  27  February  2012  the  Chancellor 
outlined  the  substance of  the  safeguards proposed at  the December 2011 European 
Council when changes to the EU Treaties were discussed.4 These safeguards were not 
UK opt‐outs, exemptions or any other kind of special treatment for the UK. What we 
proposed  were  safeguards  for  the  whole  EU  that  would  have  supported  open 
competition for financial services companies across the Single Market, and upheld the 








EU  rules  respect  the Single Market and vital national  interests of all Member States 
whether  they  happen  to  be  part  of  the  euro  area  or  not.  Although  it  would  be 
premature  to  outline  now  what  safeguards  the  UK  would  propose  if  there  were 
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• What is the relationship between the new ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty and the EU’s acquis?  
 
The Fiscal Union Treaty stands outside the Treaties and in the absence of agreement by the UK 
cannot form part of the acquis or permit use of EU institutions under it. 
 
• Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty into the 
EU Treaties?  
 
No, because the means by which this is to be done sets a dangerous precedent inconsistent with 
future UK interests. 
 
• If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make its condition for doing so? 
 
We doubt that any safeguards and conditions would be honoured, given our prior experience of 
• hould the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier EU and start to develop ideas for 
o. We believe that this would still involve an unacceptable loss of sovereignty and would be far 
• etween now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the UK seek 
 the UK remains a member, then the relationship should be confined to trade and access to the 
• hat impact might the conclusion of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty have on other aspects of the 
e believe that this will be a signal for the EU to increase its budget, raise more of its own 
• o what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen as a 




multiple forms of EU membership. 
 
N
too complex to establish and administer. 
 
B
for the EU? 
 
If
single market with a concomitant architecture. UKIP’s policy is clear, however: only withdrawal 
is the means of securing the exclusive national interests of the UK. 
 
W




resources and to enforce harmonised tax rates across the Union. Enlargement is on hold. The 









In the first instance we feel that a more h r the questions posed in the Committee’s 
ubric is to follow the order we have used below. 
 compact’ Treaty and the EU’s acquis? 
ance in the 
onomic and Monetary Union ("The Fiscal Union Treaty" or "FUT") is a Treaty within the meaning 
vereign nations who are, coincidentally, also members of the European Union. It is 
t, however, a European Union Treaty. The Treaties - now consolidated as The Treaty on European 
 members, The UK and the Czech Republic, having declined to 
n this Treaty, the Fiscal Union Treaty has no legal nexus to TEU/TFEU.  
t assented to be bound by 
 the EU is not itself bound by the FUT. Nor does the Fiscal Union Treaty have any lawful impact on 
ion competences are governed by 
e principle of conferral”. The full 27 member states have not granted to the EU any of the 
ple, Article 81 of the FUT makes provision for use of the 
CJ in certain circumstances. Given that the FUT Group legally lies wholly outwith the structures of 
 is the "interpretation and application of the Treaties" [i.e. TEU and TFEU] 
nd, “in accordance with The Treaties”, ruling on actions brought by "a member State" or "an 
nization set up thereunder and nor any contracting 
arty has any locus standi to bring actions before the ECJ. The contracting parties may say whatever 





What is the relationship between the new ‘fiscal
  
As a matter of international law, the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Govern
Ec
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and therefore has all the attributes of a Treaty in 
international law. 
  
It is signed by 25 so
no
Union (TEU) and The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) - are those to which 
27 sovereign nations have acceded.  
  
Two sovereign nations which are EU
sig
  
Since the EU is not a signatory to the FUT and two of its members have no
it,
any Treaty or other agreement which is itself linked to TEU/TFEU.  
 
One should be mindful of Article 5 TEU by which “the limits of Un
th
competences which are set out in the FUT. 
 
This has significant consequences. For exam
E
the EU, it is difficult to see how Article 8 might legally be deployed, given the jurisdiction of the ECJ as 
set out in Article 19 TEU. 
 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ
a
institution" (i.e. an institution of the EU as defined by the Treaties) or a natural or legal person; giving 
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Union law; ruling on other cases provided for ‘in the 
treaties’. The FUT falls outside that jurisdiction. 
 







Article 8.3 of the FUT pretends to the notion that referring matters to the ECJ under the FUT is a 
“special agreement” for the purposes of Article 273 TFEU. Yet Article 273 only grants jurisdiction to 
e ECJ in any dispute between Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties. The 
is the Euro, an exclusive competence of the EU. 
 
axpayer’s money being thus deployed. UKIP MEP Stuart Agnew, substitute member on the 
munities Act 1972 
r any subsequent Act which makes such permission or acquiescence lawful under UK law. We 
 by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the 
uropean Union is founded”, that is entirely a matter for them. Such does not bind the UK.2 
• The intimate relationship between the FUT and the Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
ked the one 
with the other. There is an on-going case before the Irish Courts initiated by Independent 
her amendments to the FUT is 
resolved. France’s new President Hollande has called for major changes. Greece faces an 





FUT is not part of the subject matter of the Treaties. 
 
Nor can this be claimed as an act of enhanced co-operation under Article 20 TEU (which applies to 
non-exclusive competences) since the subject matter 
 
Notably, The United Kingdom has in no way consented whatsoever to any institution – such as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) – or mechanism of the EU being used by the FUT group or UK
T
European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee, has repeatedly asked what the legal basis for 
any such use might be: no satisfactory and compelling answer has been proffered. 
  
Her Majesty's Government has itself no power to permit use of the ECJ by outside organisations or 
otherwise acquiesce in such use. No such power was granted by The European Com
no
therefore contend that any expenditure of British Taxpayer's money on such use of the ECJ would 
quite simply be illegal.  
 




 We also feel it imperative that this Committee considers in this regard two other matters: 
 
Mechanism (ESM). Implicitly, at the very least, each of the treaties is intimately lin
MEP Thomas Pringle which has this relationship at its heart, challenging the lawfulness under 
EU law of the ESM and calling for a Referendum on the ESM. 
 
• Continuing developments in Europe. We respectfully suggest that the Committee cannot 
properly come to any settled conclusion until the issue of furt
uncertain future which may have major implications for the FUT. The Netherlands soon has a 
general election which may produce a call for yet further amendments or even a refusal to 
ratify. Six months from now the architecture of the EU may look very different. 
 
 
Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty
T
  






It will be recalled that very soon after the Prime Minister had indicated Her Majesty's Government's 
unwillingness to sign this Treaty, the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) spoke, on 9th. January 2012, of 
e FUT being "folded into" the existing Treaties: 
 into” existing treaties to prevent multiple rulebooks 
governing members of the 27-nation European Union.  
ther,” Clegg told reporters in 




 is a matter of note that the DPM was speaking of the FUT being "folded into" existing Treaties. One 
ission and had been privately 
erted as to how the Commission saw the FUT becoming EU law. 
onomic Affairs Committee of the 
ropean Parliament on 12th. January 2012 at Strasbourg. 
th
  
U.K. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg called for changes to the way euro-area countries 
monitor each other’s spending to be “folded
 
“We believe that it should, over time, be folded into existing treaties so that you don’t get 
permanent two parallel treaties working separately from each o
L
Economic and Monetary Affairs Commission Olli Rehn and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. 
“We all see this as a temporary arrangement.” 3  
ide, one is bound to wonder who the DPM meant by "we" here.  
It
wonders if he had been talking to his erstwhile colleagues at The Comm
al
  
 We would point to the observations of a Mr. Romero, a legal expert from the Commission, who spoke 
to a joint meeting of the Constitutional Affairs Committee and Ec
Eu
  
A video of his contribution can be found here: http://youtu.be/WfSvvgCmvbo. 
  
In summary, Mr. Romero was making it plain that making the FUT part of EU Law did not, as far as 
 by means of what Mr. 
mero calls "secondary legislation" which we take to mean by way of the whole gamut of Directives, 
l difficulty and thus rendered the so-called veto 
gatory.  
er Majesty's Government or the Commission? 
pporting the stealthy insertion of such via 
e back passage of directives, regulations and the like. Once this exercise has been done once, it will 
                                                           
they were concerned, require a Treaty change of any kind. It would all be done
Ro
Regulations, Delegated acts and implementing acts.  
  
Within about a month of the Prime Minister claiming having to have vetoed the FUT, the 
Commission had found a way round that little loca
nu
  
One might properly infer that The DPM knew all of this when he spoke. For whom, then, was he 
speaking? H
  
We strongly submit that this means of eliding external agreements into EU should be fiercely resisted 
by HMG and that there should be no question of the UK su
th
be repeated. British MEPs might in such instances vote against it but the UK stands to be over-ruled at 
every turn. What is proposed thus represents a serious threat to the UK's interests and must be 






That is quite apart from our grave concerns that this particular enterprise is both the template for and 
harbinger of a further strong drive towards Federalism. It contains within it a powerful impulsion 
wards overall control by the EU of harmonising a wide range of taxes and control over national 
ation – for the moment – the United Kingdom remains bound to EU Treaties which call for an 
ver-closer union whose currency is the Euro. The grave danger is that we shall be pulled headlong 
ms of democracy. This Treaty is profoundly undemocratic, placing as it does so 
rge a degree of control over national budgets in the hands of the EU. Given the ineptitude displayed 
etitive by the day - thus inhibiting growth - is hardly likely 
 enhance the UK’s trade. With so many of our eggs in this basket, that can only be against our vital 
e have set out above our view that it should not be supported under any circumstances. If that 
t any 
feguards and conditions would be honoured, given our prior experience of such. 
le degree of Sovereignty. More than that it is very difficult to see how such 
 complex arrangement could be made to work. 
sults of National Referendums and the insertion of 
U-approved Technocrats as national leaders are but part. We have also had ample evidence of the 
to
budgets into which we fear the United Kingdom will be sucked. The degree to which the power of 
Sovereign States to draw up budgets and set their own tax rates independently is gravely threatened by 
this Treaty and Her Majesty's Government should have nothing to do with such an anti-democratic 
step. 
 
This is a major step towards “ever closer union”. Whilst the UK remains outside much of this closer 
integr
e
into such union by the maelstrom of the collapse of the Euro and its consequences.  
 
We believe that the People of the United Kingdom desire – and demand – that we travel in an entirely 
opposite direction. 
 
In addition the emergence of a nascent proto-government for the Eurozone is bad for the members of 
the Eurozone in ter
la
during the Euro crisis by its leaders at all levels, it is not unreasonable to be pessimistic about Europe’s 
prospects for growth and competitiveness.  
 
That would be deeply damaging to the UK’s interests. Having as a major trading partner a sclerotic 




If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make its condition for doing so?  
  
W
means we become fully-declared opponents of the great European Project, so be it. We doubt tha
sa
 
Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier EU and start to develop ideas for multiple 
forms of EU membership? 
 
The problem we foresee with the suggestion of a two- or multi-tier EU is that it will inevitably involve 
concession of an unacceptab
a
 
We now have forty years’ experience of how a single-tier EU is administered and its anti-democratic 
tendencies, of which the overthrowing of the re
E
poor performance of the unelected and unaccountable officials of the EU who are immune to the 
norms of democratic life. 
 
Why should a two- or multi-tier EU be any different?  
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We consider that the notion of a two –speed or multi-speed EU is simply a non-starter. The notion of 
U has spent fifty-five years in the careful and 
ssiduous accretion thereof – is risible. A genuine two-tier relationship is very unlikely to be on offer 
d 
nd by the least political commitments possible. We should take this opportunity to disengage 
urselves, above all, from all the non-trading elements (especially the political ones) of the EU and 
h as the EU budget, enlargement, or the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
FSP)?  
 
ew entrant is required to adopt the Euro. The next countries in line, in no particular order, 
re the likes of Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. It will be some time 
hat it will do is provide the impetus to the EU to introduce new ways of raising EU taxes (“own 
 
oney will never diminish but will continue to rise. We already know how many of the EU states 
r 
iminishing the UK’s independence and ability to protect its own interests. 
o what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen as a 
oving a muscle and the use of secondary 
gislation to “fold” the FUT into EU law will happen, in a stark demonstration of the impotence and 
any significant powers being repatriated – after the E
a
on any terms that are actually advantageous. The attitude of the new French President to the UK 
ought to make that abundantly plain. 
 
Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the UK seek for 
the EU? 
 
Whilst the UK remains part of the EU, it should seek the loosest possible architecture for the EU an
to be bou
o
look to concentrate only on our access as a trading nation to the Single Market and our trading 
relationship with Europe which, we say, is all the People of the UK have ever assented to by way of the 
1975 Referendum.  
 
What impact might the conclusion of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty have on other aspects of the EU 
and its policies, suc
(C
 
As far as enlargement is concerned, we believe that this process will be placed in abeyance for the time
being. A n
a
before we can assess the impact of Croatia’s accession. Given the state of the economies of the 
prospects, further enlargement is unthinkable for the time being. Greece may yet leave or be ejected 
from the EU. We could not, with the problems that now face us, contemplate trying to digest Turkey 
or any of the Balkan states. Enlargement is at best on hold. 
 
The new agreement is highly unlikely, we believe, to promote growth and prosperity for its members.  
 
W
resources”) and harmonising tax rates across the EU. The EU’s appetite for spending other people’s
m
greatly resent Ireland’s low corporation taxes. France calls stridently for a Financial Transaction Tax. 
 
As far as the CFSP is concerned, the diminishing ability of member states to afford proper defence 
spending will lead to greater efforts to impose the creation of a European defence force, thus furthe
d
 
We believe that this agreement will be a disaster for UK vital interests. 
 
T
watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union? 
 
It is not the case that the supposed “veto” of the Prime Minister represents a watershed. As we have 
seen above, the EU plans to sidestep it almost without m
le






ntegration as fast as possible. Having thus revealed the utter contempt 
f our so-called partners for the UK’s position and interests, it may be thought a watershed in that the 
2 May 2012 
                                                           
In reality it was not a veto at all but simply a spur to the EU to find a way of thwarting UK policy and 
getting on with the business of i
o
UK must now admit to and contemplate the fact of our impotence and lack of influence at the heart of 
Europe. Those who would claim otherwise must stand adjudged of mere hollow bluster. 
 











Written evidence from the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) 
 
The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) is the trade organisation whose main aim is to promote 
and protect the interests of the Scotch Whisky industry.  A key element within that broad 
remit is to try to ensure that the trade regimes in which our members operate are non-
discriminatory and permit fair competition.  The EU is the industry’s single largest export 
market and is therefore of vital importance to our sector.   
 
Our member companies, which range from small and medium-sized enterprises to multi-
national companies, sold over 500 million bottles of Scotch Whisky in the EU in 2011: over 40% 
of all Scotch Whisky sales take place in the 27 Member States.  Much of this success has been 
built on the harmonised trade rules in the internal market and the EU’s regular phases of 
enlargement.   
 
We frequently campaign to ensure the internal market’s rules are appropriate to our sector 
and we greatly appreciate the dialogue with, and the support we receive from, UK officials.  
The EU legislation of greatest interest to our sector often bears the hallmark of UK 
participation.  We only are able to secure rules meeting the needs of our sector through the 
UK’s EU membership and full involvement in its decision making processes.   
 
The SWA therefore welcomes the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry into the future of the 
European Union and UK Government policy.  The attached submission seeks to highlight the 
benefits the UK’s EU membership has brought our sector within and beyond the EU’s borders.  
We have provided information regarding the internal market, EU enlargement and 
international trade relations.  As a trade association, however, the Committee’s questions in 
relation to e.g. the ‘fiscal compact’ lie outwith our remit.   
 




1 Executive Summary 
 
1.1 The Scotch Whisky Association welcomes the Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry into the 
future of the European Union and UK Government policy. Our sector liaises regularly with 
UK government departments and greatly appreciates their guidance and support in the 
effort to improve trading conditions for Scotch Whisky in the EU and in third countries. 
 
1.2 The EU is the industry’s single largest export market and is vital to the Scotch Whisky 
industry. Global exports in 2011 were worth £4.23 billion, of which sales to the 26 other 
EU Member States accounted for £1.45 billion. Total sales within the EU, i.e. including 
the UK, amounted to over half a billion bottles, or 42% of the industry’s total volumes.  
 
1.3 Scotch Whisky is sold in every EU Member State; our sector benefits greatly from 
harmonised trading rules in the single market, i.e. as opposed to the 27 sets of national 
rules that would otherwise apply. These advantages have been extended by EU 
enlargement. Although the internal market provides a (relatively) barrier-free trading 
environment, more is required for it to reach its full potential.  
 
1.4 The UK plays a key role in the EU’s decision-making processes through the European 
Council and European Parliament. The Association is extremely grateful for the readiness 
of UK officials, MPs, MSPs, MEPs and Ministers to raise our sector’s concerns and pursue 
our interests in all relevant fora. 
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1.5 The UK’s EU membership has delivered benefits to Scotch Whisky which would not 
otherwise have been possible. We very much hope that, whatever decisions are taken 
regarding the EU’s future institutional architecture, and the UK’s role therein, these will 
not jeopardise the benefits of the internal market and the UK’s ability to influence and 




2.1 Scotch Whisky is the world’s foremost internationally traded spirit drink. The Scotch 
Whisky Association (SWA) is the trade organisation which represents the interests of the 
Scotch Whisky industry. Its main objective is to protect and promote Scotch Whisky at 
home and in its overseas markets. More than 90% of sales take place outside the UK. 
 
2.2 Despite the current economic difficulties, rising demand in both emerging and mature 
markets has resulted in export values increasing by an average of 10% a year over the last 
five years. The government regularly exhorts business to find new opportunities 
overseas. The Scotch Whisky industry provides an excellent example of the benefits of 
such trade. Much of the export success could not have been achieved without the UK’s 
EU membership.  
 
2.3 Exports of Scotch Whisky to over 200 countries in 2011 were worth £4.23 billion. This 
equated to nearly 1.2 billion bottles; or 3.2 million bottles every day. Scotch Whisky 
alone represents 80% of Scotland’s food and drink exports, 23% of the UK’s and 7% of the 
EU’s (2010 data, as 2011 figures are not yet available for the whole EU). Scotch Whisky 
contributes £134 per second to the UK balance of trade.  
 
2.4 The industry employs over 10,000 directly and a further 35,000 jobs across the UK are 
supported by the industry. Our sector spends £1 billion each year with UK suppliers of 
goods and services. Prospects for further export-led growth have resulted in the industry 
investing £1 billion in additional distillation, maturation and bottling capacity over the 
last 5 years.  
 
2.5 The ability to export is vital to the health of the industry. Our members have been 
exporting for over a hundred years and are fully familiar with intra-EU and international 
trade and a wide variety of national trading environments, not all of which are benign. 
The SWA is an active campaigner against trade barriers and seeks to ensure fair and non-
discriminatory trading conditions in all markets.  
 
2.6 Our submission includes an overview of Scotch Whisky in the EU, and highlights some of 
the benefits it has brought as well as the work that remains to be done. It also looks at 
international trade aspects, and explains why the UK’s EU membership brings benefits 
within and beyond the EU’s borders. We have not sought to address questions in relation 
to, e.g. the “fiscal compact” since these lie beyond the Association’s remit.  
 
3 Scotch Whisky in the European Union  
 
3.1 Exports to the 26 other Member States were worth £1.45 billion in 2011. Total sales 
within the EU, i.e. also including the UK, amounted to over half a billion bottles. Scotch 
Whisky is sold in every Member State and our sector enjoys the advantages of the EU’s 
harmonised trading rules, i.e. as opposed to 27 sets of national rules. Our success in the 
EU is in large part a consequence of the internal market’s (relatively) barrier-free trade 
environment.  
 
3.2  Our sector has long been involved with UK / EU officials and MEPs to try to ensure that 
EU legislative proposals are appropriate for our sector and enhance trade rules in the 
internal market. Our involvement is both direct and through our membership of the 
European Spirits Organisation – CEPS, which represents spirits producers at EU level. In 
the same way as CEPS relies on its members to determine the best policies for the 
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industry, so too do the EU decision making processes rely on the active engagement of 
national governments and MEPs to pursue the interests of their constituents.  
 
3.3  Thanks to the readiness of EU and UK officials to engage with our sector, much useful 
legislation for the Scotch Whisky industry has been passed. Policy areas where the 
Association has been actively involved at every stage include VAT and excise taxation, 
bottle sizes, spirit definitions, holding and movement of excisable products, strip stamps, 
environment, food labelling and protection schemes for geographical indications. 
 
3.4 The policy work in which SWA and CEPS are engaged requires a constant dialogue with UK 
and EU officials in national capitals and Brussels, and with MEPs once those dossiers 
come before the European Parliament. The breadth of issues, and the level of 
engagement needed, are such that we could not secure trading conditions appropriate to 
the sector without UK support. Some of the dossiers on which we are engaged affect 
Scotch Whisky far more than any other spirit drink and the UK’s voice is critical in 
ensuring the enacted measures meet industry needs.  
 
3.5 Among the advantages brought to our sector from the UK’s EU membership since 1973 
are the following:  
 
 - removal of excise tax and VAT discrimination against Scotch Whisky in France, 
Greece, Italy and Denmark; 
 
 - adoption of EU rules to define and protect whisky, and to provide specific protection 
for geographical indications, such as Scotch Whisky; 
 
 - introduction of common rules on labelling requirements and the bottle sizes in which 
spirits must be sold; 
  
 - removal of tariffs, quotas, tax discrimination, national labelling requirements and 
many other trade barriers in EU accession countries. 
 
4.  Single Market - work still in progress 
 
4.1 While we strongly support the principles of the Single Market, as is regularly observed it 
is far from complete. In our sector difficulties persist, notably on tax issues and 
inappropriate national rules which prevent free movement or protect domestic interests. 
Resolving such concerns does not happen overnight; the UK’s voice is needed over the 
long term to try to improve the operation of the single market.  
 
4.2  A key area of concern is the EU’s excise tax directives which require Member States to 
apply minimum rates of tax according to category of alcoholic beverage. On spirits the 
minimum rate is €1,000 per hectolitre of pure alcohol (hlpa); for beer, it is €127 per 
hlpa; and on wine, the minimum rate is zero, a level applied by 16 Member States. All 
alcoholic beverages compete with one another and we believe the tax structure should 
reflect this situation. Instead the current crisis is being used by some countries to further 
widen discrimination against spirits; in many cases Scotch Whisky is the main imported 
spirit. 
 
4.3 In addition, EU structures permit some national derogations from the broad principle 
that, within each category of alcoholic beverage, everything should be taxed in an 
identical manner. Thus, for example, there are lower rates of tax in France on rum from 
its overseas departments and on ouzo in Greece. There are other examples, too 
numerous to mention, of particular categories of spirit receiving preferential tax 
treatment sanctioned by the EU.  
 
4.4  These have created the conditions in which some Member States, unilaterally and 
illegally, have introduced protection for domestic products: Hungary and Romania are 
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the current worst offenders but Greece too has illegally extended its derogation for ouzo 
to include other local spirits. While there are means of redress in place, infractions 
proceedings, designed to enforce compliance with the acquis, are often slow and can 
take over 4 years before being resolved. In the meantime the discrimination continues.  
 
4.5 Although it is usually the Commission that leads in removing such barriers, the UK’s 
involvement, at EU level, and bilaterally with the offending Member State, are extremely 
helpful in trying to resolve such concerns. We are constantly grateful for the UK’s 
support in this respect.  
 
5. EU Enlargement 
 
5.1 The internal market’s benefits have regularly been extended by EU enlargement. In 
acceding countries this has brought, among other things, the removal of many trade 
barriers including high tariffs, quotas, preferential tax rates, import permits, 
inappropriate laws defining whisky and national labelling rules. 
 
5.2  The SWA has been closely involved in each phase of enlargement. Our main aim has been 
to ensure the EU acquis is implemented and enforced in the new Member States at the 
earliest opportunity, and that any derogations and/or transition periods in our sector are 
kept to a minimum. We have been helped greatly by the UK administration in this 
process. Through, e.g. the Enlargement Working Group, and bilaterally with the 
accession country, the UK has been extremely effective and persuasive in ensuring new 
EU members accede under the right conditions. Among other things, the UK was 
influential in securing: 
 
 - the introduction of 2 benchmarks in Turkey’s accession negotiations which were 
instrumental in resolving 2 major trade barriers for the Scotch Whisky sector; 
 
 - the agreement by Romania that, in advance of its EU accession, the tariff 
preferences it had negotiated for US whisky should also be extended to EU whiskies; 
 
 - the introduction of a review period for certain tax derogations granted to some of 
the 2004 intake of accession countries; 
  
 - the refusal to permit any continuation of the preferential treatment (via excise tax 
and / or tariffs) of local vodka after Poland joined the EU.  
  
5.3  More recently, we very much appreciate that the UK and others did not accept Croatia’s 
request for a seven year transition period to allow the sale of inappropriately labelled 
national spirits (‘domaci rum’ and ‘domaci brandy’), against which Scotch Whisky 
competes. Croatia’s accession in 2013 will therefore provide far greater potential for 
improving Scotch Whisky exports than if the current protection had been maintained. 
 
5.4 EU enlargement has, over the long term, proved to be of massive importance to Scotch 
Whisky exporters. Some countries that have joined the EU over the last 25 years have 
been among the industry’s most important export destinations: 
 
 - Before its 1986 accession, exports to Spain were typically £20 - 30 million a year. 10 
years later they averaged over £200 million; between 2003 and 2010 they exceeded 
£300 million on 4 occasions.  
 
 - Exports to Greece were worth £10 - 15 million a year between 1980 and 1985. When 
barriers were removed upon its 1986 accession, exports rose to £71 million after 5 
years. They exceeded £100 million 4 times between 2003 and 2010. Prior to the 
recent economic difficulties, Greece was often cited as the country with the highest 
per capita consumption of Scotch Whisky in the world.  
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5.5 Among more recent accession countries, exports to Poland have increased from £5 
million in 2003 to over £42 million in 2011.  
 
6. EU and International Trade  
 
6.1 Europe is the world’s largest trading bloc, accounting for one fifth of global trade. EU 
trade policy promotes the principles of free and fair trade around the world. While the 
Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU, the active involvement of Member States is 
critical in ensuring vital national interests are pursued in the negotiations. For example 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) between the EU and third countries remove market access 
barriers, including excessive tariffs, and are an important tool in helping exporters gain 
better access to markets. In an export dominated industry such as Scotch Whisky, we are 
very grateful to UK officials and Ministers who regularly seek to ensure our interests are 
pursued in FTA negotiations. 
 
6.2 The highest priority market for the Scotch Whisky industry is India. There is significant 
demand for Scotch Whisky in the market, but also major barriers, the most important of 
which is the excessive 150% tariff; effectively this prices our products out of the range of 
most consumers. The negotiations on the proposed EU-India FTA offer the only realistic 
chance of significantly reducing this tariff in the medium to long term. The Association is 
very grateful to UK officials in Delhi, Brussels and London who put in a considerable 
amount of time and effort to ensure the interests of the Scotch Whisky sector are taken 




6.3 In the case of South Korea, where Scotch Whisky is both the UK’s largest export to the 
country and by far the biggest imported spirit, the entry into force of last year’s FTA 
provided substantial benefits. Not only will the 20% import tariff on spirits be eliminated, 
but the Agreement provides a mechanism to introduce legal protection for Scotch Whisky 
as a Geographical Indication. As in India, UK officials in London, Seoul and Brussels 
played a major part in delivering the successful outcome.  
 
6.4 WTO trade rules have also been very useful in improving trading conditions for Scotch 
Whisky. For acceding countries, we have been helped enormously by the UK and EU’s 
readiness to ensure, in some cases, that longstanding barriers are resolved as a condition 
of accession. Elsewhere, WTO rules provide a mechanism for the EU, pressed by the UK, 
to take action against illegal protectionism in world markets. Our sector has been 
successful in removing tax discrimination in Japan, Chile, Korea and the Philippines.  
 
6.5 More generally, the EU’s trade dialogue with third countries also helps it to promote and 
‘export’ the application of EU rules as best practice, and thereby shape trading 
conditions around the world. As mentioned earlier, the UK is active in seeking to ensure 
EU rules are appropriate for the Scotch Whisky sector; such rules can have a positive 
impact well beyond the EU’s borders.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
7.1 The SWA firmly believes the UK’s membership of the European Union has provided 
significant benefits in improving trading conditions for Scotch Whisky in Europe and 
beyond. We could not have secured these advantages from outside the EU. And there 
remains much to be done, in particular to ensure that the proposed FTA with India 
delivers the tariff reductions that would help unlock this potentially huge export market.  
 
7.2 The UK government has a vital role to play in promoting a level playing field for business 
in the EU. The EU Single Market and free movement of goods has already delivered huge 
benefits to Scotch Whisky producers. However, improving the Single Market and removing 
the remaining barriers to trade should remain a priority UK objective.  
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7.3  It is therefore critical that the British voice is, and continues to be, heard in Brussels and 
is successful in shaping EU policies. The UK would lose its current influence if, like EEA 
members Iceland or Norway, it was not part of the EU decision making process. 
Moreover, the UK would still be required to implement EU legislation which it had not 
helped shape.  
 
7.4 We hope any decision regarding the institutional architecture and the UK’s EU 
membership will not jeopardise the advantages membership has brought, or weaken the 
influence and impact membership brings in the decision-making processes.  
 
We hope the above comments will be helpful. If any further written information or 
clarification on any aspect would be useful, please do not hesitate to get in touch.  
 
 






Written evidence from the Liberal Democrat European Parliamentary Party 
Summary: Unless structural problems are tackled, the long-term future of the EU is at risk. 
UK European policy lacks strategic clarity on this and other matters. Economic recovery is 
not possible without a stronger Union, where fiscal solidarity supplements fiscal discipline. 
The fiscal compact treaty is a necessary expedient. Its incorporation in the EU framework 
will trigger a full-scale revision of the Treaty of Lisbon. The UK will have to decide whether 
to support further integration of the EU - and, if so, whether to participate. A British 
referendum on the EU is likely to be necessary. 
1. We  welcome  your  important  enquiry,  and  hope  it  can  produce  some  clear‐sighted 
commentary on and options  for  the guidance of  the United Kingdom’s  future  relationship 
with the European Union.  
 
2. As Liberal Democrat Members of  the European Parliament we are committed  to making a 
success of British membership of the EU and, in particular, to advancing the role, efficiency 








EU membership.  The  obvious  alternative  available  to  the UK  is  to move  to  a Norwegian 
model as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). But as the recent and thorough 
report  from  the  Norwegian  EEA  Review  Committee  shows,1  there  are  serious  negative 
consequences from such a model, not least to national sovereignty since Norway is obliged 
to  implement  the  vast majority of  EU  rules without having  any  voting powers over what 
those rules actually are. We find this ‘fax democracy’ option deeply inappropriate for the UK.  






through  the  launching  of  new  project  bonds,  can  produce  massive  cost  efficiencies  and 
economies of scale, not least by cutting wasteful duplication and adding value in science and 
technology  (including  defence  capabilities),  as  well  as  by  modernising  Europe's 
infrastructure.  The  transfer of  some  significant  items of public  expenditure  from national 
budgets to the EU budget, re‐shaped to be more flexible and drive competitiveness, makes 
every sense. New streams of genuinely autonomous EU revenue will reduce the burden on 







constitutional  conditions;  and  that while,  after  the  Treaty of  Lisbon,  the  EU  lacks  little  in 
terms of statutory authority it is deficient in terms of capacity of government and resources. 








failed  to  deepen  Britain’s  engagement with  the  EU  or  to  enlighten  British  public  opinion 
about the true nature of the country’s deep  interdependence with  its EU partners and the 
scale and scope of integration.  
The December European Council 
8. So, to turn to your questions, we believe that the crisis at the December European Council 
marks a  radical  shift both  in  the UK’s policy  towards  the EU and, more  importantly,  in  its 
partners’ attitude towards the UK. No other prime minister since Anthony Eden has turned 
his ‐ or her ‐ back on the Brussels negotiating table. We find Mr Cameron's demands of his 





2011  installed  UK  referendums  on  all  future  important  constitutional  change  in  the  EU. 
Although  denied  by ministers  at  the  time,  this  unilateral  British  constitutional  innovation 
was  not  received  elsewhere  with  equanimity:  the  EU  Act  is  seen  to  have  side‐lined  the 
Westminster parliament, weakened British political parties, and given  the populist press a 




on  a  system  of  common  law.  Regular  treaty  amendment  is  needed  to  codify  settled 
jurisprudence  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  to  adapt  to  enlargement,  or  to  adjust  the Union’s 
competences and  the powers of  its  institutions  to deal with new  challenges. Remove  the 
possibility of treaty change, and the Union is paralysed. The fact is that the EU is once again 
facing  a  further  round  of  substantial  reform  with,  one  way  or  another,  major  political 
consequences  for  the UK. Therefore  the government cannot  indefinitely  resist a European 
referendum in Britain.  
 
11. The  December  European  Council  was  well  aware  of  the  threat  of  a  looming  British 
referendum. The main story of that meeting was not so much the attempt by a British prime 
minister  to stymie  the efforts  to salvage  the euro but,  rather,  the willingness of  the other 





British  problem might  be  about  to  go  away. While  the  Coalition Government  has  shown 






field of  justice and home affairs, the  first shots  fired  in the battles over the budget rebate 
and the reform of the own resources system, the continuing debate over the regulation of 
the  financial markets,  and  a  general British  refusal  to  back  the  development  of  common 
foreign, security and defence policies. Good and energetic initiatives from the UK side need 
to utilise  the usual European  channels  to  reach  their  full potential.  For example,  the  Like 
Minded  Growth  Group  has  successfully  brought  together  16  member  states  to  focus  on 
deepening the single market, smarter regulation and growth generation, but so far only in a 





to  British  reputation  and  relationships  have  been  significant,  with  potential  knock‐on 
consequences  for our negotiating clout,  including,  ironically, on  financial services dossiers. 
Moreover,  the potential  for  caucusing among Eurozone or Eurozone Plus  countries on EU 
matters, including the single market, is now more real than before December. 
13. We  note with  deep  regret  the  tendency  in  London  to  proceed  to  debate  EU  affairs  as  if 




'repatriation'  of  EU  competences.  The  behaviour  of  British  right‐wing  MEPs  who  work 
merely  to  undermine  the  institution  to  which  they  are  elected  to  serve  is  universally 




The fiscal compact treaty 
14. The new treaty is unprecedented.2 It works by explicit analogy with the EU treaties, respects 
the competences conferred under the EU treaties, seeks to deploy the institutions which are 
empowered by  the EU  treaties,  commits  to  its own eventual  incorporation within  the EU 
treaties,  but  is  not  itself  of  them.  It  is  an  archetypal  confederal  treaty,  committing  the 
governments of signatory states to a course of action which if in the event they choose not 
to pursue  there  is no enforceable  legal  sanction against  them. The European Commission 
may help to  implement  the  fiscal compact treaty, but  it  is unable to use the  fullness of  its 
powers vested under the EU treaties to do so. The European Court of Justice is enjoined to 
act at the behest of one member state against another according to Article 273 of the Treaty 





on  the Functioning of  the EU  in a dispute  'which  relates  to  the subject matter of  the  [EU] 






sincere  cooperation  among  member  states  and  between  the  institutions  is  here  a  very 
relevant and  important general principle of EU  law.4  It  is difficult not to conclude that the 
relationship  between  the  fiscal  compact  treaty  and  the  formal  EU  treaties  is  highly 
ambiguous.  
 
15. Despite  its  portentous  title,  the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the 
Economic and Monetary Union does not go all  the way  to  remedy  the  flawed structure of 
EMU  as handed down by  the  Treaty  of Maastricht. Nor  does  it  comprise more  than one 
element  in  establishing  the  reign  of  austerity:  indeed, most  of  its  provisions  are  already 
enshrined  (with the full support of the ALDE Group  in the European Parliament)  in the  ‘Six 
Pack’ of EU laws which re‐tightened the nuts and bolts of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
has  made  it  more  difficult  for  states,  even  large  ones,  to  evade  their  mutualised 
responsibilities to observe fiscal rectitude.  
 
16. An  important  innovation of the fiscal compact treaty  is that the signatory states commit to 
passing  cardinal  laws at home  in order  to  install a debt brake on national budgets where 
structural deficits  rise above 0.5% of GDP. The  confederal nature of  the  treaty means, of 
course,  that  there  is  no mechanism  for  enforcing  the  implementation  of  such  rules.  The 
contracting parties also agree  to use  reverse qualified majority  in  the Council of Ministers 
when  it  acts  in  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  –  a  principled  code  of  conduct  whose 
practical operation will be under close observation. The effect of the corrective provisions of 
the  new  treaty will  only  be  felt  in  a  number  of  years  once  the  outcome  of  the  present 
austerity  regime  is  known.  The  immediate  impact  of  the  treaty  falls  on  those  eurozone 
states  which  will  be  unable  to  access  bail‐out  funding  from  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism unless and until they agree to ratify both the fiscal compact and ESM treaties. 
For  that  reason  alone,  the  substantive  importance  of  the  fiscal  compact  should  not  be 
underestimated. Its symbolic importance lies in its exclusion of the British.  
 
17. Two  other  features  are  notable.  First,  the  treaty  commits  its  signatories  to  using  the 
enhanced cooperation provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon to go further and faster in matters 
of social and economic  integration. And, second,  like all good confederal pacts,  the  treaty 






and adds  to  the pressure of market discipline and  continual peer assessment  to which all 
member  states  are  now  subjected  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.  What  is  needed  now, 
however,  is  faster  economic  growth  to  make  palatable  to  a  sceptical  democracy  the 
inevitably painful process of structural reform.  





Incorporation of the fiscal compact treaty 
19. Article  16  of  the  new  treaty  foresees  its  substantive  incorporation  within  the  EU  legal 
framework 'within five years at most' following entry into force. It also predicates a situation 
five years hence in which the United Kingdom (and the Czech Republic) have changed their 




20. We  would  draw  the  Committee's  attention  to  the  likely  significance  of  the  institutional 
innovation of twice yearly summit meetings of the eurozone. Under Article 12(3) of the fiscal 
compact treaty these summits will discuss Europe's competitiveness, the modification of the 
global architecture of the euro and  its fundamental rules  ‐ that  is, the convergence criteria 
and the Stability and Growth Pact. Unless and until the UK agrees to the incorporation of the 
substance  of  the  fiscal  compact  treaty  into  the  EU  framework  its  prime minister will  be 
excluded from such  important negotiations. British self‐exclusion from such a forum would 
not serve the national interest. 
Fiscal union and beyond 
21. The integration of the fiscal compact treaty into the EU framework will not be the only item 
of constitutional business which the Union will need to address over the next few years. For 
a  start,  in  addition  to  the  new  treaty,  the  rigid  fiscal  discipline  enshrined  in  the  current 
austerity  programmes,  the  stronger  regulatory  framework  for  the  financial  sector,  the 
creation  of  the  EFSF  and  ESM  and  the  revision  of  Article  136  TFEU,  the  Euro  Plus  Pact 
proposals on  the  supply  side,  the Six Pack  (and other) EU  legislation  ‐ all need now  to be 
followed  through  by  a  decisive move  towards  fiscal  solidarity.  The  debate  about  stability 
eurobonds  takes  the Union  in  that direction, as does  the election of President Hollande  in 
France. We believe that  it  is  in everybody's  interests that the euro  is consolidated through 
the  building  of  a  fiscal  union  in  which  joint  and  several  liability  for  sovereign  debt  is 






22. The  creation of  a  fiscal union  requires  a  radical overhaul of  the  Economic  and Monetary 
Union chapters of Maastricht, including the granting of new powers to the Commission and 
Court,  adjustment  to  the  statute of  the  European  Central Bank,  changes  to  the decision‐
making procedures  in  the Council of Ministers, and modification of  the  'no bail out'  rules. 




last  constitutional  Convention  whose  work  culminated  in  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon:  another 
general revision of the treaties cannot reasonably be long avoided ‐ with its inevitable climax 
in a British referendum.  






23. For  the United Kingdom,  therefore, and  for other member  states  frustrated by  the British 
problem,  there will be one unavoidable  topic at  the next Convention. This  is nothing  less 
than the continuing status of the UK as a member state. Will the UK wish to stay a member 
of a more  federal union or not?  If not, will  the UK have either  the moral authority or  the 
political  will  to  block  its  partners  from  proceeding  where  they  deem  it  necessary  and 
desirable to go? Alternatives to EU membership should be properly assessed. Would a form 
of  associate  membership  be  more  convenient  for  the  UK?  If  so,  what  shape  could  that 
association take? Would other countries, either currently full member states of the Union or 
actual or probable candidate  states, prefer  to be more or  less closely associated with  the 
federal core but not to be a full part of it? These questions will be divisive. Their answers will 
be  complex. Any outcome of a  re‐ordering of membership of  the European Union will be 








Written evidence from Professor Michael Dougan, Chair in European Law, 
and Dr Michael Gordon, Lecturer in Public Law,  
Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool 
 
 
1. The main points substantiated in this evidence may be summarised as follows: 
 
• The December European Council veto will only be treated as a watershed if 
the UK opts to view it as such. 
• The TSCG1 is separate from and subordinate to the EU Treaties. One should 
be wary of dressing political reservations about the TSCG in the language of 
illegality. 
• There are several different scenarios in which UK policy towards the TSCG 
will be conditioned by the legal and political environment created by the 
European Union Act 2011 (EUA). 
• Flexible membership of the EU already exists. The benefits of further reform 
must be balanced against the corresponding costs of greater flexibility. 
 
To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen 
as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union?  
 
2. There is no necessary reason that the “veto” exercised by the Prime Minister at the 
December 2011 Brussels summit should be treated as a watershed moment in UK 
Government policy towards the EU. The exercise and consequences of the veto 
were significant, yet we believe its implications can be construed in two ways. We 
suggest that the veto will only be treated as a watershed if the UK opts to view it 
as such. 
 
3. First, the 2011 veto could be understood “narrowly”, as an exercise in the 
protection of specific UK national interests which has had a minimal impact on its 
broader position in the EU. Indeed, this would seem to reflect the view of the 
Prime Minister, who in a statement to the House of Commons on 12th December 
2011 maintained that the veto was necessary in the absence of “relatively modest” 
safeguards “on the single market and on financial services”. Disagreement about 
the fiscal compact might thus be seen as effectively severable from other EU 
policy issues, and not necessarily inhibiting constructive engagement by the UK 
with fellow Member States. 
 
4. Further, the UK, as a non-Contracting Party to the TSCG, actually remains in 
substantially the same position with respect to the provisions of the fiscal compact 
as non-eurozone Contracting Parties. The new obligations set out in the fiscal 
compact, and in particular the balanced budget rule, will only be applicable to 
such non-eurozone Contracting Parties if they declare an intention to be bound by 
these provisions. Further, the UK may decide at any point to accede to the TSCG, 
thereby placing itself in an identical position to any other non-eurozone 
Contracting Party. The UK may not then in practice be isolated on the margins of 
                                                          
1 TSCG – The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
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the EU simply because it has declined to participate in a compact designed 
principally to regulate fiscal policy among Euro-members. 
 
5. Secondly, however, the Brussels veto might in contrast be viewed more “broadly”, 
as expressive of a more fundamental shift in UK Government policy towards the 
EU. The UK Government’s attempts to obtain concessions in exchange for 
consenting to an amendment of the existing EU Treaties demonstrates a lack of 
solidarity with fellow Member States during the ongoing financial crisis, 
especially since the most controversial provisions contained in the fiscal compact 
would not have been automatically applicable to the UK. Nor was the Prime 
Minister’s veto necessary to avoid a national referendum in accordance with the 
EUA, because the “referendum locks” contained in that Act would not have been 
triggered by the provisions of the fiscal compact. Indeed, it is difficult to see the 
Brussels veto as necessary or effective in any real sense, given the Prime 
Minister’s negotiating strategy failed to secure any of the safeguards sought, while 
the provisions of the fiscal compact objected to by the UK Government were still 
enacted by alternative means. 
 
6. Perhaps the UK veto might then be emblematic of a shift in Government policy 
towards the EU, rather than a statement of dissatisfaction with the notion and/or 
terms of the fiscal compact itself. If this is the case, the 2011 veto may ultimately 
come to be seen as a watershed moment: the diplomatic manifestation of the UK’s 
retrenchment from Europe. Yet the fact that such an understanding of the veto 
may be adopted does not mean that it ought to be adopted. Whether viewed 
narrowly or broadly, the Brussels veto will have implications for the UK’s future 
within the EU. The two contrasting understandings discerned here will, however, 
afford different priority to the questions raised in this inquiry. If the impact of the 
veto is to be understood narrowly, attention should be directed to the Committee’s 
questions concerning the relationship between the fiscal compact and the existing 
EU architecture. If the impact of the veto is to be understood broadly, then one 
should concentrate rather upon the Committee’s questions concerning the UK’s 
vision for future EU membership.  
Narrow focus: 
 
What is the relationship between the TSCG and the EU acquis?  
 
7. The formal relationship between the TSCG and the EU Treaties is very 
straightforward. The TSCG is an international agreement entirely separate from 
and constituting no part of the EU legal order. Moreover, the TSCG must be 
interpreted and applied in conformity with EU law, the latter taking precedence in 
the event of any conflict between the two regimes.  
 
8. Despite that formal separation, there is a significant overlap between the subject 
matter of the TSCG and EU law. The TSCG contains certain obligations for 
Contracting Parties which go beyond those already laid down under EU law: e.g. 
the “balanced budget” rule in Arts.3 and 4 TSCG commits the Contracting Parties 
to a higher standard of fiscal discipline than that imposed under existing EU law 
(while Art.8 establishes a specific enforcement mechanism in respect of limited 
aspects of that commitment); the “reversed qualified majority voting” rule in Art.7 
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TSCG commits the Contracting Parties to a particular course of conduct within the 
Council (though there is no effective way to enforce that commitment, should a 
Member State behave otherwise in accordance with EU law). 
 
9. Otherwise, however, the TSCG does little which can be considered genuinely 
novel. Various provisions merely anticipate obligations which are possible and 
indeed imminent under the EU Treaties, e.g. Art.5 budgetary and economic 
partnership programmes; Art.6 public debt issuance plans; Art.11 major economic 
policy reform plans. Similarly, several provisions do no more than express 
aspirations about the future use of powers/procedures already provided for under 
the EU Treaties, e.g. Art.10 enhanced cooperation; Art.13 parliamentary 
cooperation. Meanwhile, other provisions refer to informal programmes/activities 
already established before the TSCG, e.g. Art.9 enhanced convergence and 
competitiveness; Art.12 Eurosummit meetings.  
 
10. We do not share the analysis expressed by certain commentators, and partially 
endorsed by the recent report of the European Scrutiny Committee, concerning 
three important issues of compatibility between the TSCG and EU law. 
 
11. First, there is the idea that recourse to an international treaty is somehow 
improper, as a matter of principle, whenever a Member State(s) tries and fails to 
persuade its partners to amend the EU Treaties themselves. That is quite a 
remarkable proposition – amounting to a virtual denial of state sovereignty. It 
cannot be seriously argued that the failed or indeed hypothetical possibility for the 
EU to have assumed responsibility over a given matter thereby precludes the 
Member States from pursuing the same or similar objectives under ordinary 
international law. 
 
12. Secondly, there is the argument that Art.273 TFEU2 is an improper legal basis for 
the jurisdiction conferred upon the ECJ pursuant to Art.8 TSCG. There is little 
direct judicial authority exploring the detailed conditions governing resort to 
Art.273 TFEU, though there is much historical precedent to support the view that 
the Member States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to 
voluntarily submitting disputes to the ECJ. To reject the lawfulness of Art.8 
TSCG implies adopting a systematically restrictive interpretation of Art.273 
TFEU without any real legal authority and despite the evidence of past practice. 
 
13. Thirdly, there is the argument that it is impermissible for Member States to entrust 
limited tasks to the Union institutions outside the framework of the EU Treaties. 
There is direct authority from the ECJ to support the lawfulness of such delegated 
functions as a matter of constitutional principle. However, the conditions 
governing such delegated functions in practice remain unclear – especially 
whether delegation requires the express consent of all Member States. There are 
solid legal arguments on both sides of that debate – which should caution against 
adopting a strong critical stance based on the alleged unlawfulness of the TSCG, 
as opposed to holding an opinion about its political desirability.  
 
                                                          
2 TFEU – The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the TSCG into the EU 
Treaties? 
 
14. Adopting a narrow understanding of the implications of the UK veto, and 
accepting that the TSCG contains little which can be considered genuinely novel, 
the possibility of the fiscal compact’s future incorporation into the existing EU 
Treaties will need to be considered. We focus here on the legal issues arising in 
relation to the UK Government supporting incorporation of the fiscal compact into 
EU law, as envisaged by Art.16 TSCG. 
 
15. There is no compelling political reason that the Government should not support 
incorporation, especially since the provisions of the fiscal compact do not bind the 
UK. There is also no domestic legal impediment to the Government supporting 
incorporation, for, as noted above, the referendum locks contained in the EUA 
would not be triggered by such a development. Although an amendment of the 
existing EU Treaties to include the balanced budget rule set out in Art.3 TSCG 
would appear to be caught by s.4(1)(f)(i) EUA, which provides that an extension 
of EU competence in relation to economic policy will attract a referendum, the 
exemption in s.4(4)(b) would serve to obviate this requirement. By this 
exemption, while the provisions of the fiscal compact remain inapplicable to the 
UK, it would not be necessary for a national referendum to be held before an 
amending Treaty could be lawfully ratified by the Government. 
 
16. This basic position should be qualified by noting three potential legal problems in 
relation to future incorporation attempts. First, if an amending Treaty went beyond 
the simple incorporation of the fiscal compact provisions into EU law, and 
purported to make other changes which extended the competence of the EU in any 
of the ways specified in s.4 EUA, unless those changes were exempt under s.4(4), 
a referendum would be necessary. If the UK were to make its acceptance of an 
amendment of the existing EU Treaties conditional upon certain demands being 
satisfied, and other Member States were to counter with competing demands, it is 
conceivable that the exercise could expand beyond the mere incorporation of the 
fiscal compact into EU law, with the consequence that a broader amending Treaty 
might engage the EUA’s referendum locks. 
 
17. The remaining problems expose inconsistencies in the EUA itself. The second 
problem is a gap in the scheme of referendum locks. If the UK were to support the 
incorporation of the fiscal compact into EU law, and subsequently opted to be 
bound by these provisions, the competence of the EU with respect to UK 
economic policy would have been extended, and yet a referendum would not have 
been required lawfully to ratify this extension of competence. A referendum lock 
would only be engaged if the rules contained in the fiscal compact were to be 
applicable to the UK from the time of their incorporation. Otherwise, a national 
referendum could be readily avoided, and while this may appear politically 
convenient, given the controversial content of the fiscal compact, it might also be 
difficult to justify. 
 
18. The third problem is, in contrast, one of overprovision. If the UK were to accede 
to the TSCG in accordance with Art.15, and declare an intention to be bound by 
the fiscal compact prior to supporting its incorporation into EU law, a referendum 
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would be required at the moment of incorporation notwithstanding the fact that the 
UK would already have put in place a domestic mechanism to implement the 
balanced budget rule. In such circumstances, the formal extension of EU 
competence would trigger a referendum essentially to approve what had already 
been done, with the corollary that a failure to obtain the requisite popular approval 
would produce significant legal and political uncertainty. 
 
19. In essence, the EUA adds a further layer of legal and political complexity to any 
UK Government decision to support the incorporation of the fiscal compact into 
the existing EU Treaties. In so far as it has transformed the domestic procedure for 
approving an amendment of the EU Treaties, and dramatically reconfigured prior 
assumptions about the role played by national referendums in this process, we 
contend that, if a watershed moment in UK Government policy towards the EU is 
sought, it should be found not in the Brussels veto, but in the enactment of the 




Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the 
UK seek for the EU?  
 
20. It is worth recalling that, despite its controversial evolution, the final Lisbon 
Treaty was widely seen across Europe as a triumph for the UK’s vision of 
European integration. Lisbon clearly affirms that the EU is merely the creation of 
its Member States, the latter remaining sovereign states under international law, 
and that the EU lacks any claim to statehood of its own. Lisbon reinforces 
fundamental characteristics such as the principle of attributed EU powers and a 
system of differentiated EU competences. It redraws the EU’s institutional balance 
by strengthening the influence of national governments. It also includes specific 
provisions for the UK, such as extending the opt-out across all of justice and home 
affairs. Against that background, we should ask: if the British vision for Europe 
triumphed at Lisbon, what is it that remains “wrong” with the UK-EU 
relationship?  
 
21. For some, the problem is a relatively narrow one: it relates to the fact that one 
government objects to being bound by particular EU reforms or policies (in fields 
such as employment rights) that were agreed to by or under a previous 
administration. If that diagnosis is correct, there seems little that can be done to 
remedy it: there is no unilateral capacity to undo EU treaty reforms; the right to 
repudiate existing EU secondary obligations is very rare. Perhaps the major 
political parties need to reconcile themselves to a system in which certain policy 
choices are indeed a collective responsibility of the Member States and as such 
difficult to reverse unilaterally even after a change of domestic government. 
 
22. For others, however, the real difficulties are significantly more far-reaching. 
Perhaps the British vision for Europe has changed since Lisbon, even among those 
actors who are not opposed as such to UK membership: there is certainly a strong 
political constituency which argues that the extent of our participation in European 
integration now needs positively to be rolled back. Or perhaps the fallout from the 




of the Lisbon settlement, so as to strengthen considerably the foundations of 
European economic and political integration – a project in which the present or a 
future Government decides the UK should not fully participate. In either case, the 
FAC’s terms of enquiry suggest that one potential solution lies in developing 
multiple forms of EU membership. 
 
23. In that regard, it is worth recalling that “flexible integration” already exists under 
the current Treaties. The range of policy opt-outs provided for directly under the 
Treaties themselves, together with the system for engaging in enhanced 
cooperation within the EU framework, mean that there are myriad constellations 
of (actual and potential) national participation in various fields of EU activity. 
Moreover, such flexibility already carries clear institutional (as well as 
substantive) consequences, e.g. as when the Council acts in restricted formations, 
taking into account only the votes of participating Member States.  
 
24. Against that background, one should ask: how much further might the UK want 
such flexibility to go? E.g. would it be sufficient to encourage more 
frequent/extensive resort to enhanced cooperation within the framework of the 
existing Treaties? If so, that would permit the UK to opt into or stay outside given 
EU measures or policy sectors as the national interest required – but would require 
building consensus within the EU that enhanced cooperation should be exploited 
to its full potential (and possibly also a Treaty amendment to remove the 
requirement that enhanced cooperation may only be used as a “last resort”). Or 
would the UK wish to negotiate amendments to the Treaties themselves, 
extending its existing opt-out rights beyond the single currency or justice and 
home affairs, to cover additional policy fields? If so, that would require the UK to 
persuade its European partners of the need for potentially far-reaching revisions to 
its EU membership, potentially including making the difficult case for special 
treatment within the single market, or a second-rate status for UK 
workers/consumers.  
 
25. In any event, it is worth recalling that flexibility has costs as well as benefits. 
Flexibility can involve a tangible loss of policy leadership and influence – 
especially if it involves institutional arrangements which exclude a Member State 
even from being present around the negotiating table. Depending on the relative 
sizes of the core/periphery, and the importance of the subject matter, flexibility 
might risk non-participating states being de facto obliged to follow, or work 
around, the policy agenda agreed by others. Flexibility can also exacerbate 
concerns about the complexity, transparency and legitimacy of EU decision-
making – though such concerns pale when compared to the limitations of more 
traditional intergovernmental bargaining conducted outside the EU framework. 
Seeking to negotiate “country specific” Treaty amendments obviously still 
requires unanimity among the Member States, and opens the door for other 
countries to bring their own demands to the table, some of which may not serve 
the UK national interest.  
 







Written evidence from Open Europe 
Open Europe is an independent think tank, with offices in London and Brussels, set up to 
contribute positive new thinking to the debate about the future direction of the European 
Union and Britain’s role within it.  
THE UK MUST REVISE ITS EU MEMBERSHIP TO SAVE IT 
Summary: 
• The institutional and political status quo in Europe is not an option for the UK. The UK 
public and political class are growing more sceptical of the European Union at exactly 
the same point as the Eurozone is set for more integration: the final destination points for 
the UK and the Eurozone are inevitably different.  
 
• Without a revision of the UK’s EU membership terms and if the EU is left to become 
simply an extension of the euro, Britain may be forced to leave altogether. 
 
• Based on these changed circumstances, the UK should set out a new, firm and positive 
vision for its place in the EU, based on the following principles: 
 
- Powers can flow back from the EU – it should not be a one-way street; 
- Countries must be free to integrate with each other to different degrees; 
- No EU interference in areas that can be better – or equally well – handled locally or 
nationally;  
- A far greater role for national parliaments.  
 
• This agenda should be pursued with a concerted and thought-through drive by the UK 
government aimed at:  
 
- Formalising an EU structure based on different – but equally legitimate – circles of 
membership;  
- Seeking safeguards to counterbalance the risk that a more tightly knit Eurozone could 
dictate terms to non-euro members;  
- Starting a process of devolving powers back from the EU when the political and 
economic circumstances present themselves.  
-------------- 
1. To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome 
be seen as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union? 
 
1.1. The December veto was a reflection of the multi-tier Europe inherent in the 
creation of the euro, not the cause of it. It was a watershed moment in as much 
as it could signal the start of a new political settlement in Europe in the wake of 
the Eurozone crisis, a process which could last for a number of years – perhaps 
more than a decade. Furthermore, no matter what we think of the diplomatic 
efforts and the preparatory work that preceded the veto,1 so far there is no 
evidence that the UK has lost influence in Europe as a result of it – as some 
                                                            
1 For a broader discussion, see Open Europe, ‘Cameron’s EU veto: Ten lessons that need to be learnt’, 
December 2011, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/10lessons.pdf  
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warned, in very stark language, following the December Council.2 On the crucial 
Capital Requirements Directive, for example, the UK managed to largely achieve 
its objectives, despite being in a minority position at the outset.  
 
1.2. What is clear is that the status quo is not an option. The euro crisis will inevitably 
force EU member states to develop a more variable approach to European 
cooperation. Though not of the UK’s making, the rules of EU cooperation are 
changing – Britain’s role in Europe must change with it. This presents 
opportunities as well as challenges.  
Challenges: 
1.3. If the EU becomes a political extension of the Eurozone, then the UK may 
well be forced to leave the EU: The December veto did remind us that the end 
points for the Eurozone and the UK are now, inevitably, different if the UK 
remains outside the euro. The British public and political class is becoming 
increasingly sceptical of the EU at exactly the same point that the Eurozone is set 
for further integration. Therefore, if the Eurozone continues to insist on more 
political integration, including those EU member states that are not euro 
members – such as was the case with the fiscal treaty – then the UK will become 
increasingly uncomfortable within the EU and could well slowly move towards the 
exit. The question is whether this is what the UK and the rest of the EU really 
wants and if it is inevitable (see ‘Opportunities’ below)? 
 
1.4. Eurozone caucusing: A well-documented risk is that Eurozone states start to 
act and vote as a ‘caucus’ – not only in areas of direct concern to the running of 
the Eurozone but also, for example, in single market legislation, social policy or 
financial services regulation.3 It is hard to envision how ‘Eurobonds’ or other 
forms of shared eurozone government borrowing could work without some sort of 
banking resolution fund at the eurozone level to underpin the financial system or 
potentially even a shared finance minister, as proposed by former ECB President 
Jean-Claude Trichet.4 This would clearly have major implications for the UK’s 
financial services industry.  
 
1.5. So far, there has been limited evidence that Eurozone caucusing is taking place, 
but it remains a clear risk – this is particularly true if the EU grows more 




2 See, for instance, Charles Grant, ‘Britain on the edge of Europe’, 9 December 2011, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/charles-grant/britain-on-edge-of-europe; Charles Grant is Director of 
the Centre for European Reform (CER)  
3 We discussed the issue thoroughly in Open Europe, ‘Continental shift: Safeguarding the UK’s financial trade in 
a changing Europe’, December 2011, 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/continentalshift.pdf  
4 See the FT, ‘Trichet seeks single EU finance ministry’, 2 June 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e0bd4e7a-8d15-
11e0-815d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1vUPlj1IT  
5 An early example of the potential for eurozone dominance was the decision leading to the creation of the EU’s 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) bailout fund, used to aid Ireland and Portugal. Unlike the 
European Financial Stability Facility, which is guaranteed solely by eurozone states (EFSF), the EFSM is jointly 
guaranteed by all 27 EU member states via the EU budget. The decision, in May 2010, to create this fund was 
hugely controversial because it used Article 122 of the EU Treaties, previously reserved for providing financial 
assistance only in times of natural disaster, to overrule the Treaties’ ‘no bailout clause’. Although the decision 
was formally approved under QMV at a meeting of the EU-27 finance ministers on 9 May 2010, eurozone leaders 
had already outlined the creation of the EFSM at their own meeting two days earlier. The statement of the heads 
of state or Government of the euro area (from 7 May 2010) is available here, 
http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idINIndia-48328620100507 
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1.6. Future changes to qualified majority voting weight in the Council of Ministers 
(under the Lisbon Treaty) could potentially exacerbate this risk. In 2014 or 2017 
(if a country requests it), Eurozone countries, if they vote as a bloc, will for the 
first time have a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers, meaning that they 
can outvote non-euro members on issues decided by QMV.  
Changes to qualified majority voting under the Lisbon Treaty 
 
1.7. The colonisation of the EU institutions: Linked to the above is the risk of the 
European institutions being used to pursue policies that are designed for the 
specific needs and concerns of the Eurozone as opposed to the EU as a whole. 
There is some, albeit limited, evidence that the EU institutions are already 
starting to act as facilitator of a Eurozone agenda. As has been widely noted, 
without the specific approval of the UK, and despite it not being incorporated in 
the EU treaties, the fiscal treaty makes some use of the EU institutions to enforce 
Eurozone budget rules (the ECJ is meant to police whether the new rule on 
‘balanced budgets’ is implemented into national law, but cannot impose penalties 
if a signatory country breaks the rule).6 Likewise, the European Commission has 
tabled a proposal for a financial transaction tax, following pressure from within the 
Eurozone (the proposal is protected by a veto so will not be adopted at the EU-
level as long as the UK objects).7  
 
                                                            
6 See Open Europe’s blog, ‘Fifth time lucky?’, 30 January 2012, 
http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/fifth-time-lucky.html  
7 See Open Europe’s blog, ‘Taxing unicorns’, 23 March 2012, 
http://www.openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/ftt-rears-its-ugly-head-once-again.html  
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1.8. These risks are linked to the possible ‘fragmentation’ of the single market, i.e. the 
single market gets divided between those inside the euro and those outside, 
which would represent a step backwards for intra-EU trade. However, the UK 
could have allies in seeking to prevent this. The European Commission and 
smaller member states want to avoid it, as it would tip the balance of power 
further towards the Franco-German axis.  
 Opportunities: 
1.9. A new vision and model for European integration: The Eurozone crisis marks 
a clear setback to the original founding principle of “ever closer union”. First, the 
principle has led directly to financial and political turmoil; Greece should clearly 
not have joined the euro, but there was so much political momentum for closer 
union that it signed up, which is now threatening to cause major political and 
economic fallout in Europe.  
 
1.10. Second, as noted, it cannot accommodate for the different end points for the UK 
and euro countries. It follows that the UK now has a unique opportunity to take 
the initiative, stating clearly and firmly an alternative principle of European 
cooperation, which allows for different circles of membership of the EU, and 
which would be based on the following principles: 
  
• Powers can flow back from the EU – it should not be a one-way street; 
• Countries must be free to integrate with each other to different degrees; 
• No EU interference in areas better – or equally well – handled locally or 
nationally (the current concept of ‘subsidiarity’ is so vague that it can 
mean anything, elsewhere we have instead proposed a ‘European 
localism’ agenda, i.e. taking the principle of localism endorsed at the 
national level and applying it to the European level);8 
• A far greater role for national parliaments.  
 
1.11. The UK government has consistently suffered from a poverty of vision for its role 
in Europe, which has left it without an overall strategy.9 The euro crisis, and its 
potential aftermath, means this must change. The alternative vision it now has 
the opportunity to set out needs to be positive, stressing a new, economically 
flexible model, growth opportunities across the globe and the need to reconcile 
EU membership with national democracy. David Cameron came close to spelling 
out such a vision last year when he said that the EU should take on “the flexibility 
of a network, not the rigidity of a bloc – whose institutions help by connecting and 
strengthening its members to thrive in a vibrant world, rather than holding them 
back.”10 Having a clear vision of where the UK should be in Europe – and setting 
out an alternative vision for European cooperation – will also help to focus 
diplomatic efforts and make it easier for EU partners to know what, exactly, the 
UK wants to achieve (and therefore easier for them to lend support or at least 
reach a position of compromise based on mutual interests). 
 
                                                            
8 See Open Europe, ‘The case for European localism’, September 2011, 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/EUlocalism.pdf  
9 See, for instance, Open Europe Senior Analyst Christopher Howarth’s article on Conservative Home, ‘If he 
wants Britain to have a vision for Europe, David Cameron should appoint a European Secretary’, 17 April 2012, 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2012/04/christopher-howarth-if-he-wants-britain-to-have-a-vision-for-
europe-david-cameron-should-appoint-a-e.html  
10 From David Cameron’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 14 November 2011, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/lord-mayors-banquet/  
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1.12. Pushing for redistribution of powers: As the Eurozone will continue to need 
the UK’s approval to pursue further integration via the EU institutions, and as 
Germany and other member states have a strong incentive to keep the UK inside 
the EU, the UK should accompany its drive for an alternative model for European 
integration which includes bringing specific powers back to the UK (see below).  
 
1.13. Reorientation of the UK economy away from the eurozone: The EU will 
remain an important destination for UK trade but the short and long-term 
economic challenges Europe faces warrant a rethinking of the UK’s economic 
interests. Currently, only 1.4% of UK exports go to India forecasted to grow on 
average by 8.1% a year up to 2050 and only 2.35% to China forecast to grow at 
5.9%.11 Although trade negotiation remains an exclusive EU competence, the UK 
retains the power to promote UK business and exports to non-EU countries, 
something which the current Government has correctly made a priority. This is an 
important exercise for two reasons. Firstly, boosting UK trade with emerging and 
fast-growing economies is clearly beneficial in its own right but, secondly, the less 
the UK depends on the EU/eurozone for trade, the stronger Britain’s negotiating 
position when it comes to arguing for reform. 
  
 
2. Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should 
the UK seek for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier 
EU and start to develop ideas for multiple forms of EU membership? 
 
2.1. Talk of a “multi-speed Europe” – implying that all EU member states are 
religiously heading in the same direction – must stop. Instead, the UK should fully 
embrace a formalised EU structure based on different modes of membership, 
based on the principles set out above and the understanding that Britain will not 
join the euro.  
 
2.2. The notion that such a multi-facetted EU structure would leave the UK on the 
side-lines is misplaced: the UK is one of EU’s ‘big three’ economies; it is a large 
export market; remains a genuine global player; a big net contributor to the EU 
budget; is home to Europe’s financial centre and a nuclear power. The rest of the 
EU will listen to the UK if it comes up with a constructive agenda. In the EU 
debate, “influence” is a term too often used – particularly by those who favour the 
status quo – in a rather lazy and undefined way. Those who worry about loss of 
influence must give concrete examples of where this is happening and, crucially, 
what the UK should be influencing.  
 
2.3. In terms of an EU institutional framework, the UK has three basic options: 
 
• Status quo; 
• Changing the institutional framework from within, i.e. seeking new 
membership terms; 
• Seeking a new institutional arrangement with Europe altogether, which 
most likely would involve withdrawal.  
 
2.4. We believe the status quo is not an option, while withdrawing from the EU 
altogether would raise more questions than it would answer (the alternative 
trading arrangements with Europe, i.e. the European Economic Area or a free 
trade agreement, would also require the ‘approval’ of EU partners and therefore 
                                                            
11 ONS, ‘Pink Book’ and Open Europe, ‘Continental shift: Safeguarding the UK’s financial trade in a changing 
Europe’, p25 
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raise many of the same issues as renegotiation from within). Therefore, creating 
a new institutional arrangement from within is the UK’s best option. Concretely, 
the new institutional architecture that the UK should push for could include: 
 
2.5. The devolution of powers from EU – at least for the UK: David Cameron has 
labelled the current crisis “An opportunity, in Britain’s case, for powers to ebb 
back instead of flow away and for the European Union to focus on what really 
matters.”12 This is the right thinking. Substantially reforming the institutional 
division of labour between the UK and the EU may be necessary to reconcile 
public opinion to EU membership. The pursuit of returning powers to the UK and 
further Eurozone integration is not mutually exclusive – on the contrary.  
 
2.6. The priorities should be areas that have an everyday impact, for example: 
 
• Devolving EU regional spending to richer member states, including the 
UK, which would save Britain billions and allow it to run a far more 
effective regional policy (no treaty change);13 
 
• The UK should exercise its ‘block opt-out’ from around 130 EU laws in 
justice and home affairs, which it could do unilaterally under the Lisbon 
Treaty (by 2014 – no treaty change);14 
 
• As noted below, there needs to be a better balance between European 
market access and control over vital national economic interests, for 
example via a veto over disproportionate financial services law (treaty 
change);15 
 
• At least part of the CAP should be re-nationalised (no treaty change);16 
 
• A UK long-term objective should be to devolve social and employment law 
(treaty change). A short-term, intermediate objective should be to 
minimise the impact of the working time directive (no treaty change);17 
 
• EU environmental legislation should be far less prescriptive. A 
compromise may involve overall targets set at the EU-level but member 
states free to meet them in whatever way they deem the most cost-
effective (no treaty change). 
 
2.7. Far stronger roles for national parliaments: This should include far greater 
scrutiny powers for MPs (for example a mandate-based system based around the 
Danish model, which could be achieved unilaterally) and pushing for parliaments 
to be given a “red card” option which would enable them to veto Commission 
legislation if there was a significant majority opposed (requiring Treaty change).18 
 
                                                            
12 From David Cameron’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 14 November 2011 
13 See Open Europe, ‘Off target: The case for bringing regional policy back home’, January 2012, 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/2012EUstructuralfunds.pdf  
14 See Open Europe, ‘An unavoidable choice: More or less EU control over UK policing and crime law’, January 
2012, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/JHA2014choice.pdf  
15 See Open Europe, ‘Continental shift: Safeguarding the UK’s financial trade in a changing Europe’ 
16 See Open Europe, ‘More for less: Making the EU’s farm policy work for growth and the environment’, February 
2012, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/CAP_2012.pdf  
17 See Open Europe, ‘Repatriating EU social policy: The best choice for jobs and growth?’, November 2011, 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/2011EUsocialpolicy.pdf  
18 Open Europe, ‘The case for European localism’ 
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2.8. European cooperation must be a two-way street: As noted above, it simply 
has to be possible under the Treaties for powers to flow back to member states. 
There are a number of ways in which this could be formalised. For example, the 
Lisbon Treaty already allows for so-called “enhanced cooperation”, whereby a 
group of member states are free to pursue a policy separately if not all 27 are 
able to agree. This has already happened in areas such as family law and an EU 
patent. However, there is no reason why this cannot also work in reverse, with a 
group of countries deciding to repatriate powers or EU laws, even though it may 
not be politically possible for all 27 countries to do so. 
 
3. Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ 
Treaty into the EU Treaties? If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, 
should it make its condition for doing so? 
 
3.1. Yes, subject to safeguards or powers back. These safeguards need to be better 
thought-through, prepared and communicated than the UK’s demands ahead of 
the December summit. The safeguards could include: 
 
1) Formal safeguards for the non-euro group. For example, ‘double QMV’ to give 
the non-euro group a veto or a non-euro red card allowing non-euro members to 
block a Eurozone ‘caucus’ in the Council.  
 
2) A new 'single market protocol', which could commit the EU to a pro-growth, 
outward looking and proportionate regulatory regime while safeguarding the UK 
from decisions taken solely by the eurozone for all 27 member states.19 
 
3) UK-specific, legally watertight safeguards that will ensure that the UK is not 
overruled on a vital financial measure and cement London's ability to do business 
and compete in global markets. Though it will be resisted by EU partners, this 
could include a 'double lock', acknowledging the UK's prominence in this sector 
and giving the Government the right to refer any disproportionate or 
discriminatory laws to the European Council, where it has an effective veto over 
regulatory proposals.20 
 
3.2. We have recommended that the UK focus first and foremost on financial services 
as it is a policy area where we can already see the potential friction that can 
occur between Eurozone integration and UK interests (as a fiscal union could 
well spill over to financial supervision and regulation) – therefore options two 
and/or three are our preferred ones.  
 
22 May 2012 
  
                                                            




ANNEX: Potential wording of the protocols 
Wording of a potential single market protocol 
PROTOCOL ON THE SINGLE MARKET 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
RECOGNISING the importance of maintaining the single market for the prosperity of the 
Union;  
DESIRING to reduce barriers to trade in areas such as the digital economy, services, 
telecoms and energy by 20XX; 
DESIRING to allow for a competitive flexible and responsive labour market; 
HAVE AGREED upon the following provision, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
Article 1 
So as to ensure that competition in the internal market is not distorted, all decisions relating 
to the internal market are to be decided by the Council of Ministers by the ordinary legislative 
procedure and that all decisions relating to the operation of the euro-area are compatible 
with the internal market of all member states. 
Article 2 
No provision will be introduced unless it has been subject to a rigorous impact assessment, 
is matched by the cancellation of a current measure, is proportional, consistent with the 
principle of subsidiarity and is demonstrably related to a known risk.  
Article 3 
No provision relating financial services will be introduced unless it is proportional, related to 
and seeks to remedy a known and demonstrated risk, and does not impose maximum 
standards on the sector, if a member state demonstrates the need to safeguard its own 
industry. 
Article 4 
That a Code on Better Regulation will be considered before any proposal is brought forward 
and an assessment made as to whether measures will improve growth and competitiveness 
of the Union economy.  
Wording of a potential UK Protocol: 
PROTOCOL ON THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
RECOGNISING the importance of the financial services industry to the United Kingdom;  
DESIRING to allow the United Kingdom to maintain control over the regulation of its financial 
services industry;  
WHILST wishing to allow the United Kingdom to retain the ability to participate in regulations 
and measures; 
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ACKNOWLEDGING the United Kingdom’s responsibility to act responsibly and preserve the 
Single Market; 
HAVE AGREED upon the following provision, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
Article 1 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaties, where the United Kingdom indicates to the 
Council that it believes that a proposed regulation or directive or an amendment to an 
existing regulation or directive is or would in its judgement adversely and disproportionately 
affect its financial services industry it may request that the proposal is referred back to the 
European Commission, that additional assessments are made of the proposal and that 
suggested amendments are considered. 
Article 2 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaties, where the United Kingdom indicates to the 
Council that it believes that an existing directive or regulation, a proposed regulation or 
directive or an amendment to an existing regulation or directive is or would in its judgement 
adversely affect its financial services industry it may request that the proposal is suspended 
and referred back to the Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be 
suspended and the validity of such a request shall not be called into question whether by the 











• The December 2011 European Council and the subsequent signing of the “Fiscal Compact 
Treaty” by 25 EU Member States (excluding the UK and the Czech Republic) would at face 
value seem to have little impact on the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union. After all the 
British Government remains firmly committed to EU membership, which is not, in my 
judgement, in the country’s best interests.  
• But perhaps the December Summit will be seen by future historians of the EU as a 
watershed event for the UK and the EU, when the UK’s isolation was obvious, at last, for all 
to see. Moreover, despite the PM’s veto, the European Council has simply pushed ahead 
with the Treaty, which will probably be incorporated into the EU Treaties sooner rather than 
later. One can only conclude that Britain’s influence on EU events, as crisis engulfs the 
Eurozone, is minimal.  
• Given the lack of UK influence in the EU, we are in the weakest possible position to drive 
forward institutional or policy developments in the EU. Whilst we remain a member, the 
best we can do is respond to decisions made by the Franco-German axis and EU institutions 
and attempt to obtain the best deal for us. This may seem like a counsel of despair, but it is a 
realistic one.  
• In any case, any major near-term to medium-term developments in the EU will almost 
certainly concern the Eurozone as EU institutions and the EU17 Member States struggle 
with the existential threat to the currency. Britain, thankfully outside the euro, is inevitably 
at the periphery of events, a bystander. 
• Moreover, any notion that the British Government could use the Eurozone crisis to negotiate 
any repatriation of powers, and develop a different form of membership, is a chimera. There 
is absolutely no evidence that our EU partners would accept such a move. 
• It is not clear that the Treaty will have any direct impact on other aspects of the EU and its 
policies. But the indirect impacts of its implementation must not be underestimated. The 
Treaty is part of the on-going centralisation of EU policy-making. Under these 
circumstances, I would expect the EU’s institutions to push ahead with the further 
centralisation of policy-making, some of which is intended, at least putatively, to “save the 
euro”. 
• Having vetoed the incorporation of the Fiscal Compact Treaty into the EU Treaties in 
December 2011, the UK Government should continue to reject any such move for the sake 
of consistency, at the very least. If the Government is prepared to agree to the incorporation 
they should at the least get guarantees that the EU-wide Financial Transactions Tax will 
remain subject to veto in order to support the City. They can, after all, do little to protect the 
City from the flood of EU Single Market financial regulations which are subject to QMV.  
 
Submitter of evidence  
Ruth Lea has worked in the Civil Service (the Treasury, the Civil Service College, the CSO 
and DTI (1970-88), with a short break lecturing in economics); the City (Mitsubishi Bank 
(1988-93), Lehman Brothers (1993-94), Arbuthnot Banking Group (since 2007)); ITN 
(1994-95) and the Institute of Directors (1995-2003). She was Director of the Centre for 
Policy Studies (2003-07) and Director of Global Vision (2007-10).  
 





To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen as a 
watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union?  
 
1. A brief analysis of the background to the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union”, otherwise known as the “Fiscal 
Compact Treaty”,1 is required in order to assess the significance of the December 2011 
European Council meeting for Britain.  
  
2. The Treaty is intended to strengthen the Eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
whereby general government deficits should not exceed 3% of GDP and general government 
debt should not exceed (or is “sufficiently declining towards”) 60% of GDP, by introducing 
a new range of medium-term objectives, including a “balanced budget rule” and an 
automatic mechanism to take corrective action. The former states that budgets must be 
balanced, with “a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP”, or in surplus. 
Concerning the corrective action, if the European Court of Justice judges that a member has 
failed to comply with the “balanced budget rule”, it can impose a fine, a sum “that shall not 
exceed 0.1% of GDP”. It should be noted that there is some flexibility in the “balanced 
budget rule” in that “exceptional circumstances” are allowed for. In addition, the target is 
expressed in terms of the “structural” (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted) balance, not the actual 
recorded balance, which can allow for large deficits if the economy in question is 
performing well below potential. Note also that, because the Treaty is exclusively about the 
Eurozone, it does not directly affect the UK.  
 
3. Putting aside the feebleness of the SGP to impose fiscal discipline on the Eurozone’s 
members in the first decade of the euro’s existence, there are significant doubts about the 
Treaty’s potential success, given the horrendous and deep-seated structural problems faced 
by the Eurozone in its current dysfunctional configuration. The Treaty is, significantly, only 
concerned with fiscal discipline in the Eurozone and should be seen in the general context of 
the EU’s endeavours to tighten economic governance procedures.2 It is not, as sometimes 
reported, concerned with the development of an EU fiscal union, broadly defined as 
comprising a common Ministry of Finance, common sovereign debt (the mutualisation of 
debt) and substantial financial transfers from the rich, highly competitive northern 
economies (principally Germany) to the less competitive peripheral economies. Such a fiscal 
union is arguably necessary to save the currency area in its current configuration. There are 
moreover few signs that the Eurozone is moving towards such a union. It should also be 
noted that the Treaty does nothing to address the fundamental structural fissure at the heart 
of the Eurozone crisis, namely the competiveness mismatch between the northern and the 
peripheral economies, which is tearing the currency union apart. It can be argued that the 
                                                 
1 European Council, “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union”, signed on 2 March 2012. Subject to ratification by at least 12 Eurozone members, the Treaty 
enters into force on 1 January 2013. Available on www.european-council.europa.eu. 
2 Council of the European Union, “Council confirms agreement on economic governance”, press 
release, 4 October 2011. This press release for example outlines the “Six Pack”, the six legislative 
proposals on economic governance in the EU (though more specifically in the EU17), agreed by the 
Council of the European Union (the Council) in October 2011. The proposals related to a reformed 




Treaty, by focussing on fiscal discipline, has simply side-stepped or chosen to ignore the 
causes of crisis engulfing the euro.  
 
4. 25 out of the 27 Member States signed the Treaty in March 2012, with the UK and the 
Czech Republic the only two dissenting members. The Czech Republic may yet sign, 
leaving the UK completely isolated. December’s Summit was, of course, noted for the 
British Prime Minister’s veto of the EU’s plans to incorporate the proposed Fiscal Compact 
Treaty into the current EU Treaties when his stipulations for relatively modest safeguards 
for the City of London were refused. His veto forced the separate Treaty but the EU clearly 
intends to push ahead and incorporate the Treaty into the EU Treaties “as soon as possible”.3 
The likelihood is that this will happen sooner rather than later.  
 
5. So to what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen 
as a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union, given this background? The 
short answer appears to be “very little” at face value. After all the UK’s EU policy remains 
committed to membership of the EU, which is not, in my judgement, in the country’s best 
interests.4 
 
6. But developments since the PM’s veto have merely served to underline our lack of 
influence in EU affairs, implying our place in the Union is firmly at the periphery. The 
Fiscal Compact Treaty has gone ahead essentially as planned by the European Council, even 
if it remains outside the main EU Treaties. Because the UK is (rightly) outside the Eurozone, 
which is understandably focussing on trying to hold the currency union together, the UK is 
inevitably increasingly peripheral. Our influence diminishes as crisis engulfs the Continent, 
even though the future of the Eurozone has major implications for the country. If the 
Eurozone pushes ahead towards full fiscal union the UK’s influence in EU affairs will 
diminish even further. Perhaps the December Summit will be seen by future historians of the 
EU as a watershed event – an event when the UK’s isolation was obvious, at last, for all to 
see.  
 
Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the UK seek 
for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier EU and start to develop 
ideas for multiple forms of EU membership? 
 
7. Given my earlier comments on the lack of UK influence in the EU, I believe we are in the 
weakest possible position to drive forward developments in the EU. Whilst we remain a 
member, the best we can do is respond to decisions made by the Franco-German axis and 
the institutions of the EU and attempt to obtain the best deal for us. This may seem like a 
counsel of despair, but it is a realistic one.  
 
8. More specifically, any debate on the future of the EU and its institutional architecture is 
inevitably dominated by the possible resolution of the existential Eurozone crisis. It is worth 
speculating as to how the UK should respond, given possible Eurozone resolution scenarios. 
                                                 
3 The precise words in the Treaty are “…bearing in mind that the objective of the Heads of State and 
Government of the euro area Member States and of the other Member States of the European Union is 
to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European 
Union is founded.”  
4 See Ruth Lea and Brian Binley MP, Britain and the EU: a new relationship, Global Vision, May 
2012, for wide-ranging discussion of the options open to the UK.  
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Very broadly three such scenarios can be identified. The first scenario is that the EU17 
members push ahead with full fiscal union and the Eurozone bloc survives broadly as 
currently configured. The EU is already a two-tier organisation comprising the EU17 (and 
arguably the pre-in aspirants) and the “outs” the UK, Denmark and possibly Sweden.5 With 
fiscal union, or political union, a two-tier structure would be formalised and the UK’s 
peripheral position would be reinforced. The second scenario is a possible major 
reconfiguration of the currency union with either the weaker countries returning to their own 
currencies or, more fundamentally, a split into a northern Eurozone and a southern Eurozone 
to reflect the competitiveness gap between these two blocs. The power would indubitably be 
with the northern Eurozone bloc. Britain should, of course, stay clear of both blocs, but with 
the Eurozone split Britain would look less isolated from mainstream affairs than with full 
fiscal union. The third scenario is a complete collapse of the bloc which would shake the EU 
to its very foundations and could possibly present the UK with an opportunity to remodel, or 
reform, the EU as a looser trading relationship. But I regard this scenario as highly unlikely 
with the chances that the UK could drive forward a major reform of the EU as vanishingly 
small. There is simply no stomach for such a “reformed” EU in the other EU Member States.  
  
9. There are, of course, non-currency “multi-tier” aspects to the EU already (Schengen 
springs to mind) but these are of minor significance compared with the currency and will 
almost certainly remain so. On a slightly related issue, there is much speculation that the UK 
Government could negotiate the repatriation of certain powers thus creating a different class, 
or form, of EU membership. But there is absolutely no evidence that our EU partners would 
accept such a move and plenty of evidence to show they would block it totally. For example, 
German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble said last October that Britain should forget 
any attempts to use the Eurozone crisis to repatriate EU social and employment laws.6 The 
repatriation of powers is a chimera.  
 
What is the relationship between the new ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty and the EU’s acquis? 
What impact might the conclusion of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty have on other aspects of 
the EU and its policies, such as the EU budget, enlargement, or the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy? 
 
10. I assume for all practical purposes that the Treaty is already part of the acquis and 
if/when it becomes part of the EU Treaties then it will formally become part of the acquis.  
 
11. It is not clear that the Treaty will have any direct impact on other aspects of the EU and 
its policies. But the indirect impacts of its implementation must not be underestimated. The 
Treaty is part of the on-going centralisation of EU policy-making. The history of the EU 
tells us that its proponents only have forward gears and the EU’s institutions cumulatively 
accrue competencies and influence. They do not divest power. Under these circumstances, I 
would expect the institutions to push ahead with further control over policies, possibly 
including budgetary issues or matters relating to the CFSP. Where there is a possible link 
between an EU policy (say budgetary control or promoting an EU-wide Financial 
Transactions Tax) and “saving the euro”, I would expect “saving the euro” to be invoked 
frequently in support of increased EU activism. Concerning the implications for 
                                                 
5 Only Britain and Denmark have formal opt-outs whilst Sweden has decided to stay out of the euro for 
the time being. The other seven, however, are legally bound to join and wish to do so except, perhaps, 
the Czech Republic. 
6 “David Cameron told by Berlin: drop demands for repatriation of powers”, Guardian, 19 October.  
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enlargement, I would speculate that successful countries on the EU’s periphery, Turkey 
springs to mind, would have even less interest in joining the EU if it means an EU-grip on 
its economic policies.  
 
Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty into the 
EU Treaties? If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make its condition 
for doing so?  
 
12. Having vetoed the incorporation of the Fiscal Compact Treaty into the EU Treaties in 
December 2011, the UK Government should reject any such move for the sake of 
consistency, if nothing else. But, as already commented, the Treaty states clearly that the 
European Council wishes to proceed with its incorporation “as soon as possible” and I 
expect the UK Government to agree to this.  
 
13. The Government should revisit the Prime Minister’s demands for some relatively modest 
safeguards for the City of London and insist they are enshrined in the Treaty. Specifically, 
any proposals for an EU-wide Financial Transactions Tax should strictly remain subject to 
veto. But there is little that the UK can do about the EU’s heavy programme of financial 
regulations because they are part of the Single Market and subject to QMV where we have 
just 8½% of the vote in the Council of the European Union. As such the UK has little 
influence over the legislation relating to one of its major businesses, arguably one of its most 
successful businesses, some of which has been described as “harmful”.7 Membership of the 
Single Market is increasingly disadvantageous for this country. But this is a different issue.  
 
22 May 2012 
 
                                                 











1.1   This  Note  sets  out  views  on  behalf  of  TheCityUK  in  response  to  the  Select  Committee’s 
Inquiry  into  the  future of  the  European Union  and UK  government policy. TheCityUK  is  a 
membership  body  representing  UK‐based  financial  and  related  professional  services 











UK  economy,  the  UK’s  international  competitive  advantage  and  in  meeting  the  saving, 
protection and  investment needs of  its  citizens. Financial  services account  for 8.9% of UK 
GDP ‐ higher than all other major economies including the US (8.4%), Japan (5.8%), Germany 
(5.3%) and France  (5.1%). A significant portion of this  is made up  from the contribution of 














EU  Institutions and European Supervisory Authorities  (ESAs).  Indeed we would argue  that 
even greater  focus and  resources are needed  today  than before. First, UK participation  in 
the  staff  of  the  EU  Institutions  and  ESAs  needs  to  be  enhanced.  Rulemaking  powers will 
reside  with  the  EU  authorities.  The  new  UK  regulatory  bodies  will  have  a  secondary 
supervision  and  enforcement  role.  This  change  in  the  balance  of  decision‐making 
necessitates  the  establishment  of  a  UK  secondment/placement  scheme  for  filling  senior 
roles. Senior vacancies  in EU  Institutions and ESAs need to be mapped out, followed by an 
identification of suitable candidates whose candidacy can  then be promoted. TheCityUK  is 




2.4  Financial  services  regulation  and  trade  liberalisation  both  have  key  implications  for  EU 










3.1   TheCityUK’s  member‐businesses  exist  to  service  their  customers’  needs  in  the  UK  and 
globally; and TheCityUK has an interest in those EU policies that impact on their ability to do 
so. The areas of EU policymaking with which TheCityUK is particularly concerned include EU 
regulation  of  financial  services  and  related  professional  services,  EU  proposals  for  taxing 
financial  services,  the EU’s  strategy  for  regulatory convergence with other global markets, 
and the EU’s trade and investment policy for market opening; as well as an interest in such 
other areas of EU policy as encouraging Small and Medium Enterprises  (SMEs); finance for 








Financial  services  account  for  8.9%  of  UK  GDP  higher  than  all  other  major  economies 
including  the  US  (8.4%),  Japan  (5.8%),  Germany  (5.3%)  and  France  (5.1%).  A  significant 









Market and  the  “four  freedoms”  inherent  in  the Single Market  (free movement of goods, 
persons,  services and  capital) as  the basis  for conducting business  in Europe. The UK also 
derives  benefit  from  participating  in  the  formulation  of  such  EU  policies  as  the  Common 
Commercial Policy – the basis for the EU’s trade relations with third countries. UK exports of 
financial services  to  the EU  totalled £17.8bn  in 2010, 80% up on £9.8bn  in 2005, although 
down from a peak of £21.8bn in 2008. Main destination centres in the EU for UK exports of 
financial  services  in  2010 were  the Netherlands  £3.4bn, Germany  £3.4bn,  France  £2.9bn, 
Ireland £1.7bn, Luxembourg £1.2bn and Spain £829m. The existence of  the Single Market 
also  underlies  the  UK’s  success  in  attracting  foreign  firms.  A  total  of  1,442  financial 
companies  were  authorised  by  the  FSA  as  foreign  owned  at  end‐2011  including  634  US 
companies and 78 Swiss companies. 
 
4.2   The  UK  seeks  to  shape  EU  policies  in  line  with  the  principles  of  open  and  competitive 














5.1   This  part  of  TheCityUK’s  response  will  not  attempt  a  comprehensive  itemisation  of  the 
details  of  every  policy  area  in  which  the  UK  has  an  interest  in  full  participation  in  EU 





5.2   Changes  to  financial  regulation  are  clearly  required  to  address  failures highlighted by  the 
financial crisis. Protecting consumers, businesses and taxpayers from the costs of failures in 
financial firms is rightly the priority. A significant programme of change is already underway 




Treaties  (i.e.  it  differs  from  the  EU’s  Common  Commercial  Policy,  Common  Agricultural 
Policy or Competition Policy). It comprises a developing body of legislation and institutions. 
These  have  evolved  to  a  point  where  the  EU’s  common  legal  framework  for  much  of 
financial services is now a “given” in the international business of the UK as a global financial 
centre: indeed the provision of financial services in the UK by non‐UK firms has become to a 
large degree dependent on the maintenance of  that common EU  legal  framework and  the 
UK’s part  in devising  it and operating within  it. The evolutionary character of this common 
legal framework means that the UK must be engaged at all levels of policy development.  
 
5.4   Nor  is  the  process  of  widening  and  deepening  EU  engagement  only  a  matter  for 
Government. Financial institutions also have a role to play. TheCityUK and its membership in 
conjunction with the City of London Corporation have decided to promote a dialogue with 
other Member  States.  It  is  envisaged  that  this dialogue will  encompass policymakers  and 
regulatory  authorities  as  well  as  business  and  trade  associations,  think‐tanks  and  civil 
society.  We  believe  this  effort  can  complement  UK  diplomatic  engagement  with  other 
Member States. 
 
5.5   Nonetheless  the main burden of maintaining  constructive engagement with  the European 
Institutions and  international bodies will  inevitably fall on the FSA and  its successor bodies 
and other UK  regulatory  authorities.  Further, we would  argue  that  greater  resources  and 
attention  are now  required  given  the  changing  political  and  regulatory  environment.  The 
developing  role  of  the  ESAs  mean  that  greater  focus  is  required  from  the  UK.  This  was 








5.6   TheCityUK  welcomes  the  Government’s  commitment  to  establish  an  international  co‐
ordination committee for the Treasury, the Bank of England, the FCA and the PRA (“the UK 
authorities”):  its mandate should be  to  lead and co‐ordinate UK engagement on European 
financial services policy issues and to: 
   


















5.7   Two  specific  issues  should  be  highlighted.  Firstly,  UK  staffing  of  European  Institutions, 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and international authorities: the UK needs to play 
a full role in the governance of the ESAs and other bodies, whose importance is forecast to 
grow.  There  is high  level UK  staff participation  in  ESMA,  EIOPA1  and  ESRB.2 Whilst  these 
developments are helpful, greater depth of resource is needed. This necessitates the putting 
in place of a dedicated UK secondment/placement scheme for filling senior roles both in the 
European  Institutions  and  the  ESAs.  TheCityUK  is  willing  to  support  HMG  in  the 
establishment and promotion of this scheme. 
 
5.8  Secondly,  interaction of  the new UK  regulatory  regime with EU  Institutions and European 
Supervisory Authorities:  the transition to a new UK  financial regulatory regime will change 
responsibilities  for  representing  the UK  in European and  international bodies.  It  is already 
clear  that  there will  not  be  a  perfect match  between  the  responsibilities  of  the  new UK 
bodies and those of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESMA, EIOPA and the EBA3 which 
are  set  up  along  sectoral  lines).  The  Financial  Services  Bill  should  therefore  make  full 











with other Member  States  should  yield dividends over  the medium  term making  it more 
likely  that  the  UK  achieves  understanding  and  support  for  its  views  and  positions  when 
policy issues reach Heads of State and Government in bodies such as the European Council. 













5.10  Trade policy  is different  in character  from EU  financial  regulation.  It  is a “common policy” 
whose  ambit  is  set  under  the  Treaties.  The  demands  placed  upon  trade  policy  are  now 
changing. Until  recently,  the policy  focused on  long‐term, multilateral  trade  liberalisation. 
This  has  now  changed.  First,  under  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  the  EU  trade  policy  now  includes 
investment  and  investment  protection  (previously  the  province  of  Member  States). 
Secondly, the focus  is now on shorter‐term bilateral approaches, reflecting both the global 
trend towards preferential trade and  investment agreements between a  limited number of 
parties  and  the EU’s own policy enshrined  in  the Commission’s  “Global Europe”  initiative 
(2006). This provides opportunities for the EU to engage with emerging economies.  
 
5.11   This change  in policy has had  several  important effects. First, EU  trade policy, by  focusing 
more bilaterally, involves prioritisation of markets to a greater extent than before. Secondly, 
the types of trade agreement being entered into (bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) for 
instance),  are  narrower  and  deeper  agreements  than  before,  embracing  such matters  as 
regulation and consultation mechanisms  for  resolving  regulatory conflicts. Third,  there are 
more  linkages between  trade policy  and  regulatory policy.  Fourth,  the  importance of  the 
EU’s  trade  policy  for  services  in  general,  and  highly  regulated  services  in  particular,  is 
heightened as services liberalisation requires regulatory barriers to be tackled.  
 
5.12   For  all  these  reasons,  the  interplay  of  different Member  States’  choices  and  priorities  in 
policy‐formation is even more marked than before. The UK has a well‐respected position in 
the  EU  Trade  Policy  Committee,  supported  by  the  government’s  wider  commercial 
diplomacy initiative (which TheCityUK welcomes). It will be important for the UK to continue 
to have an influential voice. Trade policy is changing its nature, and the UK will need to see 





6.1   In  developing  its  views  on  both  regulation  and  trade  policy,  a  particular  feature  of 
TheCityUK’s  approach  has  been  to  emphasise  the  potential  implications  of  both  for  EU 
economic growth. In the case of EU financial regulation, TheCityUK has consistently stressed 
that  regulatory  reform  cannot be  viewed  in  isolation  from wider economic policies. True, 
sound  regulation of  financial  services  is  important  in  itself. But  financial  services  facilitate 






infrastructure. Other Proposals  such as MiFID5  II need  to ensure  the EU  remains open  to 
business with third countries. TheCityUK welcomes the Government’s efforts to reorient EU 












7.1   Even  a  cursory  review of  some of  the EU’s economic,  commercial  and  regulatory policies 




same. UK policy will need  to be alive  to  these  trends and assumptions, working with  the 
grain of other Member States’ perceptions while countering or rebutting them as necessary. 
To  be  effective,  UK  policy  will  need  to  operate  within  an  institutional  framework  that 














place  against  a  global  backdrop  of  great  changes  in  traditional  patterns  of  economic 
comparative  and  competitive  advantage  between  trading  blocs.  For  TheCityUK  and  its 









The submitters of evidence are  the authors of a  recent Chatham House  report evaluating 
the performance of EU foreign policy and the EU European External Action Service. Thomas 






that could be exported  to other EU policy domains. This  is  illustrated by  reference  to  the 
EU’s foreign, security and defence policies. The evidence outlines areas where an approach 









future  collaboration  and  agenda  setting  between  Member  States  based  on  an 
agreement to which the United Kingdom is not a party. Of crucial significance for the 
UK  is  the  principle  that  is  established  to  use  the  EU  institutions  outside  of  the 
provisions of the EU Treaties. These policies could be styled  ‘sub‐EU 27’ policies as 




set  to  operate  on  this  basis.  Consequently  a  broader  discussion  of  the  possible 
implications of the SCG for other policy areas is important. This submission will deal 




4. The  Foreign  Secretary  (in  his  letter  to  the  Committee  of  February  2012  final 
paragraph) was sanguine about the implications of the SCG for other policy domains 
and specifically referred to the leading role that the UK continues to play in foreign, 
security  and  defence  policy.  However,  foreign,  security  and  defence  policies  are 
areas in which the SCG model [of cooperation] might well be replicated.  
108





6. In  addition,  the  innovations  introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  can  be  viewed  as 






7. The  Lisbon Treaty has diminished  the  international profile of  the EU’s 27 member 
states in its elimination of the rotating six‐monthly Presidency of the Foreign Affairs 
Council  (formerly  the  General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  Council).  This  was 
intended  to ensure  a  greater degree of  continuity  in  EU policy‐making  and  in  the 
representation  of  EU  foreign  policy  to  third  countries.  However,  the  opprobrium 
attached  to  Baroness  Ashton  from  some  member  states  for  her  reluctance  to 
proactively  lead  a more  ambitious  European  foreign  policy  (rather  than  just  be  a 
servant of the EU’s Foreign Ministers) may encourage her successor to seek a more 
independent  line  on  foreign  policy  issues.  Such  an  approach  to  the  role  of  High 
Representative might  encourage  a  ‘sub‐27‐EU’  tendency within  the  foreign  policy 
domain amongst member states  that are  receptive  to a more developed approach 
[supported by the majority] which overrides the objections of some member states. 
Some member  states may even wish  to  collectively grant  the High Representative 





in  the  foreign  and  security  policy  domain.  As  we  have  noted  in  a  recent  report 
written for Chatham House (Chatham House, 2012) the EEAS will need to establish a 
reputation for  independent action  if  it  is to carve out a distinctive role for  itself.  In 
order to make the most of its role and its capabilities, the EEAS needs to cultivate the 
virtues  of  entrepreneurship:  seeking  to  be  ahead  of  the  market  by  emphasizing 
intellectual  leadership and  innovative policy development; utilizing  resources most 
effectively through a clear strategy; seeking new opportunities to advance the EU’s 
common  agenda  and  be  prepared  to  take  calculated  risks  for  that  purpose;  and 
building the confidence of its ‘shareholders’ – the EU’s 27 member governments and 














10. Another  area  in which  ‘sub‐27  EU’  practices  can  be  considered  is  a  decision  by  a 
group  of  member  states  to  ‘sub‐contract’  their  consular  work  or  political 
representation  in third countries to Union delegations. Under such an arrangement 
the  member  state(s)  concerned  would  sign  an  agreement  that  allows  for  their 
consular activities or diplomatic representation to be conducted on their behalf by 
the  Union  delegation.  This  arrangement  is  likely  to  appeal  to  states  that  face 
resource  constraints  in  running  an  extensive  embassy  network  in  third  countries 
and/or  take  the  view  that  they  do  not  have  foreign  policy  interests  that  extend 
beyond  those already pursued collectively  through Union  foreign policy and which 
may be more effectively conveyed  through collective negotiation. Agreement by a 




11. The  Common  Security  and Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  is  an  area  in which  ‘sub‐27  EU’ 
policies could be contemplated. This  is also an area  in which the UK currently finds 
itself  in opposition  to majority member  state  support  for  increasing  the European 
Defence Agency  (EDA) budget  and  setting up  an EU operational headquarters. An 
SCG‐type  arrangement  in  defence  may  become  an  attractive  option  to  other 




the  CSDP  that  allow  for  ‘cooperation  between  member  states  whose  military 
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to 
one  another  in  this  area’. The participating member  states  are expected  to  ‘bring 
their defence apparatus  into  line with each other as  far as possible, particularly by 
















The  procedure  to  establish  a  ‘coalition  of  the  willing  and  able’  is  much  less 
convoluted  than  in  the  case  of  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation.  The  Council 
authorizes the decision and, thus, the mission is launched in the name of the EU, but 






14. The  precedent  setting  consequences  of  the  Intergovernmental  Treaty  on  Stability 
Coordination  and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  should  be 
considered. A broader discussion of  the possible  implications of  the SCG  for other 
policy areas is important. As indicated, EU foreign, security and defence policies are 
policy  domains  which  could  see  the  evolution  of  comparative  arrangements  of 
collective action by  smaller constellations of  states within  the 27. This could place 
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UK returning to EFTA : 
Divorce at 40 and going back to Mom and Dad? 
Summary 
Our objective is to assess the proposal that the United Kingdom (UK) leave the European 
Union and return to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
in order to get deals such as the European Economic Area (EEA) or even simple bilateral 
agreements such as Switzerland enjoys for a couple of years. 
In the first part, we analyse the relationship between EFTA states and the EU through the 
EEA. This mechanism is based on a certain number of complex features that offer a high level 
of integration to three EFTA countries. 
Second, we address the Swiss case, an active member in EFTA, who maintains close relations 
with the EU despite its rejection of EEA membership. Prima facie, the example of Switzerland 
supports many British eurosceptics because it provides an example of flexible arrangement. 
Third, we assess the likelihood of the UK joining either the EEA/EFTA or instead adopting 
the EFTA/Switzerland approach as a sustainable and realistic choice. 
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1. There has been increased domestic pressure demanding that the United Kingdom (UK) 
leave the European Union.  
2. Some of them also propose to return to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and 
to get a “more advantageous integration” through deals such as the European Economic 
Area (EEA) or even simple bilateral agreements such as Switzerland enjoys for a couple of 
years.1 
3. Advocates of this EFTA option expect major positive effects following a UK withdrawal 
from the EU.  
4. Economically, they foresee greater prosperity and growth due to the removal of the British 
contribution to the EU budget, the phasing out of the common agricultural and fishery 
policy, a lowering of VAT, a reduction of European workers from Eastern Europe, a 
decrease of bureaucratic norms that constitute barriers to trade and the possibility of 
concluding independently free trade agreements with other countries in the rest of the 
world. 
5. They also argue that EFTA states (especially Norway and Switzerland which are the two 
biggest members) are more prospering economically than the EU countries and, 
consequently, that their levels of unemployment and debts are much lower.2 Note also 
that the combined GDP of Norway and Switzerland is nearly half of the U
6. They also anticipate political benefits including greater independence and increased 
democracy. In addition, it is argued that by abandoning the EU’s foreign, security and 
defence policy, the UK will benefit from a rapprochement to United States' external 
policies.  
7. On the other hand, advocates of maintaining UK membership to the EU do not take into 
serious consideration the EFTA option, which they consider as a regressive proposal, 
comparing this to divorcing at 40 and "going back to mom and dad". 
                                                        
  March.  Available 1  Van  Randwyck,  H.  (2011)  "EFTA  or  The  EU?",  The  Bruges  Group,  21 at: 
<http://www.brugesgroup.com/EFTAorTheEU.pdf>.  
Ould, R. (2011) "Time To Leave The EU And Stop Exporting British Jobs Abroad", Public Service Europe, 17 













 14. Materially, the EEA is an association based on primary EU law and treaties, in addition to 
secondary law such as regulations and directives commonly referred to as the acquis 
communautaire. It mainly contains the so-called EU “four freedoms”: free-circulation of 
persons, goods, services and capital. 
15. The EEA agreement also include issues pertaining to several horizontal provisions 
relevant to the four freedoms, such as competition law (i.e. the abuse of dominant 
position, cartels, merger control, state aid and state monopolies), minimum social 
standards as well as consumer and environmental protection. 
16. The EEA does not eliminate however border controls for rules of origins and indirect 
taxation. Indeed, the free movement of goods is only established in respect of products 
originating from the contracting parties. Otherwise put, this agreement does not establish 
a customs union as it is the case in the EU.  
17. Consequently, EEA/EFTA countries retain their full sovereignty over their trade policies 
in addition to the capacity of establishing their own different level of value added tax 
(VAT). 
18. Similarly, the EEA is not related to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as 
well as the Justice and Home Affairs policies.  
19. Finally, the EEA agreement provides a cooperation framework between EU and 
EEA/EFTA states in matters concerning research, development, tourism and civil 
protection. 
EEA institutions 
20. In exchange for internal market access, the European Commission imposed from the 
beginning a rigid institutional arrangement with the concept of the European Economic 
Area based on two pillars: EC and EFTA.  
21. As a result, the Oporto agreement established four different institutions: the EEA Council, 
the EEA Joint Committee, the EFTA surveillance authority and the EFTA court. Let us 
briefly introduce them hereafter. 
22. The EEA Council is composed of members of the Council of the EU, members of the EU 
Commission and of one of the government members of the participating EFTA states. 
According to Article 89 of the treaty, it “is responsible for giving the political impetus in 
the implementation” of the agreement. Furthermore, it may decide to amend the 
agreement. 
23. Daily tasks are left over to the EEA Joint Committee. This body ensures that, “the 
implementation and operation” of the agreement is carried out on a monthly basis. In 
practice, it is responsible for adopting the decisions extending the evolution of the acquis 
to the EEA/EFTA members.  
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 24. Taking a step back the Committee’s composition and functioning appear to be quite 
interesting as well. Since the EU is represented by the Commission and faces EEA/EFTA 
states representatives, it can be argued that this committee is an interesting example of 
both a supranational/intergovernmental mixed institution.  
25. The EFTA surveillance authority, which is a technical and supranational institution by 
nature, ensures that the EEA/EFTA member states respect their legal obligations. Hence, 
as the EU Commission, it may initiate proceedings against one of these states (for instance 
in case of development of unlawful burdens on commercial activity).  
26. Parliamentary cooperation is also provided through the EEA Joint Parliamentary 
Committee. Interestingly enough, this institution has a special composition, as it includes 
members of the EU Parliament and of the EFTA states. However, it does not carry out 
important political tasks.  
27. Finally, a Court of Justice, also referred to as the “EFTA Court”, has been created in order 
to ensure a single interpretation of the treaty. Generally, this Court aims at ensuring a 
strict homogeneity of interpretation with the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). That 
being said, it has no legal monopoly as rulings of the CJEU falling within the EEA scope 
are also bound to produce effects for EEA/EFTA participants.  
The EEA as an asymmetric market-association 
28. Despite this seemingly balanced institutional architecture, the EEA agreement prevents 
significant political participation of EEA/EFTA member states in the EU decision-making 
process. 
29. As we have seen, these States must comply with the obligations imposed by most of the 
acquis, in addition to the adoption of Community law and the interpretations made by the 
ECJ existing prior to their EEA accession.  
30. Although, they have been granted a right of consultation and association during the early 
stage of the legislative procedure, the so-called “decision shaping”, no possibilities of 
participation to the voting procedure in the EU Council or the European Parliament are 
provided.  
31. Admittedly, an opting-out instrument exists but it is politically unusable and has never 
been used until now. Like in the case of the decision shaping clause, this opt-out 
instrument has to be agreed upon by the entirety of the EEA/EFTA pillar members.  
32.  In principle, any of these three countries may refuse to take on new EU legislation. 
However, this would drag into the same opt-out position the other EEA/EFTA countries, 
regardless of their particular position on the matter. Indeed, the EEA agreement clearly 
stipulates that EFTA participants are not entitled to take the decision to adopt EU 
legislation on an individual basis (see art. 93).  
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 33. An additional deterrent is also the understanding that failure to adopt an act after the end 
of the time-limit, may lead to the partial or even total suspension of the EEA agreement 
(see art. 102). Consequently, these conditions make any rejection less likely to occur.  
 
B- The EFTA/Switzerland's model 
34. Following the rejection of the EEA agreement in a popular referendum on 6 December 
1992, the Swiss Federal Council engaged in long negotiations which led to the conclusion 
of a first package of bilateral agreements, hereafter “Bilateral Agreements I”. Signed on 
June 21, 1999 in Luxembourg, these agreements were adopted by the Swiss electorate on 
May 21, 2000 and entered into force on June 1, 2002.4 
35. Five of the agreements posed no difficulty and concerned relatively secondary matters. 
The most important two – free movement of persons and overland transport – on the 
contrary, were the object of intense debate.  
36. The EU and Switzerland also signed a second series of Bilateral Agreements (BA II) on 
October 26, 2004. These agreements cover nine dossiers each of which took effect on 
different dates. The most important concern the participation of Switzerland into the 
Schengen area and a withholding tax on taxation of savings in place of the lifting of bank 
secrecy originally demanded by the European Union. 
37. From a legal perspective, these agreements are not interlinked, unlike the Bilateral 
Agreements I, and thus do not include a “guillotine clause”. Switzerland could have 
rejected any one of them without the others being called into question.  
38. Seven of these agreements posed no problems and concerned secondary issues. Once 
again, the two most important ones, Schengen/Dublin and the taxation of savings, were 
the subject of a heated internal debate. As a result, the Agreement on Schengen/Dublin 
was subject to a referendum in June 2005 but was accepted by about 54.5%. 
                                                        




Differences between the Bilateral Agreements and the EEA 
39. In comparison with the EEA, the Bilateral Agreements enable a third-party country (in 
this case Switzerland) to negotiate on an individual basis. 
40. This freedom of action is in part limited by the multilateral structure of the EEA, which 
obliges EFTA countries to speak with a single voice. Here, Switzerland has never been 
obliged to harmonise its position with its EFTA partners before or during its dealings with 
the European Union. 
Differences in terms of structures  
41. The structure of the Bilateral Agreements I and II is light and does not create any new 
institutions. This distinguishes it from the EEA which was more unwieldy and based on a 
two-pillar system relying on a galaxy of institutions. 
42. In principle, the Bilateral Agreements I and II do not function through a literal and all-
inclusive application of Community law as is the case in the EEA: they are not governed 
by a Community or para-Community justice mechanism akin to the European 
Communities Court of Justice or the EEA/EFTA Court, but rather by a political 
mechanism (the Joint Committees). 
43. The Bilateral Agreements I and II, therefore, radically differ from the EEA agreement, 
under which the EFTA-pillar states were obliged to adopt the relevant Community law 
together with its interpretations by the European Communities’ Court of Justice pre-
existent to the date of the signature of the agreement. 
 
118
 No automatic acceptance of new relevant Community legislations 
44. The Bilateral Agreements I and II do not include an automatic adoption of new relevant 
Community legislations but instead, allow for the renegotiation on a case-by-case basis. 
There are, however, exceptions concerning Schengen legislation and air transport 
competition. 
45. Thus, these Bilateral Agreements I and II differ from the EEA, where the EEA/EFTA 
countries are almost obliged to integrate developments of the relevant acquis.  
46. Nonetheless, the Bilateral Agreements should not be over idealized. Switzerland is not 
immune to outside developments and the processes of “EU-isation”. Since 1988, with 
every new federal legislation considered, it is mandatory for the Swiss parliament to 
include a paragraph summarising the EU position on the relevant matter. As a result, this 
has led to indirect adaptation in that Switzerland adopts numerous legislation of the 
European Union without conducting formal agreements.  
Differences in terms of content  
47. The EEA includes important sectors not covered by the Bilateral Agreements I and II, 
mainly concerning the free movement of services (i.e. financial, telecommunications and 
postal services), the free movement of capital, company law and intellectual property.  
48. Additionally, the EU rules of competition for the four types of free movement were 
transposed into the EEA treaty. Regarding the monitoring of competition rule compliance 
is carried out, on the one hand, by the European Commission and, on the other hand, by 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
49. Conversely, the Bilateral Agreements I and II do not make provision for rules of 
competition. The only exception is in the domain of air transport where the European 
Commission and the European Community Court of Justice obtained exclusive 
jurisdiction over compliance with competition rules provided for in the agreement.  
Differences in terms of horizontal and flanking policies 
50. In comparison with the bilateral path, the EEA also added horizontal and flanking 
policies. This included concepts such as equal treatment between men and women, labour 
rights, participation in enterprises, consumer or environmental protection, and some 
social policy, education and youth, tourism, civil protection together with European 
economic and social cohesion.  
51. The financial solidarity towards less affluent countries and regions of the EU that would 
have been asked from Switzerland as a member of the EEA would be greater than that 
required under the Bilateral Agreements I and II. 
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 See Schwok, R. (2009) and Lavenex, S. (2011) 
The bilateral approach is largely deadlocked since 2007 
52. Since 2007, no more significant agreements were signed. This can be attributed to the EU 
dissatisfaction regarding the continuous Swiss' strategy aiming at concluding rigid “tailor-
made agreements”.  
53. Recently, the European Union demanded that Switzerland adopt the evolution of the 
relevant EU acquis and called for a uniform interpretation in its application.  
54. For its part, the Swiss Confederation does not want to lose its autonomy of decision and to 
accept the rulings of foreign judges. In fact, Bern would prefer as a model for future 
agreements the 2009 Switzerland-EU bilateral agreement on “the simplification of 
inspections and formalities in respect of the carriage of goods and on customs security 
measures” (also known as the "24 hours" agreement). 
55. This technical agreement offers interesting institutional components.  
56. First, it provides a participation in the early stage of the legislative process.  
57. Second, Switzerland does not adopt automatically the evolution of the relevant EU acquis. 
Although it declares itself in principle ready to adopt the new EU legislation, the internal 
approval processes are respected.  
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 58. Third, if Switzerland were not able to adapt to the evolution of the relevant EU acquis, the 
whole agreement would not become automatically terminated (there could be however 
proportionate “rebalancing measures” decided by the EU).  
59. Fourth, the settlement of dispute about the interpretation or application of the agreement 
is also very creative because it is not let to the EU Court of Justice but to the Joint 
Committee or to an ad hoc arbitration.  
60. This contrasts sharply with the EEA agreement since there are no such possibilities of 
independent arbitration on the proportionality of the EU rebalancing measures.  
61. That being said, the European Union has constantly repeated that the 24 hours agreement 
will not serve as a framework model for the future of the Swiss-EU relations. 
 
C-  Advantages and disadvantages of the two options 
62. Within the following analysis, our goal is not to argue for or against the UK leaving the 
EU. This is a political decision to be taken by the British themselves.  
63. Besides, we are also aware that the circumstances of a return of the UK into EFTA are not 
comparable to the situation of EEA/EFTA countries as well as Switzerland. 
64. Finally, although not addressed within this text, we acknowledge that a withdrawal of the 
UK from the EU itself would likely result in an avalanche of consequences that are difficult 
to assess.  
Advantages of joining EFTA 
65. First, EFTA membership would imply a far lower British financial contribution. Costly EU 
policies are not included, especially the ones related to the onerous CAP.  
66. Nevertheless, one should also keep in mind that EEA/EFTA membership is not free of 
costs. These three countries have to pay for policies in which they are included. Their most 
important financial contribution is related to their participation in EU structural funds 
(1.8 billion Euros allocated to 13 EU member states for the 2009-2013 period). Similarly, 
Switzerland, which is not even part of the EEA, had to disburse significant amounts to 
secure its relationship with the EU. Indeed, through its bilateral agreements, Bern is also 
obliged to contribute, though far less than EEA/EFTA states, to the "reduction of socio-
economic disparities" in the Union.  
67. Thus, it is plausible that a country with a larger GDP such as the UK would have to 
disburse much more than the above-mentioned amount if it was to join the EEA/EFTA 
pillar or even to adopt a Swiss approach through the use of bilateral relations.  
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 68. In terms of the total financial cost, it is possible, by extrapolation, to provide the following 
figures for both potential EEA/EFTA pillar membership and the Swiss-type bilateral 
approach (all-included): EUR 2.54 billions and EUR 1.62 billions per annum, respectively. 
However, it is also important to note that the UK would have to negotiate the exact 
amount of its contribution in both cases. Hence, these figures are only intended to be 
indicative as they assume that the UK would get the same treatment as EEA/EFTA states 
or Switzerland.  
69. In addition to the above mentioned elements, the UK government would also be free to set 
its VAT level. That being said current British VAT level is 20% for most of their products, 
which is much higher than the 15% required by EU legislation. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that a withdrawal from the EU would change immediately anything in this regard.  
70. Another advantage of EFTA membership is that States within this organisation have 
demonstrated their capacity to ratify free-trade agreements faster and with more partners 
than the EU.5 As of 2012, EFTA member states have implemented 24 free trade 
agreements (covering as much as 33 countries).  
71. It should be noted that the EFTA countries negotiated agreements with all States, which 
have concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the EU.  
72. Additionally, it is interesting to observe that the EFTA States preceded the EU in their 
free-trade agreements with Canada, Columbia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Ukraine 
and South Korea. Moreover, they are also well advanced in their negotiations with India, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.  
73. It can be argued that Switzerland and Norway have been more efficient in terms of 
developing their free trade network than the EU. Indeed, the Union is often mired with 
internal disagreements as well as its institutional constraints in matters of trade policies 
(mainly related to the existence of divergent interests and views regarding agriculture and 
conditionality).  
74. Finally, it is also important to underline that EFTA member states are free to enter into 
trade agreements independently. Thus, if the UK would join the EFTA, it would certainly 
benefit from a greater freedom of manoeuvre to sign free trade agreements with other 
countries in the world.  
75. Concerning dimensions of foreign policy, security and defence, bilateral agreements 
between the UK and the EU, based on the Norwegian model, would undeniably better 
protect British sovereignty. It would come however at the expense of a loss of influence, 
particularly on CSDP. This would also mean that it would be more difficult for the UK to 






 76. While it can be argued that a withdrawal from the EU would imply a decrease of 
adaptation to new norms the Norwegian and even the Swiss cases show that these two 
"outsider" countries have still adopted directly or indirectly a certain number of EU laws. 
Challenges of EFTA and EEA membership 
77. In order to accede to EFTA or to the EEA/EFTA pillar, the UK would have to follow a 
potentially difficult path.  
78. First, the UK would have to submit an application to EFTA. Unlike the EU, this 
organization does not pursue an active enlargement policy and, according to a well-
informed source: “Feasibility and desirability of a possible EFTA enlargement would have 
to be assessed on a case-by-case basis for each possible applicant”. 
79. As a matter of fact, there is no guarantee that EFTA States would welcome any new 
member or simply not veto its application (as the EFTA convention specifies that 
unanimity is needed in case of enlargement). Indeed, this organization represents a quite 
homogenous bloc in terms of countries' size, economic development and trade 
preferences. Hence, the accession of big countries such as the UK would certainly shake 
the established bases of the whole organization. Besides, it is also questionable if the 
British would accept to deal on a one to one basis with small countries such as 
Liechtenstein.  
80. Furthermore, even if London secured an EFTA membership, it is not guaranteed that the 
three EEA/EFTA States would welcome the UK in “their” pillar. As we have seen, these 
countries would have to adopt a common position during the joint decision making 
procedure. While this has not proven to be a problem until now, it could very well change 
with the arrival of a new member. These three countries would be laying at the mercy of 
any kind of British opt-out, leading potentially to a partial or even the total suspension of 
the EEA agreement. 
Swiss or EEA option? 
81. Arguably, the Swiss option can be seen as relatively favourable when compared to the EEA 
option as a way to formally maintain its sovereignty. That being said, the EU is clearly 
against the perpetuation of this sui generis bilateral relation mechanism, which is a case 
resulting from the several economic and political particularities of Switzerland.  
82. In contrast, the EEA option could result in the support of the European Commission and 
of its member States. There is also the advantage of providing full access to the EU internal 
market. Given EEA’s evolutionary nature, this allows for easy and rapid adaptation to the 
developments of EU legislation, while also offering strong legal certainty, and therefore 
predictability.  
83. The main challenge of the EEA option is related to the undermining of UK sovereignty. If 
the UK withdraws from the EU, it may very well end up becoming a sort of “satellite” of 
the European Union if it joins the EEA/EFTA pillar. Indeed, its government would be 
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 obliged to automatically adopt certain legislation within important policy areas, while 
being unable to take part in the making of decisions.  
84. In 2012, Norwegian experts mandated by the government went as far as relating these 
sovereignty problems to a more general question of democratic deficit. In their view, the 
Norwegian government cannot be held accountable for most of its European policy.6 
Thus, one has to seriously question the argument that the EEA would be a better deal for 
the UK because it would restore important parts of the British national sovereignty. 


















range of benefits  including  jobs and prosperity both  through  free access  to  the EU’s  internal 
market and through the EU’s collective weight in international trade negotiations. It has brought 
robust  consumer  rights  and  protections,  justice  and  home  affairs  measures  which  help  our 
police  and  security  services  to  keep  British  people  safer  and  more  secure  and  greater 
environmental  protection  and  it  has  generally  magnified  UK  influence  in  the  world.  But  EU 
institutions are not perfect and should be subjected to challenge and review. 
• The  obsessive  focus  by  some  on  the  worst  aspects  of  the  EU  gives  the  British  public  a 
grotesquely distorted  view of Europe. But British parliamentary  scrutiny of EU  affairs  is  itself 
inadequate and needs  to be mainstreamed across departmental  select  committees. Ministers 
need  to  be  questioned  ahead  of  sectoral  council meetings. More  also  needs  to  be  done  to 
increase British representation within the commission and across the EU institutions. 
• No  compelling  case  has  been made  for  any  alternative  to  full  EU membership. Norway  and 









of  our  continent  and  the  seriousness with which we would  be  taken  as  a  global  player. We 
should retain top table status within the EU. 
• The  fiscal  compact  treaty  should  be  incorporated  eventually  into  the  EU  treaties  along with 







is  built  on  our  long  tradition  of  internationalism  and  our  clear  belief  that  UK  membership  of  a 
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European Union of peaceful, free democracies is in the British national interest. Our membership of 
the EU has brought huge benefits  in  terms of  jobs and prosperity  through  free access  to  the EU’s 
internal market and a uniform regulatory environment for EU‐wide business, and through the EU’s 
collective  weight  in  international  trade  negotiations,  whether  via  the  WTO  or  EU  free  trade 
agreement negotiations.  
3. Membership of the European Union allows us extraordinary freedom to live, work, study and retire 
anywhere  in the Union.  It makes  life cheaper and easier by, for example, driving down flight costs 
through  competition,  cutting  phone  and  data  charges,  providing  free  access  to  EU‐wide  health 
insurance and putting in place robust consumer rights and protections. EU justice and home affairs 




4. Collective European action enables  the UK  to pursue  credible policies on  cross‐border matters of 
vital  importance, whether  it  is energy security, combating climate change, boosting environmental 
protection  or  developing  joined‐up  infrastructure  networks.  Collective  EU  action  in  foreign, 













with  any  set  of  political  institutions,  the  EU  structures,  systems  and  processes  are  in  need  of 
constant attention, regular challenge and review. We are convinced that there is considerable scope 






often,  a  picture  is  painted  that  is  grotesquely  distorted,  riddled with  myths  and  peppered with 
untruths.  If our picture of British public  life was equally distorted –  if  all  the British public  knew 
about  the  UK  government,  parliament  and  British  politics  was  MPs’  expenses,  party  funding 
scandals, media  scandals, and  failed big budget projects  ‐  it would hardly be  surprising  if people 
questioned the value and purpose of the whole British political system. 
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8. We do want  to  see  a more  responsive,  transparent  and  accountable Union,  and we believe  that 
some of  the  reforms necessary  to achieve  this need  to occur at home. For  instance,  it  is painfully 
clear  to  us  that  the  Commons  European  scrutiny  system  needs  urgent  reform.  In  a  post‐Lisbon 
world,  it  is  simply  unacceptable  for  the  Commons  to  rely  on  a  single  Scrutiny  Committee  and  a 
system of ad hoc Standing Committees to scrutinise EU affairs. Such a setup  is symptomatic of the 
widely  held  and misplaced  view  that  Europe  is  a  niche  foreign  policy  issue  and  only  of  general 
interest when  framed  in  terms of  in/out or  the  future of UK‐EU  relations. While we welcome  the 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee’s  inquiry,  it  is  in  danger  of  falling  into  this  trap  as  well,  unless  it  is 
accompanied by a mainstreaming of EU foreign policy matters within the work of the committee.  
9. The vast majority of MPs have little or no engagement with substantive EU matters at all. The level 
of understanding of how  the  EU operates  and Britain’s  role within  it  is  staggeringly  low  and  the 





select  committees  so  that  they  can  consider  them  early  enough  to  influence  government  and 
commission  thinking, question ministers representing Britain’s  interests ahead of sectoral councils 
and  focus on policy direction and how  it  relates  to domestic policy and British  interests, not  just 
constitutional questions. 
10. Equally, we are extremely concerned at the UK civil service’s capacity on EU matters and the  long‐
term  decline  of  British  personnel  in  the  EU  institutions  and  the  numbers  successfully  passing 
through  the  Commission  concours. We  understand  that  EU  units  across Departments  have  been 
among the first to see cut‐backs, that the UK has never before been so under‐represented amongst 
commission personnel and that only eight British nationals successfully passed through the concours 
in  2011.  The  lack  of  focus  on  this  crucial  area  by  successive  governments  needs  to  be  urgently 
addressed.  The  British  civil  service  and  UK  representation  (UKRep)  have  some  incredibly  good 
people working on EU matters, and many talented British nationals work in the EU institutions. But 
we  need  to  drastically  increase  Whitehall  capacity  and  British  representation  across  the  EU 
institutions.  
There is no realistic alternative  
11. In  the  absence of  any  clear  and  compelling  alternative  vision  to Britain’s  full membership of  the 
European Union, the only option for Britain is to remain at the heart of the European Union. Within 
the EU, we will retain the economic benefits, individual freedoms and advantages for British citizens, 
the  enhanced  ability  to  manage  major  cross‐border  issues  and  the  geo‐strategic  advantages  of 
increased global influence in an increasingly interconnected and competitive world.  
12. There  is no compelling  case  for an alternative  relationship between  the UK and  the EU. The only 
realistic  alternative  to  full  EU membership  is membership  of  the  European  Economic Area  (EEA) 
along  the  lines  of  Norway  or  Switzerland.  But  this  would  clearly  be  detrimental  to  UK  national 
interests.  
13. In order to gain access to the single market as a member of the EEA, the Norwegian government has 
to  implement  the vast majority of  the EU’s  rules but has no  say  in deciding  those  rules. This  ‘fax 
democracy’  represents  a  huge  democratic  deficit  for  the  people  of  Norway.  As  a  Norwegian 
127
Committee  set  up  to  consider  the  impact  of  EEA  membership  recently  reported,1 Norway  is  as 
‘Europeanised’  as  the  UK  despite  not  being  a  member  of  the  EU  yet  there  is  an  enormous 
democratic  cost  to  not  having  votes  in  the  Council,  MEPs  in  the  European  Parliament  or  a 
commissioner in the commission as the UK and all other member states do.  
14. In our view, this would not enhance British sovereignty. It would leave the UK sitting on the sidelines 
as others went ahead and shaped  the  future of  the continent without us. Without a British voice 
pushing  for open markets, green governance and an outward‐facing Europe,  the EU could  turn  in 
ways that would damage all our collective interests. As the Prime Minister put it: “Leaving the EU is 
not  in our national  interest. Outside, we would end up  like Norway,  subject  to every  rule  for  the 
single market made  in Brussels but unable to shape  those rules. And believe me:  if we weren’t  in 




has  increasingly  accepted  that  it  is  in  its  interests  to  apply EU  rules  given  the  importance of  the 
Union for its own trade. Bern, by its own admission, has increasingly deferred to Brussels in the key 
areas of banking and trade. New hedge fund rules proposed  in Switzerland are explicitly based on 












of  the Union,  all  the other member  states decided  that  they  could not work with  the UK  in  this 







member states  (and we expect  the Czech Republic  to sign before  long). Provisions  for discussions 
and  initiatives among the signatories are dangerously close to single market matters under Title IV 





around  European  Council  meetings.  Unless  the  Treaty  is  embedded  into  the  institutional 
architecture of the EU, the UK cannot  fully rely on the protections and rights afforded to member 
states under the Treaties. The potential for caucusing among Eurozone or Eurozone Plus countries, 
and without  the UK, on  single market matters, especially  financial  services,  remains  clearer  than 
ever with vehicles and legal scope for this to occur.  
19. This risk is reinforced by the political impact of the December council, with British relations with our 
partners  strained  at  a  time  of  extreme  anxiety  for  the  Eurozone  and  broader  EU.  The  UK’s 
reputation as a fully committed, reliable and trustworthy member of the EU has been questioned. It 
is far from rare to hear people openly speculate about Britain’s future in the EU, or about whether 
EEA membership may be a better model  for us. The key danger  in the short/medium‐term  is that 
the questionmark over Britain’s  future place  in Europe becomes a self‐fulfilling prophecy as other 
member states start to overlook UK arguments and interests (regardless of their merits), and make 
other  alliances  over matters  of  core  interest  to  the UK.  The  recent  negotiations  over  the  CRDIV 
Directive,  a  piece  of  legislation  of  crucial  importance  to  us,  saw  the  UK  dangerously  close  to  a 





highly  valued  member  of  the  Union  in  many  ways,  not  least  for  our  free  trade  and  liberalising 
instincts which chime with many other member states and the natural disposition of the European 
Commission.  But  also  for  our  leadership  in  foreign  and  security  policy  matters,  our  excellent 
reputation  on  police  and  judicial  co‐operation,  our  strong  climate  change  credentials  and  our 
rigorous scrutiny of EU proposals at a technical level to ensure they are workable.  
21. The UK has  rightly  fought hard  to  rebuild  key  relationships  and  alliances on matters  such  as  the 
European growth agenda, climate change and EU foreign policy matters. We need to redouble our 
efforts, maintain a  flexible approach, generate new  initiatives and  ideas, deepen existing alliances 
and  build  new  ones  ‐  especially  with  Euro  “ins”  ‐  and  maximise  our  influence  while  taking 
opportunities for good deals and trade‐offs for the UK. 




participate  in police  and  judicial  cooperation  aspects  in  the  latter)  and we  have  an opt‐in  on  all 




retain  the  option  of  altering  these  arrangements  according  to  their  own  interests. Denmark,  for 
example,  is  considering moving  from an opt‐out on  JHA matters  towards a UK opt‐in model, and 
many non‐Eurozone states are committed to joining the Euro in the future.  
23. The  treaties’  enhanced  co‐operation  mechanisms  (the  first  use  of  which  the  UK  pushed  for  in 







internationally.  The  non‐Euro  block  is  likely  to  decline  in  size  so  the  idea  of  forming  a  non‐Euro 
group to balance a Euro‐grouping is fanciful. If the UK wishes to maximise its influence in the EU and 
retain global player status in world affairs, it is fundamentally in the national interest to ensure we 
retain  top  table  status within  the EU. We  see grave  risks of  the  ‘self‐fulfilling prophecy’  if  the UK 











member  states  to  meet  to  discuss  matters  under  the  Fiscal  Compact  Treaty  could  directly  or 
indirectly  impact the  interests of the EU‐27 or the single market. The prospect of this materialising 
depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  27’s  ability  to  find  solutions  to  problems with  the  EU’s main 
architecture, and thereby on the attitude and approach of the UK and other member states.  
Should  the UK Government  support  the  incorporation of  the  ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty 
into the EU Treaties? If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make 
its condition for doing so? 
26. The  ‘fiscal  compact’ Treaty envisages  its own  incorporation  into  the main EU Treaties within  five 
years. This would be far more satisfactory than the current situation and clearly  in  line with British 




















• Over 100,000 British  firms export  to other EU countries, 94,000 of which are SMEs. 80% of all UK 
businesses think the Single Market delivers concrete benefits to them.7 Over 200,000 UK companies 
trade with the EU every year.8  






• Full access to the EU’s single market makes the UK a magnet for foreign companies  locating  in the 




• The UK  is pushing  to  liberalise  trade within  the  EU  in new  growth  areas  such  as  energy, digital, 
services and green  tech. sectors. This could add over £650 billion  to  the EU economy, making  the 
average UK household almost £3,500 better off each year.14 
• EU enlargement  is hugely economically beneficial for the UK by expanding the EU’s single market. 
The  enlargement  of  10  central  and  eastern  European  countries  has  seen  UK  exports  to  those 
countries treble over the last ten years to almost £12bn. 



































o E.g.  the  EU  is  in  the process of passing  a package of measures  that will  ensure  that  any 
British citizen arrested on the continent will have their basic rights guaranteed including the 
right  to be  fully  informed at all  stages of  the process, access  to a  lawyer and  translation 
rights.  





• The average British UK consumer  saves around £480 per person per year as a  result of EU  single 
market  competition driving down price of goods and  services.18 For example, British  families and 










than Turkey or  Indonesia) has virtually eradicated all  tariffs barriers  for EU exporters.  It will bring 
£500m a year of benefits to British businesses.19 
• The EU  is  in  the process of negotiating a series of new FTAs  including with  India, Canada, Ukraine 
and  South  America  which  will  deliver  enormous  economic  benefits  to  British  households  and 
businesses.  Completing  all  ongoing  EU  FTA  negotiations  would  generate  over  £50bn  for  the 













o EU‐India  FTA:  This  agreement  could  produce  benefits  to  the  UK  of  approximately  £2 
billion over ten years; 

















• The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme  is  the biggest of  its kind  in  the world and vital  for combating 
climate change and generating low carbon growth.  
• The EU’s new Energy  Strategy  is essential  in delivering UK energy  security by diversifying energy 
generation  and  supplies,  driving  through  reductions  in  consumption,  creating  a  fully  functioning 
internal energy market and investing in an efficient European Supergrid. 
• EU  targets and actions  stimulate  investment  in UK  renewables and  low  carbon  technologies, and 
generate British low carbon export markets across the EU.  







EU‐wide  action  is  essential  to  tackle  cross‐border  security  threats  to  Britain  like  terrorism,  human 
trafficking, drug smuggling, illegal immigration and money laundering. Some examples: 
• A  3‐year  Europol  investigation,  Operation  Rescue,  broke  the  world’s  largest  online  child 
pornography network making 184 arrests  (121  in Britain) and rescuing 230 children  (60  in the UK) 
2011.23  









saw 7  individuals arrested  in  the UK and  the release of 28 children.  In  total, some 121  individuals 
were arrested under the Operation.24 
• Through the European Arrest Warrant (EAW),  in 2010 the UK extradited over 145  individuals from 
other EU member  states  to  the UK  to  face  criminal prosecutions  for  crimes  they had  committed 
here.25  












• EU action via  ‘Frontex’ at Europe’s external borders helps to combat  illegal migrant flows  into the 
Union, many of whom intend to travel to the UK.  
• The EU’s  Joint  Investigation Team  (JIT) has become a key vehicle  for  the British Police  to operate 
smoothly with other national  forces  in pursuing  lengthy and  complex  cross‐border  investigations. 
Since 2009, British Police have been involved in at least 15 JITs.30  
• The  recently operational  EU Council  Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA  should  enable  the UK  to 
ensure  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pounds  worth  of  financial  penalties  issued  for  offences 
committed in the UK can be claimed back from individuals in other EU member states.31 
• The EU’s Prisoner Transfer Framework decision, which recently came into force, should allow the UK 
to both  improve  rehabilitation outcomes  and  reduce  the  size of  the British prison population by 
returning foreign national prisoners to the home EU member state. The transfer of the first batch of 
prisoners is currently in the pipeline.32 
• The ongoing package of  legislation  to put  in place minimum  standards  for  victims  rights, heavily 
inspired by UK best practice, will help to ensure that British victims of crime in other member states 
have  their  rights properly protected. The parallel package on procedural  rights  in criminal  justice, 
also heavily  inspired by UK best practice, are crucial  for ensuring that the more than 3,000 British 




















Acting  as  part  of  a  27  nation  bloc,  representing  the  largest  single  market  in  the  world,  is  a  huge 
magnifier of Britain’s voice and influence in the world. Some examples: 
• The EU’s biggest foreign policy success is spreading European values, peace, security and prosperity 







others,  recently agreed sanctions on all oil exports  from Syria  to help put pressure on  the  regime 
there. Syrian oil exports  to  the EU are 95% of  their  total oil exports and  reports  suggest  that  the 
impact of  the sanctions  is already being  felt by  the  regime and  the  ruling elite.34 The EU has also 
enacted a robust sanctions package on Iran and Zimbabwe.  
• Equally, removing EU sanctions, opening up normal diplomatic channels and relaunching aid flows 







UK  initiative, agreed an ambitious emergency  trade relief package  for Pakistan  in  the wake of  the 
devastating floods in the country last year.  
• The EU’s Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP)  is delivering  in a variety of  important areas to 
the UK and broader EU such as: 
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DISTINCTIVE UK PRIORITIES FOR THE EU'S FUTURE 
 
  
1.1 The December 2011 European Council is a challenge, not a watershed, 
because it is unclear how eurozone members of the EU will react to future events. 
The German Chancellor is calling for changes in EU rules that could trigger a British 
referendum under terms of the 2011 European Union Act. To avoid 
misunderstandings and possible isolation, HMG should start preparing for such 
developments. 
 
1.2 The European Union notionally endorses diversity as well as Union, but the 
predominant position favours all member states advancing in unison toward an ever 
closer union. Thus, the UK's repeated challenges to further European integration are 
widely perceived as negative. This submission recommends that, consistent with 
HMG's distinctive position, it should promote institutional diversity as a positive 
means of managing differences within an EU that has 27 or more member states. 
 
• 1.2a Pragmatic experimentation. EU procedures for enhanced cooperation 
enable willing countries to adopt policies and countries with doubts to observe 
the experiment before deciding whether to join in. This has been Britain's 
stance on the euro and the Stability Treaty can go into effect after ratification 
by 12 countries.  
 
• 1.2b Give European citizens a say on major increases in EU powers. HMG 
should promote its 2011 EU Referendum Act as a positive step to address the 
EU's democratic deficit by testing the commitment of Europe's citizens to 
further expansions of the EU's powers.  
 
• 1.2c Link enhanced cooperation and referendum endorsement. A coalition of 
the willing implies that the unwilling should satisfy themselves by opting out. 
Therefore, future agreements on the expansion of EU powers should have 
complementary and contingent provisions for enhanced cooperation by 
countries that favour further integration and opt out clauses for countries that 
may not do so, e.g. Britain after a national referendum.  
 
1.3 The above recommendations are based on an ESRC-funded study to be 
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published by Oxford U. Press next spring, Representing Europeans: a Pragmatic 
Approach, and related publications. Both projects reflect my long-term interest in 
how growing cross-national interdependence can be managed by governments 
accountable to a national parliament and electorate. See for example, The Prime 
Minister in a Shrinking World and The Post-Modern Presidency.  
 
2.1 Experimenting through enhanced cooperation occurs when some EU member 
states adopt a policy and others do not. This has been happening for decades in 
different policy sectors and institutional forms. For example, the Schengen 
agreement promoting easy movement across national boundaries started in 1985 
and Britain and Ireland continue to opt out. Pragmatic experimentation enables 
governments that consider a policy in their national interest to cooperate with other 
member states and promptly learn how it works. Simultaneously, it allows 
governments that think a measure not in their interest to avoid being forced to join 
and, even worse, being forced to pay the costs of doing so if the experiment is 
unsuccessful.  
 
2.2 Title IV of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Future of the 
European Union Article VI. Title III contain detailed rules for the use of enhanced co-
operation to maintain momentum toward an ever closer Union when unanimity is 
lacking about what the EU should do. Hence, the practice is sometimes described by 
the term 'differentiated integration'. The eurozone crisis pushes EU countries into 
uncharted waters. In conditions of high uncertainty, trial-and-error policies are being 
adopted in an experimental search for measures that will work. Since eurozone 
countries fall into three different groups--members; non-members with a commitment 
to join at some unspecified future date; and countries not expected to join--it is 
possible that different policies may be suited to each group. By allowing for 
differentiation, enhanced cooperation increases the number of countries satisfied 
with their EU obligations.  
 
2.3 Enhanced cooperation can avoid the extremes of Britain vetoing an EU 
measure favoured by a substantial majority or Britain being compelled to adopt a 
policy unacceptable to the UK Parliament and citizens. In a 27-country European 
Union it is unlikely that Britain would be alone in hesitating about being in the 
vanguard of moves toward closer integration. However, in the absence of leadership 
from a major country, small states lack the political will and clout to secure major 
changes in what a predominant majority agrees. 
 
2.4 The convention of the acquis communautaire prevents "retro-fitting" enhanced 
co-operation to established measures. Hence, it is rhetorical overkill to suggest that it 
would cause the EU to disintegrate. Where uniformity is required, for example, the 
admission of new member states or basic principles of the single Europe market, 
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enhanced cooperation is not feasible. However, existing EU policies show that the 
case for uniformity tends to be exaggerated. Key measures affecting the three pillars 
of the EU are not uniformly applicable across EU member states, e.g., border 
controls (Schengen); monetary policy (the euro); and defence (NAT0). 
 
2.5 HMG should promote enhanced cooperation as desirable in principle and 
invoke it when issues emerge where there are pressures to act but no agreement 
about what is to be done. Ideally, these issues would include policies where Britain 
can lead in cooperation, as it did in air support for Libya, as well as those where its 
distinctive priorities recommend opting out.  
 
2.6 Pragmatic experimentation through enhanced cooperation is not a 
commitment to a two-speed Europe. The dynamic consequence depends on its 
success. If an initiative is successful, laggards (that is, those who do not initially join) 
can catch up with leaders subsequently. This is the process by which the UK entered 
the European Union two decades after refusing to be a founder member. It also 
provides a firm institutional foundation for flexible integration, in which the member 
states that join together can differ from one policy to another. This is the basis on 
which Britain participates in the chief institution for European defence, NATO, while 
remaining outside the chief institution for European monetary policy, the ECB.  
 
 
3.1 Giving European citizens a say through referendums. While the European 
Parliament has gained in powers vis a vis other EU institutions, its claim to represent 
EU citizens has fallen as turnout has settled below half the electorate. Moreover, key 
decisions in the EP are made by multi-national party groups, which research shows 
are much more in favour of an ever closer Union than are Europe's citizens. 
Moreover, irreversible decisions on treaties expanding the EU's powers can be 
agreed in the European Council by national governments representing less than half 
their country's voters and binding future national governments. This is less than the 
super-majority normally required to endorse changes in national constitutions; ten 
member states require referendums on major changes in their national constitution.  
 
3.2 Consistent with the EU principle of subsidiarity, it is open to the government of 
any EU country to call a referendum on an EU issue. At different times over the 
years 22 countries have called a national referendum on an EU issue on grounds of 
political principle, political prudence or for domestic political reasons. The conduct of 
a referendum campaign focuses attention on whether citizens want to be committed 
to further integration. Turnout at EU referendums is normally significantly higher than 
national participation in a European Parliament election. In three-quarters of the 
cases, the result of a referendum is popular endorsement of an EU measure. Public 
opinion in every EU member state favours a referendum vote on any new EU treaty 
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(Annex 1).  
 
3.3 The current practice of referendums on expanding EU powers has major 
flaws. National referendums have excluded between 72 and 99 percent of EU 
citizens from voting (Annex 2) and a single EU country can veto the adoption of an 
important measure supported by a preponderant majority of countries. Because a 
free and fair referendum vote risks the rejection of an EU agreement, current EU 
policy is to expand its powers by adopting "treaty-like" agreements through novel 
procedures. The new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union is a prime example. It confers new powers on the 
European Commission and European Court of Justice and national governments are 
expected to get their parliaments to adopt fiscal measures prescribed therein without 
further reference to their national electorate.  
 
3.4 The UK is now one of three member states with a legal requirement to hold a 
national referendum on treaties transferring powers to the EU. The Irish court has 
ruled that the Stability agreement is a Treaty subject to a national ballot. Danish 
lawyers have been able to finesse referendum requirements. National elections in 
member states, occurring at the rate of seven a year, present further challenges, as 
Greece most vividly demonstrates. In addition, the German Federal Court is now 
prepared to examine cases challenging whether EU measures are consistent with 
the democratic principles of the German Constitution.  
  
3.5 HMG should call for European citizens to be given a bigger voice on major EU 
decisions through simultaneously held national referendums. This is a practical 
means of reducing the EU's democratic deficit and increasing popular commitment to 
EU measures that national majorities endorse. Moreover, it does not require a new 
Treaty to be enacted. National governments that decide to hold a referendum need 
only co-ordinate the date and wording of a ballot. National governments hesitant 
about doing so would be under pressure to follow where others lead.  
 
3.6 The prospect of a referendum on the transfer of powers to the EU should 
have a significant influence on discussions in Brussels about whether and how 
integration should be increased. It should encourage the pro-integration majorities in 
the Commission and Parliament to pay more attention to securing the commitment of 
their citizens. It would also remind national governments meeting in the European 
Council that British concerns with ambitious transfers of power are not a peculiarly 
insular fixation but one that a significant number of their own citizens may share.  
 
4.1 Linking enhanced cooperation with popular support through referendums. Any 
treaty approved by all national governments in the European Council is likely to be 
endorsed by a majority of national referendums. But since all referendums raise the 
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possibility of defeat, a treaty proposal should include clauses for opting out by 
countries rejecting a treaty and also clauses allowing countries to join subsequently if 
a new policy is successful.  
 
4.2 HMG should have a two-pronged strategy for proposals to expand EU 
powers. It can seek support to modify proposals to make them acceptable in Britain. 
If this is not practical, it should emphasis including enhanced cooperation clauses 
that allow member states to co-operate and allow Britain to opt out. Such a strategy 
can be justified as consistent with the EU principle of diversity, authorized by the 
Treaty on European Union. It will also avoid conflict between the UK's 2011 EU Act 
and commitments that majorities endorse.  
 
22 May 2012 
 
Annex 1  National demand for referendums on EU treaties  














• A UK referendum on the EU  is now highly  likely and will,  irrespective of the wording, most 
likely be treated as a vote on whether to stay in the EU or not 
• Any  renegotiation of  the  terms of UK membership will need  to address  the  individual and 





• The United  Kingdom  already  benefits  from  a  specially  tailored  form  of membership  that 
other member states may be willing to see refined in the context of a further round of wider 
treaty  reform  but  this  refinement  may  not  be  sufficient  to  meet  popular  and  political 
demands for a renegotiation 












a  watershed  in  the  United  Kingdom’s  EU  policy  and  place  in  the  Union  is  open  to 
question. Current  debates  on  how  the  United  Kingdom  should  respond  to  calls  for  further 
integration,  particularly within  the  Eurozone,  on whether  the UK  government  should  seek  to 
alter the terms of its membership, and on whether there should be a referendum on remaining 
in the EU all predate the eurozone crisis. Rather they are the symptoms of the United Kingdom’s 
uneasy  and  unenthusiastic  participation  in  a  process  of  European  integration which  is  poorly 





2. Although  support  for  the United Kingdom’s  continued membership  is  regularly  re‐affirmed by 
governments  and most  political  parties,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  current  inquiry  is 
taking  place  at  a  point  when  the  desirability  of  this  membership  is  being  most  openly  and 
forcefully questioned  among  voters,  campaigners  and politicians.  The political  saliency of  the 
issue has not been so great since the early 1980s. With public opinion remaining  for the most 
part unenthusiastic about European integration – whether the status quo or further integration 
– and  increasingly  inclined  to express a view on  the United Kingdom’s position within  the EU, 
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debate  on  alternatives  appears  set  to  remain  a  feature  of  UK  politics  until  such  time  as  a 
referendum is held and its outcome addressed.  
 
3. The  likelihood of a  referendum  is high and not  simply because of  the political  saliency of  the 
continued membership  issues. The EU Act  (2011),  irrespective of whether  it  requires or not a 
referendum for a treaty change, has heightened expectations of a referendum being held. In the 
current political climate,  it  is extremely difficult to envisage a future government being able to 
resist  popular  and  parliamentary  calls  for  a  referendum  even  if  it  can  provide  a  completely 
water‐tight  legal  case  for  ratification  of  a  treaty  change  being  exempted  from  referendum 




4. Many  opponents  of  the  United  Kingdom’s  continued  membership  of  the  EU  advocate 
withdrawal  and  the  establishment of  an  alternative  relationship, often  along  the  lines of  the 
European  Economic  Area  or  the  complex,  multi‐agreement  bilateral  relationship  that 
Switzerland has with  the EU. These are dynamic  forms of  relations  in which  the non‐member 







6. Assuming  such  a  focus  is maintained,  it  raises  the  question  of what  alternative  forms  of  EU 
membership  are possible  and which would  suit UK  interests best. However,  and  importantly, 
consideration of options cannot be undertaken simply from a UK perspective of what would be 
desirable. EU membership, it cannot be forgotten, is regulated by unanimous agreement among 
the  member  states  as  contracting  parties  to  the  EU’s  constitutive  treaties  –  the  Treaty  on 







substance of any  renegotiations with  the European Parliament  likely  to demand a  role  in  the 
formal  approval  of  any  change.  As  regards  the  collective  interest,  any  renegotiated  form  of 
membership would set precedents for other actual and would‐be members as well as the terms 








Established  practice  is  that  it  assumes  all  existing  treaties  as  well  as  all  other  primary  and 
secondary legislation – the acquis. Opt‐outs are exceedingly rare and highly specific. Moreover, 
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acceding states are obliged  to subscribe  to  the acquis politique of  the EU,  i.e.  its often  loosely 
worded political ambitions, including ‘ever closer Union’.1  
 
9. In practice,  certain  forms of  contractual  relationships have been presented  as a  form of  (e.g. 
‘associate’) membership. Legally speaking, however, these are not a form of membership of the 
EU, but a form of relationship with the EU. This is irrespective of the fact that the intensity of the 
contractual commitments  in some  relationships  is so great  (e.g.  the European Economic Area) 
that the non‐member state assumes many of the obligations and receives many of the benefits 
of  membership  and  in  some  cases,  notably  where  Schengen  participation  is  concerned,  is 
actually more of a member than certain member states (e.g. the United Kingdom). However, one 




10. Although  legally  there  is  only  one  form  of  EU  membership,  in  practice  various  degrees  of 
membership  exist.  On  the  one  hand,  not  all  member  states  are  members  of  the  eurozone. 
Member states can be divided into three categories: eurozone members – ‘ins’; member states 
that have not yet met the criteria to become part of the eurozone – ‘pre‐ins’; member states – 
‘outs’  –  that  have  either  previously  signed  up  to  economic  and  monetary  union  and 
subsequently decided not  to  join the eurozone  (Sweden, Denmark) or have always had an opt 
out  (United Kingdom). On  the other hand, not all member states participate  fully  in Schengen 
activities or the area of freedom, security and justice: the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
have  a  partial  membership  of  these  areas  due  to  various  opt‐out/opt‐in  arrangements. 








following negotiation between  the member states. Each – with  the exception of  the eurozone 
opt‐outs – also remains rather fuzzy, the boundaries shifting as the relevant acquis evolves and 
opt‐ins are exercised. None has been  formalized  through  the  creation of a particular  form of 
named membership that is made available – explicitly or implicitly – to others, whether current 
or  would‐be  members.  Only  at  the  time  that  the  relevant  treaty  change  was  agreed  (e.g. 
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon) was the variable degree of membership established.  
 
12. The unscripted emergence of the variable degrees of membership and  the  fact that they have 














• member  states have  studiously avoided any  situation where  they might be  classified as a 
second‐class member as with all certainty would be  the  case  if  tiers of membership were 
established; 
• formalizing  tiers of membership would necessitate  a debate on  the balance of  rights and 
obligations  associated  with  each  tier  leading  potentially  to  differentiated  levels  of 
institutional representation and decision‐making involvement;  
• the existence of formalized tiers of membership could, and potentially would, necessitate a 
fundamental  re‐working  of  how  the  EU  enlarges  (e.g.  regarding which  tier  should  be  the 
basis  for  negotiation)  and  oblige  the  EU  to  admit  applicant  states  to  some  form  of 
membership earlier than would normally be the case;  
• if  certain  rights  of  membership  (e.g.  relating  to  institutional  representation  or  decision‐




13. While  the  possibility  of  EU  member  states  formalizing  tiers  of  membership  –  whether  via 
political  agreement or  formal  treaty  change  –  cannot be  ruled out, precedent  suggests  there 
would be little appetite to do so. The default option of the EU and its member states has always 
been  for any deviations  from  ‘full’ membership  to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis and only 
when  absolutely  necessary  to  secure  agreement  on  a  wider  set  of  treaty  reforms.  The 
preference for flexibility is also reflected in the decision not to specify the minimum content of 
any agreement governing relations with a member state  that decides  to  leave  the EU  through 
the withdrawal clause in Article 50 TEU introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
14. Moreover,  the question  should be asked as  to whether other member  states actually  support 
the  idea  of  formalized  tiers  of  membership.  Past  proposals  for  differentiated  forms  of 
integration and of establishing an ‘avant garde’ of member states have generally attracted little 
support  beyond  the  most  integrationist  member  states.  Most  member  states  have  feared 







15. The history of the European  integration has been  long been characterised by flexibility with ad 
hoc  solutions often being  generated  to  address  the particular  concerns of  individual member 
states. This helps explain  the unique nature of  the United Kingdom’s  formal participation as a 
member  in  the EU. Whether  there  is scope  to secure a renogotiation or  further refinement of 










17. How member  states would  respond  to  a UK  demand  for  a more  substantial  renegotiation  is 





reform process, during which  the United Kingdom would be expected  to make concessions  to 





18. As  the gap – which already exists – widens, attention will undoubtedly  shift  to whether with 
reduced  commitments  and  obligations  the  United  Kingdom  should  retain  the  same  level  of 
membership benefits, notably  regarding  institutional  representation and decision‐making. The 
EU would be faced with  its own West Lothian question, most obviously within the Council and 
European Parliament, but also potentially within other institutions (e.g. the Court of Justice) and 





19. A consideration  that will undoubtedly  influence  the willingness of  the other member states  to 
consider  a  renegotiation  is  the  fact  that  the  result  would  further  expose  the  inconsistency 
between  the  requirement  the  EU  makes  of  acceding  states  to  accept  as  a  prerequisite  of 
membership  the acquis  in  full and  the  fact  that a member  state  can negotiate down various, 
possible  many  of  its,  obligations  while  retaining  the  benefits  of  membership.  The  EU  will 
undoubtedly want to avoid accusations of double‐standards; it will also want to maintain at least 
a  semblance of  consistency  in  its approach  to enlargement and  the  terms of accession. A UK 
government will also presumably wish to avoid accusations of double‐standards. Could though a 
UK  government, with  its  strong  advocacy  of  Turkish membership,  insist  that  Turkey  only  be 
admitted  if  it meets the criteria for membership  in full when the United Kingdom  is seeking to 
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Summary of evidence 
The December 2011 European Council meeting was a watershed for the UK’s relationship 
with the European Union (EU). It exposed the growing divergence between the UK’s 
approach to its membership of the EU and that of the overwhelming majority of other 
member states. Britain’s position outside the eurozone means that it will have minimal 
influence over near-term changes to the EU’s institutional architecture, which are being 
organised around the need to stabilise the monetary union and may include building a fiscal 
union. The risk has grown, therefore, that the UK will be pushed to the margins of European 
integration and that this will undercut its influence and interests within the EU overall. 
 
The UK has three options. It can take the radical step of withdrawing from full EU 
membership. It can sit on the sidelines of the EU while other member states focus their 
energies on saving the single currency. Or it can make the most of its EU membership. 
Either of the first two options would demonstrate a serious misreading of the UK’s national 
interests at the start of the 21st century. These interests are best served through active UK 
participation in the EU.  
 
Stepping back or sitting aside from the EU would also reveal a misreading of the process of 
European integration. Even a fiscally united eurozone will be divided between the more and 
less competitive, between those who favour a more federal or a more intergovernmental 
Europe, and between the smaller and the bigger states. Britain will continue to be an 
important player in this multi-tiered Europe.  
 
Rather than holding the EU at arm’s length at this critical juncture, the government should be 
more proactive than it has been in its approach towards the large realm of EU policy outside 
European Monetary Union (EMU). For example, it should lay the groundwork for a 
deepening of the Single Market in the services sector, drive the agenda on collective 
approaches to energy, trade and climate change, and build more coordinated European 






The logic of EMU 
 
1. The December 2011 European Council was a watershed for the UK’s relationship 
with the EU. It exposed the growing divergence between the UK’s approach to its 
membership of the EU and that of the overwhelming majority of other EU member 
states. Since December, the divergence has widened rather than narrowed. 
Eurozone members and those EU member states that hope to join the single 
currency area (and even countries such as Sweden and Denmark which currently do 
not) are working together to create new structures of financial and political integration 
that they hope will put the euro on a more stable footing for the future. 
 
2. There are some in the UK and beyond who expect the current crisis to be the 
beginning of the end of the single currency. Others expect it to retreat into a core 
group of North European countries clustered around (and sharing some of the same 
competitive advantages as) Germany. These expectations ignore the political 
thinking on continental Europe that launched the euro and the economic drivers that 
created a large rather than ‘core’ eurozone in the first place. 
 
3. The decision in 1992 to create the euro was not driven by economic logic. Principally 
it reflected the determination of the French government of President François 
Mitterrand to contain the economic power of a unified Germany. The creation of the 
euro also reflected Chancellor Kohl’s desire to bind a unified Germany irreversibly 
into an integrated Europe with France and Germany at its core. This fundamental 
Franco-German political pact at the heart of the eurozone remains intact. 
 
4. With France and Germany locked into a single currency, there was economic logic 
(as well as political pressure) to launch the euro with a larger rather than smaller 
number of members. If Italy had remained outside the euro, German companies 
would have faced stiff competition in their domestic market and internationally from 
companies based in Italy’s dynamic north pricing their goods in cheap lira. If Spain 
had remained outside the euro, German companies would have been tempted to 
shift more of their production to its relatively cheaper labour market. In either case, 
prospects for German domestic growth and job creation would have been affected. 
This economic dynamic remains in place today; as such, Germany and other 
northern states have a powerful economic incentive to keep the eurozone together. 
 
5. Most eurozone members also see membership of the single currency as part of their 
defence against the growing might of China and other emerging economies, as well 
as a counterbalance to the economic power of the United States. Despite the current 
turmoil, being inside the euro offers EU members greater long-term stability in terms 
of interest rates, inflation and exchanges and some prospects for solidarity (in terms 
of the role of the European Central Bank and other mechanisms of intra-eurozone 
financial support). Carrying out painful structural reforms to their welfare systems is 
likely to be easier inside the eurozone than if each country had to manage its own 




6. Certainly, there is a growing risk that Greece will leave the euro. The contagion 
effects of such an event could force out vulnerable countries such as Portugal or 
even Spain. But the pressures and incentives to avoid this outcome are enormous. 
Even if it happens, the impetus to sustain the euro in some form, covering as many 
EU members as possible, would be powerful. If it did have to be re-fashioned, it 
would likely be with the political dimensions of a fiscal union debated and approved 
from the outset. 
 
 
The UK and the single currency – divided we stand 
 
7. Given its geography and its history, the UK has never shared the same political 
commitment to European integration as other European countries. This means that 
not only the British public, but also the two major political parties have viewed the 
single currency with considerable scepticism. No UK government, either at the time 
of its launch or since, has been a strong and consistent advocate of membership, 
doubting the economic benefits and fearing the domestic political consequences. 
 
8. The divide between British and continental European perspectives concerning the 
relative merits and risks of joining the single currency has not abated. Today, with the 
euro crisis in full flow and with British public opinion as eurosceptic as ever, there are 
no prospects of the UK joining the euro at any point in the near- to medium-term 
(indeed, remaining outside the eurozone is even written into the ‘Coalition 
Agreement’). There is also little prospect that the UK will join the fiscal compact any 
time soon, as other non-euro and ‘pre-in’ governments have chosen to do. 
 
9. For their part, eurozone members have drawn the opposite lesson from the crisis. 
They now recognise the insufficiency of the political mechanisms in place to manage 
the single currency during periods of stress. They have committed, therefore, to 
deepen their fiscal coordination and have embedded national commitments to fiscal 
discipline in a treaty that requires a dilution of legislative sovereignty and a 
commensurate increase in the power of EU institutions. 
 
10. The UK must recognize that, absent a sudden implosion of the entire single currency, 
building this fiscal union and resolving the euro crisis in a sustainable manner will be 
the overriding objective of most EU member states for the next few years.  
 
11. The UK will be on the margins of this process, and its absence could affect its 
political relations with other EU member states. The attitudes of the Netherlands and 
of Poland are a case in point. Both countries have traditionally been close bilateral 
allies of the UK within the EU: the former as one of the main advocates of an open 
EU Single Market, like the UK; and the latter as a sovereignty-minded late-comer to 
EU integration with strong Atlanticist instincts, also like the UK. Today, however, the 
governments of both countries have thrown in their hand with the logic of deeper 




12. It is true that deeper political integration within the eurozone should not imply material 
changes to the overall EU acquis, whether in the management of the Single Market 
or negotiation of the budget, nor in more intergovernmental areas such as EU 
enlargement or foreign policy. And, while the UK may end up as the only EU member 
state outside the fiscal compact (or one of a very few), it has been in this sort of 
position before (as the only EU member state not to adopt the ‘Social Chapter’ 
initially) while remaining a full participant in other areas of EU competence. 
 
13. On the other hand, close and regular cooperation between EU members on an issue 
as fundamental as fiscal policy will change the dynamics of EU integration and the 
UK’s place in Europe in ways that are hard to predict. There is a risk that ‘package 
deals’ of demands and concessions among euro members over issues that begin in 
the fiscal realm will then spread into other aspects of EU policy-making. This was 
partly the concern of the UK government in the lead-up to the December 2011 
summit; the fear was that new regulations governing EU financial services – a Single 
Market issue in which the UK has a full vote – might be driven by concerns over the 
stability of the euro rather than by the need to sustain market openness and stability. 
 
Options for the UK 
 
14. Faced with a structural transformation of the EU in which it does not want to share, 
the UK has three options. It can take the radical step of withdrawing from full 
membership of what looks likely to be an even closer Union. It can sit on the 
sidelines while other EU member states focus their energies on saving the single 
currency. Or it can make the most of its EU membership. I argue in this evidence for 
the third option. 
 
15. The first option, reconsidering full EU membership, presupposes that UK leverage 
within the EU will inevitably decline as the euro crisis deepens. By this logic, the UK 
might as well get out before it is pushed into a second tier of membership from which 
it is increasingly difficult to shape an EU that best fits UK interests. Is this likely to be 
the case?  
 
16. On the contrary, there is every possibility that an integrating eurozone will contain the 
same tensions and inconsistencies that the EU as a whole has carried since its 
inception: between big and small states; between those that favour a more federal 
future and those that want to preserve as much national sovereignty as possible; 
between those that are already competitive and those that are struggling to become 
so; and between those who foresee the eurozone becoming a genuine transfer union 
and those, such as Germany, which currently remain committed more to the principle 
of ‘collective responsibility rather than solidarity’.1 
 
17. These cleavages within the eurozone mean that the UK will continue to find receptive 
partners to promote a range of its EU priorities, whether in the Single Market, on the 
budget, on energy policy, or on priorities for EU foreign and security policy. In 
                                                            
1 Philip Whyte, ‘Governance reforms have left the euro's flawed structure intact’, Centre for European Reform, 18 
April 2012, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/governance-reforms-have-left-euros.html. 
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contrast, stepping out of the EU but remaining inside the European Economic Area 
would turn the UK into a consumer rather than a co-designer of the Single Market 
and into an observer rather than a leader of its more intergovernmental policies. 
 
18. The second option, sitting on the side lines, fails to recognise the enormous value 
that the UK gains from its membership of the EU and the importance of the UK’s 
voice in shaping the future evolution of the Union in ways that reflect the best of 
British ideas as well as national interests.  
 
19. The UK’s membership of the EU already gives it (almost) barrier-free access to a 
single market of 500 million of the world’s wealthiest consumers; estimates suggest 
that trade between EU countries is twice as high as it would be without the Single 
Market. It is a key reason that the UK continues to attract some of the largest inflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and sends the lion’s share of its own FDI into the 
EU. Government estimates suggest that 3.5 million jobs in the UK are linked to 
exports to the EU, and the income gains for UK households from the Single Market 
are in the region of £1,100–£3,300 per year.2 
 
20. Even if the UK adjusts its patterns of trade to take better advantage of emerging 
markets, Europe is likely to remain by far its dominant market. At the end of 2011, 
eight of the UK’s top ten trading partners were in the European Economic Area.3 
And, if the UK were to double its exports to China, these would still only match the 
volume the UK currently exports to the Republic of Ireland.4 
 
21. In addition, at a broader political and geopolitical level, the UK’s attachment to 
Europe is likely to increase rather than decline in the coming years. As a medium-
sized power in a world of increasingly large players, and at a time when the United 
States is spending more of its time and energy in Asia, being part of a unified 
European market and of a coordinated diplomatic entity enhances rather than 
diminishes UK international influence. This applies as much to negotiations with third 
parties over UK trade interests, energy security and climate policy as it does over 
preventing nuclear proliferation or the spread of instability in the Middle East. 
 
22. The third option, making the most of its EU membership, represents the best 
choice for the UK, in light of both the compelling economic case and the strategic 
realities inside and outside the EU. 
 
23. Moreover, as a major player in a multi-tiered Europe, the UK government has every 
opportunity to build alliances with other EU members and within EU institutions on 
                                                            
2 These figures are taken from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. For more information, see 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, The UK and the Single Market, 2011, 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/international-trade-investment-and-development/docs/u/11-719-uk-and-
single-market, p. 3. According to BIS, in 2008, 49% of total inward FDI originated from EU member states. 
3 Office for National Statistics, ‘Trade in goods – one month geographical analysis’, 9 February 2012, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/uktrade/uk-trade/december-2011/stb-uk-trade-december-2011.html#tab-Trade-in-
goods---one-month-geographical-analysis--seasonally-adjusted-. 
4 The Guardian, ‘UK export and import in 2011: top products and trading partners’, 10 January 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/feb/24/uk-trade-exports-imports#. 
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EU policies that do not form part of eurozone competence, but that continue to be of 
direct interest to the UK. These include: 
 
• Liberalising further the Single Market by opening up the EU market in 
services, a key element of a European ‘growth strategy’ that is supported both 
by northern EU governments such as the Netherlands and Denmark and 
southern governments in Italy, Spain and Portugal. A 2005 study examining 
the economic gains for the EU of integrating services into the Single Market, 
undertaken by the Dutch Planning Bureau, suggested this could yield growth 
benefits of 0.6–1.5% of GDP;5 
• Energy policy, where the European Commission’s emphasis on building a 
more inter-connected and open energy market plays directly to UK strategic 
and economic interests; 
• Re-designing the EU budget, where Germany shares many of the UK’s 
interests in re-balancing funds towards new drivers of economic growth; 
• International climate negotiations, where UK and EU leadership and leverage 
were instrumental in the breakthroughs made at the Durban summit in 
November 2011;  
• Trade policy, where the UK, EU Commission and a number of member states 
see the completion of new free trade agreements or economic partnership 
agreements as critical to the much-needed European growth strategy; 
• Designing and conducting more coherent EU foreign and security policies in 
targeted areas where the common interests of all EU member states are 
clear, such as the sanctions regimes against Damascus and Tehran or joint 




24. The UK’s national interests are best served by active participation in the European 
Union. But, given eurozone members’ rush to build a fiscal union, the government will 
need to be more proactive than it has been in the past in its approach towards EU 
policy. It cannot afford to hold the EU at arm’s length. 
 
25. In order to overcome the growing suspicions of their EU counterparts about UK 
objectives and motivations, the Prime Minister and his senior ministers will also need 
to engage consistently, not spasmodically, in EU policy debates. 
 
26. And they will need to work as collaboratively as possible with EU institutions such as 
the European Commission, the increasingly powerful European Parliament and the 
European External Action Service, rather than treating them instinctively as obstacles 
to progress or threats to national sovereignty.  
 
                                                            
5 See European Commission, ‘Economic Benefits of the Services Directive’, 20 May 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/explanatory/economic_benefits_en.pdf. The case 
for expanding the Single Market was made by Prime Minister David Cameron and other EU leaders in two letters 




27. The euro crisis will change the EU. The UK’s psychological detachment from the 
process of deepening European integration will be more apparent than before. But 
the contributions that it can offer and the benefits that it can obtain from active EU 
membership will continue to make the EU one of the cornerstones of Britain’s place 
in the world. 
 
24 May 2012 
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FEU 26 
Written evidence from Brendan Donnelly, Director, Federal Trust  
 
1. This submission addresses all the four questions posed by the Committee in its call for 
evidence. In summary, I argue that as a result of decisions by successive British governments 
the United Kingdom is likely to be for the foreseeable future a spectator rather than a shaper 
of the most important developments in the European Union. The events of the European 
Council in December 2011 were in my view a clear illustration of this reality.  
2. I am the Director of the Federal Trust, a research institute concerned with subnational and 
supranational political structures. From 1994 to 1999 I was a Conservative Member of the 
European Parliament. My submission is offered in a personal capacity. 
-------- 
To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen as 
a watershed in the UK’s EU policy and place in the Union? 
1. At one level, the European Council of December 2011 can be regarded as a simple failure 
of British negotiating tactics. The British position was not that of refusing to join the 
proposed Fiscal Compact act as a matter of principle, but rather of being willing to do so if 
certain changes were made in the Union’s decision-making procedures in order to 
“renationalize” the regulation of financial services. The European Council’s consideration of 
this proposal had not been well prepared, nor was it well conducted during the meeting of the 
Council by the British side. With better preparation and presentation, it might have been 
possible to secure a more sympathetic consideration or at least a less brusque rejection of this 
British proposal.  
2. Beyond the immediate issue of questionable negotiating tactics, however, the events of 
December2011 mark the unsurprising culmination of a series of events and decisions by 
successive British governments which have weakened British influence and standing within 
the European Union. The continuing refusal to join the euro;  the continuing  refusal to 
participate in passport-free travel in the Schengen area; the passage of the EU Bill in 2011; 
the commitment of the Coalition government to stand aside from any further European 
sovereignty-pooling over the five years of its existence; and finally the perceived attempt of 
Prime Minister David Cameron to unpick in December 2011 central elements of the 
European single market—all these steps have cumulatively led Britain’s partners in the 
European Union to the conclusion that the political trajectory of the United Kingdom within 
the European Union is likely over the coming  years to be at best one of semi-detachment and 
at worst eventual total withdrawal.  This has fundamentally changed the political “terms of 
trade” between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Union. Britain’s partners in the Union 
emphatically do not think today that the British government believes “we are all in this 
together.” 
3.  It would have been surprising indeed if this growing perception on the part of Britain’s 
partners had not led eventually to a diminution of British negotiating capacity within the 
Union. The enormous fund of good will towards the United Kingdom from its European 
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partners and clever diplomacy by British officials and ministers have to some extent 
postponed this day of reckoning.  But the increasing centrality of the Eurozone and its 
structures to the future evolution of the European Union has inevitably hastened the process 
of British marginalization. The Coalition agreement stipulates that during its five years of 
office the United Kingdom will not join or make any preparations to join the euro. The larger 
party of government has as its established policy not to join the euro in any circumstances. 
Against this background, the British government cannot reasonably expect to play any 
significant role in the European Union’s current defining debates, those about the future of 
the Eurozone and about the implications of that future for the wider structures of the Union.   
There will no doubt continue to be some areas of the European Union’s activities where the 
United Kingdom will be able to make a constructive contribution.  But the crucial question of 
the euro is not one of them. That fact has the profoundest consequences for Britain’s position 
within the European Union. 
Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the UK 
seek for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier EU and start 
to develop ideas for multiple forms of EU membership?  
4. Over recent months, the British government has found itself in the unexpected position of 
urging upon its partners in the Eurozone a quicker and deeper process of integration than 
some of them might wish. Britain’s position outside the Eurozone deprives these calls of 
political authority or significance. The fact that they are being made highlights however the 
uncomfortable alternatives with which a United Kingdom semi-detached from the European 
Union finds itself confronted.  The success or failure of the Eurozone is a matter of central 
economic importance to the United Kingdom, not least in view of the British economy’s 
current fragility. There is a more than plausible case to be made for arguing that the success 
of the Eurozone can only be achieved by greater political and economic integration among its 
members. Yet when the current British government calls upon its neighbours to pursue more 
vigorously such integration, it is spectacularly reversing centuries of British foreign and 
European policy, central to which was the avoidance of united European structures 
potentially hostile to the United Kingdom. While a more deeply integrated Eurozone will no 
doubt be a more positive factor for the British economy than one which has disintegrated, its 
successful integration may well pose in the medium term a new set of political and economic 
problems for the United Kingdom.  There could be no guarantee, or even likelihood that the 
approach of this integrated Eurozone to such questions as macro-economic policy, financial 
regulation, trade and competition would always be congenial to the United Kingdom.  
5. Ironically, its very semi-detachment within the European Union dispenses the present 
British government from needing to form any very precise view of the appropriate future 
structures for the Eurozone and of the European Union in general. Unless the single European 
currency ceases to exist, or its membership is radically reduced, decisions on these matters 
will overwhelmingly be taken by others, and it will be up to Britain to make what it sees as 
being the best of the situation with which it is confronted.  In the chaos that would follow the 
collapse of the single currency, Britain’s voice might (but not necessarily) be a determining 
one in the reconstruction of European co-operative and integrative structures.  Otherwise, its 
role will predominantly be that of a spectator.  Even on the question of how many other 
countries from within the Union will wish to share Britain’s role as spectator, and to what 
extent, the British capacity to shape events should not be over-estimated. Before the 
European Council of last December, there were well-publicized calls in this country for the 
United Kingdom to play a role of leadership for the member states of the Union not in the 
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Eurozone. The outcome of the European Council clearly suggests that these calls are 
unrealistic. 
What is the relationship between the new ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty and the EU’s acquis? 
What impact might the conclusion of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty have on other aspects 
of the EU and its policies, such as the EU budget, enlargement, or the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy?  
6. The “Fiscal Compact” is unlikely of itself to compromise the present acquis of the 
European Union. On the other hand, the Compact is unlikely to be the final building-block of 
the greater economic, fiscal and political integration emerging from the present difficulties of 
the Eurozone.  If this integration continues on its present path, the current acquis of the Union 
will inevitably come to form an ever smaller proportion of the Union’s legal instruments and 
structures. The members of the integrated Eurozone will be well placed to shape the new 
elements of the acquis and in some instances to revise the existing acquis, according to the 
Union’s established decision-making procedures.  Fear of this latter prospect may well have 
weighed with Mr. Cameron in his abortive attempt to change some of the Union’s decision-
making procedures at the European Council last December. 
7. The Fiscal Compact is equally unlikely to affect directly the three mentioned policy areas 
of the European budget, enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
Eurozone countries are clearly unwilling to use the European budget as a major instrument of 
macro-economic or fiscal adjustment; if they had wished to do so, that would inevitably have 
created controversy with member states outside the Eurozone. The terms of the debate 
surrounding the continuation of the British rebate/abatement in the next Financial Perspective 
for the European budget are long familiar to all involved. The Fiscal Compact will neither 
exacerbate nor mitigate this probable confrontation. The debate about the further enlargement 
of the Union in general and specific candidate countries in particular is already a complex 
one, and the Fiscal Compact will not simplify it. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is 
a predominantly intergovernmental arrangement with its own specific decision-making 
procedures, in which Britain plays and is likely to continue to play a significant role. If the 
countries of the Eurozone were willing to adopt between themselves decision-making 
procedures for their contribution to the Common Foreign and Security Policy more akin to 
those of the Union’s other policy areas, then that would of itself be a radical innovation. No 
such change however seems in immediate prospect. 
Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the ‘fiscal compact’ Treaty 
into the EU Treaties? If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make 
its condition for doing so?   
8. Paragraph 6 above sketched out the possible implications of the increasing integration of 
the Eurozone for the evolution of the Union’s acquis. These implications are not greatly 
affected by whether the Fiscal Compact is incorporated into the EU Treaties or not. If a future 
British government were able to secure some “renationalization” of decision-making in return 
for accepting the Compact’s incorporation into the Treaties, then it might regard itself as 
having achieved some desirable measure of “protection” against future developments of the 
acquis driven primarily by the member states of the Eurozone. To judge from the events of 
December 2012, it seems unlikely that any such quid pro quo would be on offer. It would of 
course be open to a future British government to acquiesce in incorporation of the Pact into 
the European Treaties as a simple gesture of goodwill to its partners, which will avoid legal 
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complications for them and make no objective difference to the United Kingdom. Whether it 
will wish or be politically able to make this gesture cannot be predicted today. 
Final Comment 
9. The Committee’s Chairman, Mr Ottaway, remarked in connection with the proposed report 
that he was “starting from the assumption that the UK should and will remain an EU 
Member.” A recurrent theme of this submission is that Britain’s present capacity to influence 
the Union’s decision-making is small and likely to become smaller. When Britain joined the 
European Community in 1973, a central reason why it did so was in order to influence 
European decisions that, for better or worse, would crucially affect British interests. Policies 
pursued by successive British governments which put that influence at risk cannot but 
undermine the political rationale for British membership of the European Union. 














1. This submission argues that the European Union represents the best way for European 
countries to cooperate on matters of mutual interest whilst respecting the political 
rights of their citizens. The increasing trend towards opt-outs and integration at 
different levels is a reflection of the different state of public opinion in different parts 
of Europe, but nevertheless there are some core principles which must be observed by 
all EU member states. The several opt-outs that apply to the UK will not necessarily 
deprive it of influence in Europe’s future direction, as long as the government acts 
positively towards the rest of the EU. This is not obviously the position of the 
government at present. 
 
About the European Movement 
 
2. The European Movement is a independent, not-for-profit and all party organisation 
that calls for closer integration at the EU level, with more powers for the 
democratically elected institutions of the EU and more popular involvement in its 
intergovernmental decision-making structures. It was founded in 1948 by Sir Winston 




3. The case for the European Union is made stronger by the recent developments in the 
eurozone and around the world. That individual countries are no longer able to 
safeguard their own interests acting independently becomes clearer and clearer every 
day. To enable European countries to take care of their own interests and those of 
their citizens is the purpose of the European Union. This is true when considering the 
current economic crisis, the developing social and environmental challenges, or the 
growing change in the global balance of power. 
 
4. We recognise that, for the time being, public opinion in some countries means that not 
every country can take part in every aspect of European integration. We regret the fact 
that public opinion feels this way, but the fact that the EU is a union of consent means 
that this must be respected. 
 
5. It is therefore necessary to design the future European Union taking into account these 
variations in public opinion in different member states. This is a process that started in 
fact in the Maastricht Treaty with the opt-outs for the UK and Denmark from the euro, 
and has acquired many new dimensions since then. The notion of a finalité politique 
that was perhaps in the minds of some of the founders of the EU has been replaced by 
a more varied picture. Public opinion can change, meaning that the opt-outs that were 
once necessary might someday be relinquished, so the picture we paint here is not 
necessarily permanent. However, it may be said to be more than strictly temporary. 
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Core principles of the European Union 
 
6. The design of the European Union under this approach, recognising opt-outs, must 
also specify those aspects of EU membership from which no opt-out may be 
permitted in order to ensure that the EU is not hollowed out into nothingness. There 
are some core principles to which all EU members must subscribe, and we list them 
here: 
 
6.1 The rule of law – decisions taken through the European institutions must have the 
force of law, which citizens can see enforced through the courts, and not be merely 
political declarations to be made or dropped for political convenience. Both market 
credibility and public trust must be earned and cannot simply be taken for granted. 
 
6.2 The supremacy of EU law over national law in those areas specified in the treaties – 
this is a long-standing principle of the EU that ensures that its decisions have meaning 
and that the member states can rely on each other to keep to the commitments they 
have made. 
 
6.3 The role of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers as the two 
chambers of the legislature – the directly elected European Parliament performs a 
vital role in representing the interests of the citizens in the European decision-making 
process, and the Council represents the interests of the member states. Both are 
important; neither should have supremacy over the other. 
 
6.4 The role of the European Commission as the executive of the EU – there must be a 
part of the institutional system that represents the common European interest rather 
than the interests of any particular member state. Among other things, this is a 
protection for those member states not participating in any particular European 
initiative. 
 
6.5 Transparency – the EU institutions may have been created as a diplomatic initiative 
but are now better understood as an expression of democracy. The standards of 
openness and transparency observed by the institutions should reflect their democratic 
role rather than their origins in diplomacy and international relations. 
 
6.6 Minimal use of the veto power – it is for the time being unrealistic to propose that the 
veto power should be relinquished by the member states altogether, but its use should 
be absolutely a last resort. The threat of the veto creates uncertainty and discontinuity 
in policy – one country’s “red line” is another country’s “unreasonable veto” – which 
qualified majority voting does not. The academic literature shows that QMV 
encourages member states to join successful coalitions rather than to hold out in 
lonely opposition. 
 
6.7 Subsidiarity – the idea that there should be no more centralisation than necessary and 
as much decentralisation as possible is another foundation of the European idea. 
Changes in technology and markets will lead to a reassessment from time to time of 
what is the appropriate level for each policy, or for different aspects of the 
implementation of each policy. Debate between the member states and the European 
institutions over the appropriate level is an expression of the success of this policy and 
not its failure. 
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6.8 Contributions to the EU budget – to be able to act effectively, the EU needs reliable 
and sufficient financial resources. The original vision that the EU should be financed 
wholly from own resources has been lost in a complex web of political compromises 
between the member states, made up of rebates, exceptions and correction 
mechanisms. It is imperative we replace this opaque system with something that 
resembles what the treaty originally intended, to function in a more transparent, 
simpler and above all fairer way. A more direct form of EU funding would signal an 
end to the clientelistic relationship between the union and its member states and at the 
same time strengthen the direct connection with citizens, by making clearer how 
much the EU costs and how it is being paid for. 
 
Core powers of the European Union 
 
7. Those principles of decision-making must apply to a minimum core set of powers, 
including: 
 
7.1 The single market, with its implications for issues such as environment, social policy 
and international trade 
 
7.2 The fight against international terrorism and cross-border crime 
 
7.3 Human rights 
 
7.4 Foreign policy, to the extent that EU member states have foreign policy interests in 
common 
 
8. Opt-outs currently exist inter alia from the euro (the UK, Denmark and Sweden), 
defence cooperation (Denmark), Schengen (the UK and Ireland), the European patent 
(Italy and Spain), the euro-plus pact (Hungary, Czech Republic, Sweden and the UK). 
These and future opt-outs have to be reconciled with the organising principles of the 
EU (paragraph 6) and the essential powers of the EU (paragraph 7). 
 
Britain and the EU 
 
9. Britain belongs in the European Union. The principles outlined in paragraph 6 above 
are entirely consistent with the view of EU and of democratic politics as understood in 
Britain over many years. They imply that the EU is effective in the policy areas 
granted to it by the treaties but not beyond those areas. They grant citizens legal rights 
within the political process, in a way that no other international organisation can do. 
 
10. That Britain is currently not a member of the euro nor of the Schengen area is a matter 
of regret. Nor was the UK an active participant in drafting the fiscal compact treaty. 
However, these exclusions do not have to imply a termination of British participation 
in the European Union. 
 
11. There is still plenty of opportunity for a positive attitude on the part of the British 
government to exert a positive influence on the European Union, even given the 
exclusions mentioned above. However, that influence has got to be earned and cannot 
simply be assumed. The European Movement remains concerned that the current 
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government is not doing nearly enough to earn that influence in the EU, a trend which 
if taken to its logical conclusion would render redundant the speculation by this and 
other parliamentary committees about the future of the European Union. It is 
necessary to act before it is too late. 
 








Maurice  Fraser was  Special Adviser  to  three UK  Foreign  Secretaries, 1989‐95:  Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
John  Major  and  Douglas  Hurd.  He  is  Director  of  the  LSE‐Sciences  Po  European  Double Master’s 
Degree programme  and Director of  the  LSE  European  Public  Lectures  Series. He  is  a  trustee  and 
council member of several European think tanks and policy networks and is a regular commentator 
on European affairs  in the  international news media. He has recently conducted master classes on 
French  politics  for  Whitehall  departments  and  the  BBC.  He  was  made  Chevalier  de  la  Legion  d’ 
honneur in 2008. 
Key propositions 
1. The EU needs an  institutional  framework which enables  it  to  improve  the quality of  its outputs 
and genuinely to add value.  





be sustainable, the appetite for far‐reaching economic union  in the eurozone  is at present  limited. 
The UK’s role should be to inject clarity and realism into such a discussion, in the interests of the EU 
as a whole.  









This  should  be  obvious  but  urgently  needs  restating.  For  all  the  soaring  rhetoric  of  European 
construction, the fact is that the founding rationale of the EEC/EU was a practical and unsentimental 






the  single market were win‐win projects.  To be  sure,  they produced negative  externalities which 
required regulation. But the only losers were inefficient producers who had grown used to national 
protection.  








This mission  for  the EU  finds  its  legitimacy  in  the effectiveness of  its outputs. But  there are other 
lenses through which we look at the EU, and some of these are more problematic. One such lens is 
that of values, because the EU is a community not only of law but of values such as freedom (in the 
form of civil  liberties) and democracy, originally enshrined not  in  the EEC/EU but  in the Council of 
Europe – specifically in the European Convention on European Rights, though such rights now form 

















(and  somewhat uneasily). While  the  flexible, decentralised and non‐coercive character of variable 
geometry  most  closely  reflects  traditional  UK  concerns  about  sovereignty,  concerns  about 
marginalisation, loss of influence or potential vulnerability to caucusing by other member states has 
often  impelled British governments  to caution against  fragmentation and  the  idea of a  ‘hard core’ 
Europe.  
From a UK perspective,  the most prudent course  is to  insist on the  integrity of the acquis and the 
primacy of EU obligations over other political or legal instruments amongst Europeans, on the basis 
that the  liberal economic character of the acquis, and the  level playing‐field  it provides, serves the 
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UK’s  interests well. The demonstrable utility and moral  capital which  the EU has built over more 
than half a century should help ensure that Britain will find many allies for this argument. What  is 
more,  the  unitary  model  has  proven  its  ability  to  accommodate  multiple  forms  of  integration 
(Schengen, EMU, CFSP, aspects of  JHA) outside  its  ‘core’  competences and  indeed has  formalised 
arrangements for pioneer groups through the ‘enhanced cooperation’ provisions of the Treaties. The 













that  the UK’s keen  interest  in,  for example,  the single market and an effective competition policy, 
are safeguarded.  
Third, the Commission has been a powerful force and ally for economic liberalism, structural reform 
and  free  trade. This  is not widely understood by  the British public;  in  the printed media at  least, 
memories  of  the  Delors  Commission’s  activist  approach  to  social  legislation  die  hard.  But  that 
chapter  is closed and  is  likely  to  remain so, barring a seismic shift  to  the  left  in  the Commission’s 
complexion over the next few years, which is improbable.  
After a short‐lived and unhappy flirtation in the early 2000s with a UK‐ France‐Germany directoire ‐ 
no  longer an option  in an EU of 27 ‐ the UK  is now  in a better position to understand, following  its 
self‐exclusion from the Fiscal Compact and the fears about marginalisation which this has raised, the 








governance  going  beyond  the  Fiscal  Compact  requirement  of  balanced  national  budgets,  tight 
surveillance and automatic  sanctions  for excessive deficits, will be  required. At present, however, 






that  the member  states would  fail  to draw  from  the  eurozone  crisis  the obvious  conclusion  that 
countries  should  in  future avoid moral hazard and  take  full  responsibility  for  their own economic 
management.  As  for  the  more  radical  ideas  for  European  economic  governance  intermittently 





financial  actor  –  should  not  only  be  to  urge  clarity  in  the  Europe‐wide  debate  about  further 




interdependence  with  its  eurozone  and  fiscal  compact  partners.  But,  to  be  effective,  the  UK’s 
contribution to the debate (however intergovernmentalist or ‘eurosceptic’) should be presented in a 








education, welfare, pensions,  law and order  and defence,  along with most  areas of  taxation, will 
remain matters of national competence, and there  is no serious suggestion, even from federalists, 
that these should be revisited. (N.B. Whilst the communitisation in recent years of much EU activity 




directly  on  the  lives  of  the  citizen,  with  all  the  opportunities  for  political  contestation  and 
mobilisation which these present, is of major significance: it constitutes a potentially insurmountable 
obstacle  to  the ambition of building a  legitimate political union on  the  foundations of a European 
‘demos’.  And  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  proud  and  ancient  nation  states  (with  the  possible 
exception  of  Germany)  are  yet  ready  to  endorse  the  establishment  of  potentially  competitive 
institutions with an equal claim to democratic legitimacy.  
There are further reasons why a top‐down or mechanistic pursuit of a European demos  is  likely to 
remain  counter‐productive.  Ideas  such  as  the  direct  election  of  the  president  of  the  European 
Commission by European voters, or even of the president of the European Council, run straight into 
a number of difficulties.  
First,  their  adoption would  require  treaty  change  ‐  a  fraught  and uncertain process,  as European 
leaders have learned to their cost on many occasions over the last twenty years.  
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Second,  the  assumption  that  a  democratically  elected  Commission  or  Council  president  would 
command functional (as opposed to titular) legitimacy rests on the heroic assumption that levels of 






Third,  the well‐documented  and much‐analysed  decline  in  voter  turnout  at  European  Parliament 
elections  reminds  us  of  the  inherent  difficulty  in  building  the  legitimacy  and  credibility  of  a 
majoritarian  institution  which  handles  predominantly  low‐salience  issues  (even  when  its  powers 
have  steadily  increased  under  successive  treaties).  It  also  illustrates  the  difficulties  already 
experienced by the main actors and channels of contestation  in any putative European demos: the 
pan‐European party  groups. Whilst  the European People’s Party,  the Party of European  Socialists 
and  the  Alliance  of  Liberals  and  Democrats  for  Europe  are  able  to  agree  broad  statements  of 
principles  and  values,  they  find  it  much  harder  to  achieve  internal  consensus  around  concrete 
policies  from  which  European  voters  can  be  invited  to  make  a  clear  and  decisive  choice. 
Furthermore, party labels can be misleading: it could be more logical for a supporter of free trade to 
vote for a Scandinavian social democratic MP than for a French centre‐right MEP.  
So  it  is  by  no means  clear  that  European  political  parties  are  yet  in  a  position  to  upload  to  the 
European  level  their national  function of  articulating  clear policy options  and  aggregating  voters’ 
choices. This  is to say nothing of the lack of interest in politics shown by most citizens, most of the 
time,  in well‐ordered polities  ‐  let alone  in European Parliament elections. And even  if the political 
parties  were  more  effective  actors  on  the  European  stage,  we  are  drawn  inexorably  to  the 
conclusion that whilst the continuation, de minimis, of the present ‘passive consensus’ within a full‐
fledged  economic union  looks  very precarious, most of  the  innovations now being  canvassed  for 
addressing the even larger democratic deficit which would be opened up by full economic union risk 
disappointing  expectations  and  alienating  public  opinion  –  thereby  encouraging  the  centrifugal 
forces which such innovations were designed to reverse.  
6.  Institutional reform and public consent need to be pursued  in tandem and not  left entirely to 
post facto legitimation in the form of parliamentary ratification or a referendum.  
It  is  unrealistic  and  ultimately  futile  to  posit  any  set  of  institutional  arrangements  as  being 
appropriate  for  the UK  independently of  the  likelihood of  these  securing public endorsement. For 
any  new  set  of  EU  institutional  arrangements  to  command  public  consent  across  the  European 
Union and, more particularly, in the UK, with its particular concerns about sovereignty, the rationale 
of  institutional  reforms needs  to be explained and set out  in advance of  the  ‘end game’ of  treaty 
negotiations  in  an  Inter‐Governmental  Conference  (IGC).  In  the UK,  this will  require  a  degree  of 
public  information which  successive governments have  shirked, on  the grounds  that  such activity 
could be seen as ‘propaganda’. This has led to the curious and regrettable situation in which one of 
the two central planks of UK foreign policy ‐ membership of the EU (alongside membership of NATO) 
‐  has  never  been  properly  explained  to  British  citizens  –  and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  EU 
membership not only provides benefits for UK consumers but also creates rights for UK citizens.  
To  succeed  in  its  objective,  any  public  information  campaign  about  the  EU  should  explain  the 
centrality of institutions and law in the European project, given the need to lock in the commitments 
of  the  member  states  and  to  prevent  free‐riding  and  cheating.  Such  an  explanation  should  be 







A  combination  of  enlargement  fatigue,  the  distractions  of  the  eurozone,  concerns  about 
uncontrolled migration and  the  social  integration of minorities, and more general  fears about  the 
sustainability of the whole European project has chipped away at the EU’s most compelling narrative 
since  the Single Market programme and  risks undermining  its  international profile as an effective 
normative  power.  This  presents  a  real  obstacle  to  continued  enlargement  beyond  Croatia  and, 
possibly, Iceland.  
For  the Western  Balkans,  the  accession  process will  be  kept  alive  procedurally  by  the  European 
Commission, which  remains a committed but  increasingly  low‐profile supporter of enlargement.  If 
substantive progress  is to be made, there  is no substitute for high‐level support from the member 





In  order  merely  to  retain  a  realistic  medium‐to‐long  term  prospect  of  membership  for  aspirant 
countries,  the UK government needs  to explain why EU enlargement  is a win‐win  scenario, not a 
zero‐sum game; how  the EU has built  its  success on an open  and outward‐looking mindset; how 
transitional arrangements can be put in place to ease problems of absorption and adaptation (as in 
Germany and Austria after 2004); and how stability and prosperity  in  the western Balkans, on  the 
EU’s doorstep, is of vital interest to the EU’s existing members. 
The  case  of  Turkey,  historically  part  of  Europe’s  ‘Other’, was more  problematic  even  before  EU 
accession  negotiations  stalled  over  Cyprus,  European  concerns  about  civil  liberties  and  the 
treatment of  journalists  in Turkey  intensified, and Turkey’s  commitment  to a western orientation 
began  to  look  equivocal.  The  question  of  Turkey’s  ultimate  geopolitical  choice  (western,  middle 
eastern, or eurasian/pan‐turkic)  is unlikely  to be  resolved definitively and  is  in any case simplistic: 
there  is no  reason why Turkey  should not pursue  several  strategic vocations, whilst privileging  its 
western one. But  if Turkey’s EU accession  is not  to wither on  the vine,  the present  stand‐off will 
need to be overcome before its exclusion from the EU becomes a self‐fulfilling prophecy.  
The case for Turkey’s EU membership remains compelling: it is in the EU’s interest that as important 
an economic player and commercial partner should  join  the EU  (for  the same reason  it  joined  the 
customs union  in 1995);  that as  influential and  increasingly  important a geopolitical player should 





Written evidence from Nucleus 
Summary of submission: 
• The events of the December 2011 European Council meeting were not so 
much a ‘watershed’ as a missed opportunity, emblematic of the long-term 
approach of the UK to EU-level policy. 
• Whilst the UK has increasingly isolated itself from key EU decisions, there are 
plenty of reasons to be optimistic that the UK can still play a vital, and leading 
role in shaping the outcome of the eurozone crisis. 
• The UK’s current approach to EU-level policy-making has negative 
consequences for both the UK and the EU itself. 
• It is the approach, not the policy detail, of the UK Government, that has done 
most to isolate it from its European allies. 
• An informal two-tier EU already exists. This flexibility is part of its strength. 
• A formalised two-tier EU – with the eurozone 17 at the heart of decision 
making, with the 10 euro ‘outs’ excluded – would dramatically alter the focus 
of the EU, and have disastrous consequences for the UK. 
• The euro is a key priority of the EU, and it is extremely unlikely that it would 
be allowed to fail. 
• Before the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and the burst of asset bubbles in 
Ireland and Spain the euro had reportedly become the most widely held 
currency and the de facto second reserve currency. 
• The US and China have continually shown their support for the euro, both 
verbally and practically. 
• The UK Government’s outright rejection of the fiscal compact was unwise, 
given its effect on those outside the common currency as well as within. 
• The uncertainty over ratification of the fiscal compact by its signatories may 
present an opportunity for the UK to re-involve itself in negotiations. 
 
About the submitter: 
Nucleus is a euro-realist campaign organisation that seeks to promote a positive and 
pragmatic approach by the UK towards membership of the EU, other European 
institutions and diplomatic relations with key member states. Nucleus brings together 
various euro-realist voices, and provides a platform for figures from business, media, 
academia and politics. Nucleus is an independent, private not-for-profit organisation. 
We are not affiliated with, nor do we receive any funding from, any Government, 
political party, or European institution. Our activities are funded entirely by 
donations from the private sector. 
Our team includes senior figures from Westminster, think-tanks, media, and business. 
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Recommendations for action by the Government or others which the submitter 
would like the Committee to consider for inclusion in its report to the House: 
The Eurozone crisis has brought fresh focus on the entire EU project and reopened 
questions about the role of national parliaments - indeed, the role of citizens - in 
European policy-making. These questions are, naturally, most urgent for countries 
like Italy and Greece. For Britain, however, the situation provides an opportunity to 
promote a new understanding of what the EU does, how Parliament can influence it 
and how Britain can enhance her role in the process. 
The Conservative Party’s position is clear: we seek a changed relationship with a 
reformed EU, but at present we have an important and influential role inside the 
Union and wish to remain full-fledged members. However, such is the mistrust of 
"Brussels" and everything to do with the EU today, that there is little appetite amongst 
Tory MPs to fully understand how the EU actually works - and how to use 
parliamentary power to change it. Indeed few MPs seem even to be aware of the 
power Parliament now yields, following enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, in 
influencing or even blocking EU legislation particularly if it joins forces with just nine 
other EU countries. If we are honest, UK MPs are generally not interested in EU 
details. Few visit Brussels, few speak European languages well and few bother to 
exploit networking opportunities in other capital cities with like-minded politicians. 
Consequently we do our citizens a disservice by providing inadequate oversight and 
influence over what the EU does. 
Consequently the party is not as good at changing EU policy upstream as it should be, 
but excels at complaining about the same policy when it becomes law. Such a 
"complain-but-don't-change" policy is clearly not in Britain's interests considering 
that around 10% of all UK law determined along with 50% of all business legislation is 
decided in Brussels. 
A new approach is now needed. If we are to fully master all the EU mechanisms at our 
disposal then a clear strategy must be given, which allows Government Ministers, the 
civil service and Parliament to contribute towards shaping, tempering or indeed 
rejecting proposed EU legislation emanating from Brussels.  
This means, firstly, improving the current (underpowered) system of EU scrutiny; 
and, secondly, a cultural shift towards engagement, which will assist in projecting 
Britain’s national interests in EU decision-making and encouraging other member 
states to support us in the process. 
Essentially we must understand the (EU) beast in order to better tame it and improve 
its ‘democratic deficit’. MPs must be encouraged and rewarded for developing a 
specialism and building influence in European capitals. We must get away from 
reducing every debate on EU legislation to the broken record of quibbling about our 
fundamental relationship with the EU. This rhetoric undermines progress made by 
the Conservative-led government in enhancing our influence in Brussels through 
UKREP, the influence of British EU officials and ad hoc alliance building with other 
member states. It also overshadows the critical role we play as one of the three big 
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players in the EU. Germany and France need us. In a whole variety of areas from 
security to climate change we are the "lead" nation. The Lisbon Treaty also fully 
recognizes the case for so called ‘European Localism’1 the antidote to centralization. 
But to date there has been no voice providing a constructive plan to maximize British 
interests and influence with the Europe we have today, not the Europe some might 
want to have in the future. 
If we are in it – then we must be committed to deliver on our priorities and aims. If we 
are committed we can lead. If we lead we project influence. This paper considers how 
that enhanced commitment might start. 
Questions: 
To what extent should the December 2011 European Council and its outcome be seen as 
a watershed in the UK's EU policy and place in the Union? 
The ‘veto’ of December last year, ought not to be considered a “watershed”, as the 
outcome of the European Council was emblematic of the UK’s approach to European-
level politics under this Government. Rather, this should be seen as a missed 
opportunity for the UK to exert its influence in any meaningful sense, and a 
dangerous step towards self-propelled isolation on the sidelines. 
Prime Minister David Cameron issued a rallying cry for a “time for boldness”,2 then 
meekly retreated. Despite what the UK media overwhelmingly presented, the UK 
Government was not alone in its reservations; but what is striking is that when it 
could have indeed spoken for a large number of fellow member states, and provided 
leadership in an obvious vacuum, the government failed to rise to the occasion. 
It was this approach, especially the failure to seek out and win allies in advance and 
during the negotiations and the last-minute nature of the UK’s demands, rather than 
the substance of the UK views, which cast Britain into self-imposed exile from the 
negotiating table. 
However, whilst the UK has increasingly isolated itself from key EU decisions, there 
are plenty of reasons to be optimistic that the UK can still play a vital, and leading role 
in shaping the outcome of the eurozone crisis. There has been (often justified) 
criticism among its partners that the UK government is carping and lecturing from 
the sidelines but these partners remain anxious for Britain to offer its wisdom and 
expertise – in financial services above all - in a co-operative spirit. This was true, 
particularly of Berlin and other capitals, in the run-up to and even during the 
December 2011 ‘summit’. Since then too, there was the single market letter, signed by 
David Cameron and eleven fellow European Prime Ministers. However, so far, the 
UK’s approach to EU-level policy-making has had and continues to have negative 
consequences for both the UK and the EU itself. ‘Annoyance’ has become the oft-
repeated way to describe the feelings of our EU partners towards the UK. 
                                                        




Between now and 2020, what institutional architecture and membership should the UK 
seek for the EU? Should the UK embrace a formalised two (or more)-tier EU and start to 
develop ideas for multiple forms of EU membership? 
The FAC is correct to use the term “formalised”, as a two-tier – also referred to as a 
multi-speed – EU already exists in many senses. The most obvious example of this is 
the division between the 17 members of the eurozone and the ten non-members or 
“outs”. But there are others such as membership of NATO or the Schengen ‘passport-
free’ area. 
Bence Nemeth, of the Defence Planning Department of the Hungarian Ministry of 
Defence, has argued that the Anglo-French military co-operation treaty has created a 
‘two-tier Europe’ insofar as foreign and security policy is concerned.3 Tracing the 
development of a two-tier structure back further, Dr Michael J. Geary, (lecturer in 
history of European integration at Maastricht University), and Kevin A. Lees, 
(Associate, Latham and Watkins LLP in Washington, D.C), have written: 
By the 1990s, a two-tier EU was already emerging, which became an enshrined 
reality by the early 2000s when it became clear that Britain had not only firmly 
opted out of not just the single currency, but also rejected the Schengen 
Agreement on the removal of border controls within the EU and had scoffed 
at a Europe-wide foreign policy.4  
This might also be applied to other countries such as Denmark, Sweden in the case of 
the euro – or Ireland regarding NATO. 
It is our opinion, however, that a two-speed EU, based around those embracing closer 
fiscal union, and those who do not, would formalise a two-tier structure. This would 
undoubtedly have strongly negative consequences for the UK – we would likely see 
the 17 eurozone countries driving decision-making, while the 10 euro "outs", of which 
we are one, are not even in the room, let alone at the table. This is already happening 
to a large extent – much to the consternation of “outs” such as Poland, which are 
bound to join the EZ sooner or later. 
The centre of gravity of the EU has – since the onset of the eurozone crisis – moved 
away from the leaders of the 27 member states in the European Council towards what 
are now known as the EZ-17. The agreement amongst those eurozone states over ten 
steps to formalise how the EZ should be run, and a decision that EZ summits will take 
place at least twice a year separately and not necessarily concurrently with European 







policies, including on growth and competitiveness, has dramatically shifted the centre 
of power within the EU to an organ in which the UK has no place and no voice. 
For an image of what this would be like, we need only look to history, and the 
founding of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) as an alternative to membership of 
the then EEC. The UK quickly realised that influence and opportunity for growth 
were limited by being outside the core EU decision-making process, and began to 
pursue membership. Britain would be in danger of becoming “Greater Switzerland”: 
bound by the rules of the EU and, indeed, the EZ but having no influence over the 
latter and, increasingly, over even those of the former. 
What is the relationship between the new 'fiscal compact' Treaty and the EU's acquis? 
What impact might the conclusion of the 'fiscal compact' Treaty have on other aspects of 
the EU and its policies, such as the EU budget, enlargement, or the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy? 
The ‘fiscal compact’s’ effect is to politicise the single market. Clearly, the fiscal 
compact draws upon and enhances previous EU policies and treaty provisions such as 
the Maastricht criteria, the Stability & Growth Pact and the recently adopted “Six 
Pack” (already in the process of being amplified). The “European Semester” hands 
extensive powers to Brussels to oversee and influence the budget process in member 
states. These powers are even more extensive in the case of Greece and other Member 
States subject to the “bailout/rescue” programmes, including those of the EFSF and 
soon-to-be ESM. 
Arguably, they prefigure a fully-fledged EU federal state. The EU – including many of 
the current “outs”, future members and actual or potential applicants who are all 
treaty-bound to join - is engaged in a process of monetary integration which might 
soon be coupled with fiscal and political union. No matter what the immediate and 
short term problems of the eurozone (and its institutional architecture) are, the EZ 
and its single currency are so systemically important for the EU (and global) economy 
that it is a matter of when rather than whether the zone will sort itself out and 
continue its path towards becoming a global reserve currency. (More than a quarter of 
reserves are already in euro-denominated assets.) 
Before the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and the burst of asset bubbles in Ireland and 
Spain the euro had reportedly become the most widely held currency and the de facto 
second reserve currency. It has maintained that status throughout the financial and 
debt crisis of 2008 and 2010 and it has also kept its value, while global powers like the 
US and China have verbally and practically shown their confidence in the euro. 
As a result we will soon find ourselves in a world where the global economy will be 
dominated by two, maybe three, currencies: the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese 
renminbi/yuan. This would be a situation that could contribute to the re-balancing of 
the global economy, away from the current uni-polar and destabilising system 
towards a more sustainable multi-polar system. 
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The question is what happens to relatively declining economies like Britain's, with a 
freely floating currency, when they get caught up in the headwinds of those three 
global reserve currencies and the enormous economies that underpin them.5 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick has written:  
The global financial and economic crisis which engulfed the world in 2008 
would have tested the European Union severely whether or not the single 
currency had by that time been established. So it makes no sense to blame the 
euro for everything that has happened. Nor can any of the European Union's 
twenty seven governments afford to neglect that it is in our collective interest 
that the Eurozone should survive and prosper and avoid a chaotic collapse 
which would damage all of us. The hard fact nevertheless remains that, for the 
foreseeable future, the European Union is going to consist of member states 
within the Eurozone and member states outside it; and, since it is unlikely that 
the errors of premature admission to the Eurozone will be repeated, that 
foreseeable future could be a long time indeed, so we had better get used to 
that and learn to live with it to our mutual benefit, minimising the differences 
between the two groups. In that context the British coalition government's 
decision to reject the fiscal union treaty was unwise, given that the different 
obligations on the two groups are clearly spelled out in it. And we do all share 
the view that fiscal austerity, which is proving every bit as painful in this 
country as elsewhere in Europe, must not be regarded as an end in itself but 
rather as part of a concerted growth strategy.6 
There remains some uncertainty over the fiscal compact. Germany has sought a delay 
on a vote, and cannot now say when it will ratify – possibly in June, maybe July. The 
new French President has clearly signalled his intention to amend or, at least, amplify 
the treaty; the ratification process is incomplete. A compact will be agreed though, 
whether in its current form or otherwise. Any delay presents an opportunity for the 
UK to return to the negotiating table and, this time, help shape the outcome in a more 
constructive manner. 
However, it is also clear that the closer union of those signed up to the fiscal compact 
will have a growing influence on the future direction of the EU’s organs and policy-
making. The budget will largely be decided within its framework, future enlargement 
will require new member states to meet stricter financial criteria from the very 
beginning, even long before entry, and, by its very nature, this “inner club” will begin 
to dominate all areas of EU policy and decision-making. The question then arises 
whether the UK should actively support and participate in this integration process or, 
as in the last 40 years, with exceptions such as the Single European Act, continue to 







Should the UK Government support the incorporation of the 'fiscal compact' Treaty into 
the EU Treaties? If it should, what demands and safeguards, if any, should it make its 
condition for doing so? 
Nucleus firmly believes that the UK should play a positive but not uncritical role 
within the current – and future – EU. This requires a substantial shift from the 
position adopted at the December 8-9 2011 “summit”: Britain should now support the 
inclusion of the compact within the existing treaty framework. The compact’s 
provisions will provide greater stability to the EZ and that, as the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor constantly remind us, is in the UK’s vital interests. 
However, certain safeguards – notably over parliamentary control over the budget 
process – must be retained. In the absence of a full fiscal and indeed political union 
the old adage of no taxation without representation applies to no small degree. We do 
not share the view that – in a multipolar, highly complex globalised world – national 
sovereignty is an absolute. But the British legislature and executive must retain control 
over the national budgetary process and influence monetary policy while we remain 
outside the EZ/euro. There can be no question of the European Commission holding 
a veto on that process. The same holds true, obviously, for the decision to go to war or 
engage in peace-keeping operations with partners. 




Written evidence from Sir Peter Marshall KCMG, CVO 
 
I hope you will permit me, as someone who has followed with great enthusiasm the 
work of the Committee, to express to you my delight at your decision to launch this 
inquiry into The future of the European Union: UK Government policy.  
 
First, its timing: “by conducting an inquiry at this stage, we hope to contribute to 
public debate by airing some of the options that might be available to UK policy-
makers”. That is of particular relevance in the light of the inquiry into the Lisbon 
Treaty undertaken by the previous Committee, and of their clear dissatisfaction at the 
lateness of the stage at which they were able to express an opinion. Anyone familiar 
with the work of the Select Committees readily understands their key importance, not 
only in the service which they render directly to the House of Commons, but also 
more widely in enlightening and shaping public opinion in matters of great weight 
and complexity. Timing is of the essence. 
 
Secondly, the background. You call attention to “a widespread sense that the 
Eurozone crisis and the December 2011 European Council have raised fundamental 
questions about the future of the EU and the UK’s place in it”. The causes of the 
disquiet now so generally felt are manifold. They also go back a long way: 2013 will 
mark the fortieth anniversary of UK accession to the EEC, an appropriate juncture at 
which to make a general assessment. More fundamentally, 2014 will be the poignant 
centenary of the outbreak of the Great War, with all its disastrous consequences. It 
cannot fail to sharpen memories of the upheavals and the suffering endured by the 
peoples of Europe during so much of the twentieth century, and cast fresh inquiring 
light on the relevance to our own day of the pressures which ensued for European 
integration. It is a sombre thought that disaffection in a minor part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire led to much of Europe going up in flames. It is a no less sombre 
thought that Greece, a mere 2% of the Eurozone GDP, has the G8 by the ears.  
 
Thirdly, while attention to the historical perspective does not reduce their urgency, it 
would nonetheless suggest that the four questions on which in particular, the 
Announcement notes, evidence would be welcome represent in a very real sense the 
tip of the iceberg. That helps to explain the extraordinary way in which the Eurozone 
crisis has developed, or has been allowed to develop. Such have been the scale and 
rapidity of the crisis, any answer to the four questions must inevitably involve a 
measure of second-guessing of governments or even of electorates. 
 
Fourthly, you speak, Mr Chairman, for the vast majority of our compatriots in stating 
that you were starting from the assumption that the UK should and will remain an EU 
Member. That is a broad judgement, not a narrow one. To approach the question of 
member ship of the EU as if it was only a matter of whether we should, or should not, 
be part of the Brussels institutions, or of whether we should, or should not, acquiesce 
in any particular amendment of them, is to adopt an essentially two-dimensional 
approach to a three-dimensional problem. There is more to our stake in Europe than 
the EU. There is likewise far more to the EU than l’acquis communautaire.  
 
Fifthly, by virtue of their mandate, and of the skilled and imaginative way in which 
they are discharging it, the Committee under your leadership have acquired a unique 
understanding of the interplay between ends, ways and means in British diplomacy, 
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and of the broad political and social context, both national and international, which 
modern world wide interdependence demands of the conduct of foreign policy. These 
are factors which have in the past too often been ignored or underestimated in the 
conduct of our European policy. 
  
These considerations prompt the submission to you of two lines of thought. First, 
while concentration on the policy options that might be available to UK policy-
makers has great practical value, are the Committee not ideally placed at the same 
time to contribute to public debate on the wider issues involved in the future of the 
EU and Britain’s place in it? 
 
Secondly, could that contribution with advantage extend not only to the substance of 
our relations with our European partners, but also to the management of them? It is 
clear that the over-polarised and divisive debate on the issues which has largely 
prevailed in this country has weakened the influence which we can exert in Europe. 
Why is it, we should ask ourselves, that we have so far failed to achieve in our 
dealings with our European partners the same type of broad ad hoc, ex post/ex ante, 
de facto/de jure consensus which we have managed in virtually every other major 
aspect of our international involvement? 
 
These lines of thought in their turn point to a yet more basic consideration. We may 
have reached a stage in the debate on our European involvement at which it is 
appropriate to seek the expert impartial assessment and advice which only an 
authoritative high level body set up exclusively for that purpose, and with adequate 
resources and time at its disposal, is in a position to furnish?  
 
A study of the appointment over the years of Royal Commissions in the UK and 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth suggests that the criteria for the utilisation of this 
eminent vehicle are less than clear cut. The principal factor seems to be the perception 
that a particular situation requires the response that only a body of the consequence of 
a Royal Commission can provide, or help to provide. The present state of our relations 
with our European Partners can be a case in point. The publication of the findings of a 
Royal Commission during the lifetime of this Parliament would be an enormous help 
in the next general election. 
 
I am acutely aware that, for all the effort to make it both brief and self-contained, a 
submission of this kind to the Committee cannot but rest on a wide and detailed 
analysis of the relevant factors, which of necessity would be of a length putting it 
beyond the normal compass. I have therefore offered to the most admirable staff of 
the Committee a memorandum, prepared in the first instance for my fellow members 
of the FCO Association, that is to say, the Diplomatic Service alumni, addressing the 
issues in greater detail. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed with this letter. 
 
 
Memorandum for the FCO Association on the inquiry launched by the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee into the future of the European Union: 
UK Government policy 
 
As our Chairman noted in his report to the AGM, the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee have launched an inquiry into the future of the European Union 
and UK government policy. The brief text of the Select Committee Announcement, 
dated March 28, 2012, repays close attention. The timing is significant. The 
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Committee’s hope is that by conducting an inquiry at this stage they may be able “to 
contribute to public debate by airing some of the options that might be available to 
UK policy-makers”.  
 
The Committee have invited the submission of written evidence by May 22. Although 
time is limited, the case is a strong one for responses where possible from members of 
the Association. But that of course is by no means the end of the matter. The subject 
as a whole is on-going. It is as massive as it is complex. Boredom will not be a 
problem in the foreseeable future. We are under the ancient Chinese curse “may you 
live in interesting times”. 
 
The background, as it would seem to affect the membership of the Association in 
particular, is explored in this memorandum under three headings: Opportunity; 





(a) One of the many respects in which we are fortunate indeed to have William 
Hague as Foreign Secretary is that he is the first holder of that office to make a strong 
positive point about the value of the alumni. The strong historical sense which 
pervades his speeches is not only greatly reassuring in itself, but also gives added 
weight to the practical steps, in pursuit of clearly articulated objectives and priorities, 
which he outlines in them. He and his Ministerial colleagues are a team for which 
anyone who values the work of the Diplomatic Service should be profoundly grateful. 
Never before has a chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
subsequently become an FCO Minister, as is the case with David Howell. 
 
(b) The present Foreign Affairs Committee is likewise unprecedented in its 
expert, detailed and supportive scrutiny of the work of the Diplomatic Service in the 
pursuit of UK international priorities, which are advisedly extensive, despite the 
financial exigencies which are likely to beset us for years to come. The Committee’s 
work testifies to a precious ability to look simultaneously at the ends, ways and means 
of diplomacy in the broad political and social context, both national and international, 
which world interdependence demands. We should be much encouraged that the 
Committee set store by the experience and the opinions of the alumni, and have 
promised to let the Association know about future inquiries. 
 
(c) Past experience of discussion of the UK role in the EU suggest that it can 
easily generate more heat than light. However after years of polarisation and a 
dialogue virtually of the deaf, there is a great deal of constructive thinking and 
discussion. I make no apology for referring in particular to the recent seminar at 
Europe House, organised by Civitatis International, on the theme “The Future of 
Europe: towards the European Dream?”, which I had the honour of chairing. The 
contributions of the four main speakers – Edward Mortimer, Daniel Ottolenghi, 
Maurice Fraser and Christopher Coker - taken individually and collectively, were 
outstanding. Still less do I apologise for drawing attention to the “Eurogazing” 
missives circulated to members of the Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust by its 
indefatigable Secretary, Win Burton. All in all, one is conscious of a hint of consensus 





II Context: (i) political and diplomatic 
 
(a) In the announcement of the inquiry, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Richard Ottaway, observed that “there is a widespread sense that the 
Eurozone crisis and the December 2011 European Council have raised fundamental 
questions about the EU and the UK’s place in it”. That observation becomes more 
pertinent day by day.  
 
(b) Next year we shall mark the fortieth anniversary of UK accession to the EEC. 
The anniversary will stimulate much further analysis. 2014 will be the centenary of 
the outbreak of the Great War, which will prompt even more profound questions 
about our European involvement. Have Sir Edward Grey’s lamps, which went out all 
over Europe in 1914, been lit again? What would Eyre Crowe have to say now for our 
guidance? It is a sobering thought that disaffection in a minor part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire led to much of Europe going up in flames. Today Greece, which 
accounts for some 2% of Eurozone GDP, has the G8 by the ears. There must be better 
ways of running the railroad. 
 
(c) In the meantime let us go back fifty years. On December 5, 1962, in a speech 
at West Point, Dean Acheson waspishly remarked that “Britain had lost an Empire 
and not yet found a role”. His comment was ill-received in this country at the time, 
not least because it was uncomfortably near the truth. There seemed to be no let-up in 
our post-war adversities. The Plowden Committee to examine our future overseas 
representation had just been appointed. Our standing aside from the EEC and the 
creation of EFTA meant that Europe could be said literally to be at Sixes and Sevens. 
De Gaulle’s veto of our first application to join the EEC was only a month away.  
  
(d) Matters are somewhat better now. We have a perception, both realistic and 
responsible, of the scale and nature of our international involvement in a world of 
growing interdependence, or, to put it more picturesquely, in the Global Village. Our 
perception of course has its continuities with the past. But it is in the main very 
different from our prevailing notions of a century ago.  
 
(e) The best measure in the twenty-first century of this transformation is to be 
found in the ground-breaking White Paper on UK international priorities published by 
Jack Straw, one of our patrons, during his Foreign Secretaryship, in December, 2003 
(in which our present Permanent Under-Secretary had a noteworthy part) and its 
sequel in March, 2006. Detailed study of both these wide-ranging texts continues to 
be rewarding. The policy of the Coalition, comprehensively outlined in 2010, has a 
good deal in common with them. The same overall approach is convincingly endorsed 
in the lecture delivered at Ditchley last year by Sir John Major, another of our patrons. 
In all these documents our relations with our European partners are seen as integral to 
our international involvement as a whole, and not as some external, unwelcome, yet 
overriding, priority.  
 
(f) The FAC Chairman speaks for the overwhelming majority of our compatriots 
in stating that he was “starting from the assumption that the UK should and will 
remain an EU member”. Exactly what this implies must be approached from a number 
of different standpoints. It certainly does not suggest that there can or should be a 
single view on the major issues of the day The Committee’s announcement lists at the 
outset four burning questions on which in particular evidence would be welcome. The 
rapidity and invasiveness of developments even since March 28 are such that any 
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reply to these questions could not but be highly speculative, and require a measure of 
second-guessing of governments, or even of electorates. No two members of our 
association would be likely to come up with exactly the same answers. The idea of a 
collective Association view is fanciful.  
 
(g) We need surely to give more attention to the shortcomings of discussion in 
this country of European issues. Historians surveying our record on the fortieth 
anniversary of our accession to the EEC are unlikely to shower us with compliments 
on our handling of business. They would be bound to draw attention instead to the 
divisiveness, the sterility even, of much of the debate, when the commonality of 
interest is so great and so promising. Sir Edward Heath said at the outset that he 
would not wish to take Britain into the EEC without the “full-hearted consent of the 
British parliament and people” . He soon changed his tune, averring that a single vote 
was enough.  
  
(h) The requirement has in reality always been to nurture an approach to the EU 
embodying the same ad hoc, de facto/de jure, ex post/ex ante broad consensus we 
have achieved in almost every other major aspect of our international involvement. 
Within such a compass, there will inevitably be considerable differences of analysis 
and a plethora of prescriptions. Once again, the idea of a single view on such a 
massive array of interrelated topics is fanciful. It is however the overall consensus 
which is crucial. Without it, our impact on European counsels is much more limited. 
With it, we can be more confident that what we have to say will receive greater 
attention. Failure so far to achieve such a consensus has cost us dear.  
 
 
III Context: (ii) public and social 
 
(a) Reaching a consensus on how best to involve ourselves in the EU is not the 
elitist preserve of policy-makers. Public opinion and the public mood are becoming an 
increasingly important factor in virtually every aspect of foreign policy-making. Yet 
failure to carry people with you, and indeed the deliberate riding roughshod over the 
views of voters and what are firmly seen as their democratic rights, have in recent 
years been the besetting sins of the EU. 
 
(b) In the 21st century we are hearing more than ever before about national 
solidarity, the maintenance of which is indispensable for security as well as 
prosperity. There is increased willingness to examine our EU policy, not only in the 
context of Britain’s international involvement generally, but also in the light of the 
necessity of fostering national values and the social cohesion essential to the 
discharge of our international responsibilities. It is a far cry from classical diplomacy.  
 
(c) In EU terminology this is a matter of l’esprit communautaire in dialogue with 
l’ acquis communautaire . We have heard little or nothing in recent years about the 
former: the latter, principally in the shape of a raft of treaties and their ensuing 
regulatory moves – the Single European Act, followed by the Treaties of Maastricht, 
of Amsterdam, of Nice, of Lisbon and the current fiscal compact - has squeezed it out. 
That is the antithesis of the creation step-by-step of a de facto solidarity envisaged by 




(d) EU Heads of Government fully recognised the importance of securing public 
support or acquiescence for this fuite en avant, inspired and engineered by Jacques 
Delors in his long tenure of the office of President of the European Commission.  
 
(e) The European Council Declarations of Nice (December, 2000) and Laeken 
(January, 2002), on the eve of major enlargement to the East, followed up by the 
Declaration of Berlin on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the 
Treaty of Rome (March, 2007), dwelt on the twin necessities of fulfilling our 
international responsibilities abroad and of bringing the EU institutions nearer the 
people at home. The outcome is distressingly different. Inward-looking institution-
mongering, eventually enshrined in the Lisbon treaty, itself stubbornly adhering to the 
precepts of the Constitutional Treaty spectacularly rejected by the voters of France 
and the Netherlands, has absorbed an inordinate amount of time and attention. The 
Eurozone is now, and is likely for some time to come to remain, the major headache 
of the international financial and business community. The EU institutions, very 
largely by their own fault, have never been further than they now are from the public 
in the member countries.  
 
(f) Developing within the UK a broad ad hoc, de facto/de jure, ex post/ex ante 
national consensus on EU matters will be a mighty multi-faceted task. But we have a 
no less mighty weapon available to help meet it in the shape of the richness of our 
heritage, of our creativity, of our adaptability and of our diversity. We are a happy 
breed. In recent years we have had limited success in expressing that noble truth in 
our European involvement.  
 
(g) Co-operation among the major faiths has an important part to play in this 
quest, especially as regards the role of Christianity, and historically, of Christendom. 
On February 18 the Archbishop of Canterbury brought together at Lambeth Palace 
representatives of the nine major faiths on the occasion of a visit by The Queen and 
the Duke of Edinburgh as part of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations. As Dr Rowan 
Williams observed, 
 
it was an unprecedented gathering here within these walls, but it was one 
which certainly revealed the degree to which our society has changed quite 
radically in terms of its religious composition, just within the last 60 years. It 
was an event which highlighted both the religious diversity of our society and 
the willingness to integrate, represented by the elements within that diversity”.  
 
The text of The Queen’s short address to the gathering is highly satisfying food for 
thought. 
 
(h) In November, 2009, Notre Europe, a think-tank of which Jacques Delors is the 
Founding President, issued a Declaration which can be regarded as an authoritative 
orthodox formulation of the post-Lisbon mission of the EU in the 21st century. It 
asserts that “the condition for success is to rediscover ... the Community method, a 
virtuous and dynamic counterpoint between the three institutions responsible for the 
well-being of the Union and its people”, a triangle formed by the Council, the 
Parliament and the Commission, each body “newly strengthened ... and led by men 
and women freshly summoned for the task”.  
 
(j) Matters have not worked out that way. The thesis itself is seriously flawed in 
at least two respects. First, the Declaration makes no mention of the European Court 
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of Justice. The Court’s powers, enhanced by the wide extra discretion conferred on it 
in the Treaty of Lisbon, constitute probably the greatest stumbling block to the willing 
public acceptance of the Union’s institutions as a whole.  
 
(k) Second, there is no hint of a popular dimension to the problem. We are 
concerned not with a virtuous and dynamic triangle, but with an irregular 
quadrilateral, the fourth side being composed of the people of the Union in numerous 
configurations, Europe-wide, national, regional and local, and with interests and 
preoccupations far removed from institutional fine-tuning in Brussels.  
 
(l) In our own country the establishment of the Supreme Court in the old 
Middlesex Guildhall offers us a lively example of the quadrilateral in what can be 
called the Allegory of Parliament Square. To the East is the Legislature; to the North, 
the Executive; to the West, the Judiciary; and to the South, Westminster Abbey. It 
comprises, in what many people think of as the Parish Church of the Nation, a Royal 
Peculiar, the Seat of Monarchy, the chief National Shrine, homage to excellence and 
sacrifice, and a beacon in modern society.  
 
(m) In her message on Accession Day, The Queen expressed the hope that “this 
Jubilee year will be a time to give thanks for the great advances that have been made 
since 1952 and to look forward to the future with clear head and warm heart as we 
join together in our celebrations”. That surely applies as much to our involvement in 
the EU as to any other aspect of our national life.  
 
 
IV The Image of the Diplomatic Service and its Alumni: three FAC Inquiries 
 
Thirdly, a word about our own concerns as a Diplomatic Service. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee has, within a relatively short span, launched three related inquiries into 
policy matters which, though by no means the sole concern to the FCO/Diplomatic 
Service, are very much in our bailiwick: the first was concerned with the role of the 
FCO in UK government; the second is considering the role and future of the 
Commonwealth; the third is the present EU inquiry. They need of course to be looked 
at synoptically. 
 
(a) Until recently the FCO was not so much getting a bad press on account of its 
shortcomings as being the subject of concern on account of the difficulties created for 
it by No 10 and the Treasury. In evidence submitted to the Committee, I listed three in 
particular of what I described as the “present discontents”: sofa diplomacy in No 10, 
managerialism and what Douglas Hurd, yet another patron, called “the hollowing out 
of the FCO”. One of the last recommendations made by the FAC in the previous 
Parliament was that the new government should “carry out a comprehensive foreign 
policy-led review of the structures, functions and priorities of the FCO, MOD and 
DFID”.  
  
(b) I am not aware that the new government responded directly to this 
recommendation. But William Hague and his ministerial colleagues at once grasped 
all the main nettles. The discontents were rapidly remedied. A new atmosphere 
prevailed.  
 
(c ) The new Foreign Affairs Committee, for their part, sprang early into action. 
They immediately launched an inquiry into the Role of the FCO in UK Government. 
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The Committee’s report was published a year ago, actually on the day of our last 
AGM. The directness of the report is refreshing. Its main conclusions were that there 
was indeed a significant role for the FCO/Diplomatic Service and that we were 
significantly underfunded for its adequate fulfilment.  
 
(d) The moment however was hardly propitious for demanding an immediate 
large increase in the FCO budget. But the question remained whether the 
FCO/Diplomatic Service had been sufficiently robust in recent years in defending our 
legitimate interests, or sufficiently comprehensive in the discharge of our 
responsibilities.  
 
(e) In this context it is relevant to recall the point noted by the previous Foreign 
Affairs Committee that “among the 30 Member States of the OECD only one other – 
Germany - has a fully-fledged ministry of international development, with all the 
others maintaining agencies or departments that in one way or another fall under the 
authority of the foreign ministry”.  
 
(f) The reasons for this state of affairs may be numerous. But chief among them is 
undoubtedly the failure of the FCO adequately to understand either the emergence of 
what was aptly termed “the third world coalition” - the collective actions and the 
pressures of the countries newly acquiring their independence and eager to join 
others, similarly desirous of expressing their sovereignty and of securing a “level 
playing field” internationally - or the ever-widening concept of “development”. The 
chief consequence in practical terms of this failure is the grotesque discrepancy 
between the expanded funding lavished on the DFID on the one hand, and the penury 
visited on the Diplomatic Service on the other.  
 
(g) The second of the three inquiries directly affecting us was launched by the 
FAC on December 8. It addresses the role and future of the Commonwealth, and was 
prompted by what was widely thought of as the disappointing outcome of the biennial 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth (Western Australia) last 
October. The Committee will take its time about reporting, not least because of what 
may emerge in this Diamond Jubilee Year.  
 
(h) Although they will deservedly commend Ministers for their stance on the 
Commonwealth putting the “C” back into the FCO, the Committee are likely to be 
unenthusiastic about the performance as a whole of the FCO over the years. The 
Commonwealth has been seriously neglected. In one halcyon year – I name no names, 
nor date no dates – the word “Commonwealth” did not appear in the Annual 
Departmental Report except in the term “Foreign and Commonwealth Office”. 
 
(j) The third is the EU inquiry, launched on March 28. The particular context is 
the outcome of the December EU Council meeting and the consequences of the 
British “veto”. It must be said that the Committee can hardly ignore the general public 
perception in this country of the FCO as having been unduly influenced by, and ready 
to endorse, the actions and ambitions of Brussels. Former members of the Diplomatic 
Service, especially those who have served in UKREP, have been vociferous in their 









This brief survey of the issues involved in the Foreign Affairs Committee EU inquiry 
suggests a number of areas in which we as alumni are well placed to make a 
contribution, individually if not collectively, to the on-going debate. And let us not 
feel inhibited about discussing these matters among ourselves. How about, for 
example, a laid-back exchange of views on some low-key question such as “will 
future historians cast Jacques Delors in the role of Pied Piper of Brussels?”  
 
Finally, what of the Diplomatic Service itself? Perhaps Hollywood mogul Sam 
Goldwyn sums up our position: “the last thing I think about is money - pause - before 
I fall asleep”.  
 
















Written evidence from Professor Pauline Schnapper, Sorbonne Nouvelle University, Paris 
 
Pauline SCHNAPPER, Professor of British Studies at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University, Paris. I 
have been doing research on the UK and the EU since I completed a PhD in International Relations 
at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po Paris) in 1997, having spent two years at St Antony’s 
College, Oxford. I published among other books and articles: La Grande-Bretagne et l’Europe: le 
grand malentendu (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2000) and British Political Parties and National 
Identity: A Changing Discourse (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2011). 
Summary 
- The decision of the present government to reject the fiscal stability pact signed by the other 26 EU 
members in December 2011 was unprecedented. 
- It has led to Britain being isolated in the EU, which cannot be in its long-term interest. 
- The EU has actually evolved in a ‘British’ direction in the last 15 years, a fact often overlooked in 
the public debate. 
- The UK government should not let itself be drawn, for party political reasons, into an even more 
remote corner but play a full part in EU developments which are clearly in the national interest, 
such as CFSP, the single market, the future EU budget, etc. 
 
 
1. The refusal of the coalition government to sign the fiscal stability pact agreed by the other 26 
European Union member-states in the midst of a major economic crisis during the December 2011 
European Council marks a turning point in the British engagement in Europe, with potentially 
long-lasting consequences. The obvious risk is that Britain will find itself isolated and incapable of 
exercising influence in an organisation which weighs heavily on its economy and provides it with an 
opportunity to increase its clout on the world scene. 
2. It was the first time that a British government chose not to opt out from some aspects of a treaty 
but completely withdraw from a negotiation since it joined the EC in 1973. Neither Margaret 
Thatcher nor John Major had in effect adopted such an empty chair policy in spite of their 
reservations, to say the least, towards plans for further integration in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
They always chose, whatever the rethoric, to try to influence negotiations from the inside, hoping 
thus to advance what were defined as British interests - the single market, deregulation, reform of 




3. Arguably, David Cameron was in a different situation last December since the UK is not part of 
the eurozone and therefore not as directly affected by measures destined to help resolve the crisis as 
eurozone members. In theory it also pursues an independent monetary and budgetary policy, with 
no obligation to follow rules that apply to others. The well-known truth is, as acknowledged by 
David Cameron and William Hague themselves, that the British economy is totally interdependent 
with that of the eurozone countries and that it is definitely not in the British interest to see the 
eurozone collapse - whatever the gleeful predictions of some eurosceptics. It could therefore have 
been argued that the national interest made it imperative to sign the treaty. The other argument 
used, that the treaty failed to protect the interests of the City of London, ‘threatened’ by new 
regulations, was also debatable. On the one hand it is not obvious that the interests of the City 
totally overlap with the interests of the British economy as a whole, as underlined at the time by 
some British business worried about British isolation in Europe. Secondly, it is not certain either 
that EU plans for financial regulation are contrary to British consumers’ interests. There should at 
least have been a debate on whether obsession with the protection of interests of the City can 
become counter productive. 
4. It is clear therefore that the decision to stay out of the treaty was taken not so much for economic 
reasons as for party political ones, which raises once again the issue of British euroscepticism, in its 
different guises, and the constraints it imposes on governments. There is still a widely shared 
perception in the UK that membership of the EU is a pragmatic adaptation to international 
economic pressures but that it fundamentally undermines the sovereignty of Westminster and the 
identity of Britain. In this view membership offers some advantages, such as access to a wide and 
expanding market conducive to growth, but the scope of the EU, or at least of Britain's involvement 
to it, should be curtailed. The EU is seen as an obstacle to the UK's full enjoyment of the benefits of 
globalisation and open markets. The Conservative party has entrenched this 'soft' euroscepticism in 
its DNA since the late 1990s, while some in the party as well as its direct competitor in the electoral 
field, UKIP, campaign for a complete withdrawal from the EU. I do not believe that it is a 
reasonable reflection of the situation Britain finds itself in as a member of the EU. 
5. The reality of the EU is much more complex than this vision suggests. Eurosceptics ignore the 
fact that the EU has actually become much closer to the model that they favour than it was twenty 
years ago and that the federal dream is to a large extent dead. The European Union is now much 
more intergovernmental, in spite of or thanks to enlargement, than federalists hoped for. In 
institutional terms, this evolution can be traced back to the Nice treaty (2000), when big EU 
countries, including Britain, secured a majority of votes in the European Council, thus preventing a 
coalition of small countries from potentially outvoting them in the future. Voters throughout 
Europe have become much more wary of European integration, for both good and bad reasons, as 
illustrated in opinion polls, European Parliament elections and referendum results, which imposes 
heavy constraints on what all governments are ready to accept in the EU. Britain is not alone in 
resisting moves towards more integration – France under Presidents Chirac and especially Sarkozy 
has reasserted the importance of intergovernmentalism in the EU, contributing to a weakening of 
the Commission. Britain is therefore less ‘different’ than its politicians think from a new 
mainstream Europe. 
 
6. In the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, it is difficult to assess the future for Britain in the EU. 
Provided the whole euro project does not collapse, more budgetary and tax integration is likely in 
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the eurozone. This deepening of integration among some member states should not push Britain 
even further to the margins than it already dangerously is. In a European Union which would 
become de facto multi-tier, Britain should remain a central player in all the other crucial sectors 
dealt with at the EU level. This includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, where the UK is 
a crucial player and has a vital interest in improving the efficiency of the current system, if only for 
economic reasons. Bilateral cooperation with France, however positive, will not be enough to reduce 
costs and improve European defence within NATO. The CFSP offers an opportunity to encourage 
other EU members, notably Germany, to improve burden-sharing. It also includes cooperation in 
the former ‘third pillar’, home and justice affairs, where Britain has enjoyed the ‘best of both worlds’ 
(to use Andrew Geddes’ phrase) in being able to opt in or out of EU directives. British input into the 
EU will also be necessary in decision-making about the budget and single market issues in general if 
the government is to push the EU towards Britain-friendly policies. 
7. The long-term economic and political interests of Britain and Europe in general require 
continued engagement in the EU, not the dogmatic opposition to anything European, based on an 
outdated vision of an illusionary ‘superstate’, which is too often heard in the British media and on 
some Parliamentary benches. The British government should acknowledge how much the EU has 
changed since the 1990s and the extent to which the debate about sovereignty is out of step with a 
globalised world in which individual European nations are not major players. The debate about 
organising a referendum on whether to stay in the EU is equally surreal – leaving aside the debate 
about the merits of referenda in general in solving complex issues - when considered within the 
global environment. This is marked by the relative decline of ‘the West’, the rise of emerging 
countries and an economic crisis unprecedented since the 1930s. In this context Britain’s active 
participation in the EU is more necessary than ever. 



































2.1 BNE  is  an  independent  coalition  of  business  leaders  advocating  a  positive  case  for  reform  in 






2.3 We  are  involved  in  a wide  range  of  advocacy  activities  to  provide  a  platform  for  debate  on 








trade, Britain’s  relationship with  the  EU,  European  foreign  affairs  and  comments on  these  issues 
regularly  in  the media. Phillip Souta would be happy  to appear before  the  Select Committee and 
provide oral evidence on this submission.  
 
2.5  BNE  appreciates  the  opportunity  to  put  forward  evidence  and  will  focus  on  advocating:  (a) 
positive and engaged approach to the UK government’s relationship with the EU; (b) specific policy 
areas that the UK government should prioritise as critical to the future of the EU: the Single Market, 















− A  January  2012  report  commissioned  by  the  Norwegian  government1  highlighted  major 
drawbacks of  their agreement with  the EU  stemming  from not having a  seat at  the  table 











3.1.2  The  pursuit  of  opt  outs  is  a  red  herring  and  the UK  government must  shift  the  current 
debate towards a more constructive agenda, primarily focused on achieving better growth. 
 
− According  to  the Office  for National Statistics,  the UK’s  real GDP has  stagnated  for nearly 













in  the  UK’s  interests.  With  this  in  mind,  the  future  of  UK  government  policy  on  our 
membership of the EU should not be about renegotiation, it should be about reform.  
 
− As  3.2  notes  in  greater  detail,  the  EU  is  the  UK’s  largest  trading  partner  and  the  single 
market adds over €600 billion  to  the UK economy annually.  It  is  in  the UK’s best  interests 
that the EU overcomes the crisis and regains competitiveness in the global economy.  
 
3.2  The  European  single  market  is  vital  to  the  UK  economy  and  plays  a  major  role  in  the 














Shionogi,  which  is  currently  rolling  out  a  five‐year  global  expansion  plan.  In  July 
2012, Shionogi announced  that  they would  set up  their European headquarters  in 
London  because  of  London’s  strong  infrastructure,  outstanding  talent  and  “easy 













− The  failure  to  complete  a  digital  single  market  in  the  EU  has  the  potential—under 
cautious assumptions—to cost Europe at  least 4.1% of GDP by 2020 due to the  lack of 








− We  strongly  encourage  the UK  government  to  fully  support  the  goals  of  the  ‘Digital 
Agenda  for  Europe’,2  from  improving  cross‐border  online  transactions  to  the 








































































































































− The UK  should  remain  fully  engaged  in  the  operation  of  the  European  Banking Authority, 
which  works  with  the  national  regulators  of  all  the  EU’s  27  member  states  to  prevent 
regulatory arbitrage and help maintain a level playing field. 
 
− The  UK  should  seek  to  establish  whether  there  is  any  risk  of  a  European  Banking  Union 
creating barriers to eurozone banks which currently have operations in the UK. 
 
3.6 Negotiations on the next long‐term EU budget ‘The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–
2020 (MFF)’ are ongoing.  We encourage the UK government to push for the EU to avoid raising 
the size of the MFF to reflect the impact of the current fiscal pressures on member states.  
 
− This submission recognizes that areas such as energy, the digital agenda, innovation and 
research play a significant role in the success of productivity, growth and unemployment levels 
in the EU and individual member states alike.  
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− However, future EU spending must offset the current times of austerity and policies, such as 
CAP, that are not conducive to long‐term prosperity should be reduced.  
 
3.7 In order to pursue this realistic, pragmatic and positive approach to the UK’s membership in 
the EU, British influence towards and within the EU institutions is paramount.  We strongly 
encourage the Government to proactively push for greater UK representation at the EU level 
alongside building a better platform to encourage the importance of this domestically.  
 
3.7.1 Whilst a European Commission official is of course required to act on behalf of the interest 
of the EU as a whole, rather than that of his/her member state, the official naturally reflects 
his/her national perspective and culture in his/her daily interactions.  Without national 
perspectives represented in each institution, the institution would not act on behalf of the Union 
as a whole. Regrettably, the number of British officials within the institutions, namely the 
European Commission, is dwindling at an astonishing pace.  
 
− The UK represents 12% of the population of the EU but holds only 5% of posts within the 
institutions.   
 
− These figures are only deteriorating and UK representation in new EU institutions, namely the 
European Financial Supervisory Authorities, is also a worry to the British business 
community.   
 
3.7.2 The main issues behind this lack of overall representation include the following and all of 
these reasons fall on a background of an overall national negative perception of the EU: 
 
3.7.2.1 The 1972 intake of British citizens is close to retirement.  
 
3.7.2.2 The Concours examination must be taken in French or German. 
 
3.7.2.3 The awareness of career opportunities at universities is poor and secondments 
within the Civil Service to Brussels are not encouraged.   
   
3.7.3 BNE has worked with the UK Government, both in London and Brussels, on this issue for the 
past two years.  We will continue to push this agenda and encourage continued government 
support.  
 
− We applaud the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the UK Permanent Representation to 
the EU in placing such a priority and resources to achieving the objective of greater UK 
representation in the EU.   
 
− Following representations made by our members, we welcome the introduction of 
mandatory foreign language learning in the English Baccalaureate and we support the 
government’s drive to work with universities, including the College of Europe, to create 
awareness of the many EU career possibilities open to UK graduates.   
 
− We also welcome the support given in the establishment of the British Brussels Network.  This 
network seeks to provide a platform for debate on EU issues from a British perspective in 
Brussels and has been successful in doing so over the past year. 
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3.7.4 Whilst the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has made noticeable progress in highlighting 
the need to address this subject, BNE seeks to ensure that this priority is heard across 
Government.  We strongly recommend that further action be taken as follows:  
 
3.7.4.1 The Civil Service should explore the possibility of requiring civil servants to work on 
EU issues at some point during his/her career development, whether it is through 
secondment or training.  
 
3.7.4.2 The Government must seek to ensure that the new financial supervisory authorities 
are staffed appropriately.  This is of upmost importance because without the continuation 
and strengthening of this drive, British influence within Europe is bound to diminish. 
 
10 July 2012 
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